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APOLLOSPACECRA'T 
l'hf o;llilt't'craft (S 'n con~i~l!I of " launch fllcapr Iyltfm (LEI) aslem­
hh', commltn" mudule' (e: !tol), '1f'rnrf modulf' (11M), and the IIpacf'craftl 
lunar module' Itd.. !>I,'; (SI.A), !'ht' 1.t!!l a!I!lfmbly pro\'idt~ lhe munl for 
rapitll\ st'parOllin)l Ihl' c: 'M from Ih,' S 'M durin" pad or lIuborbilal aborts, . 
I hI' C \1 Imm~ Ihl' ..pOll'" 1..11 ('1m II"! n'nll'r. conlalO5 ntCfsllary aUlo­
malit' OInd manual I'qulpm.'nl 10 ('(>ullol and monilor thf .pactcrah 
~vslfms. and ('OOlalOS Iht' r!'ljUlled t'qulpmt'nl lor salt'IY and u,mforl 01 
Iht' nt'w, I'h,' S '\I i" a q'lindrical slrUClurt' local('(\ bl'twt'l'n Ihl' C/M 
and Ihl' SI.A, II, HIlIOlin, rill' propul"lOn svsll'ms for allitudl' and vt'loc­
ilv chOlnll.e malleU\'NS. !tolm.l ..f Iht' nmsumahll's USl'd in Ihl' mission arl' 
siored in Ih .. S '\1. I'he SI A i~ 01 Irunrall'd cone whidl connt'cts tht' 
S, 'M 10 Ihe I .. unl h "'hll'l", It ..1"0 Jlt<>\'ides Ihl' spacl' whl'rl'in Ihl' lunar 
module (I, '\1) i, (drried on lunar mission", 
TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT 
Spar't'naf! OIZ "'" "o<k,,·,oill~ a "Plu)\s OUI Inlegraled Tl'sl" al Ihe 
lim.. 01 Ihe ,H' "kill 1m .I01llUar, 'l.i, 19tii. Opt-ralional Checkout Procl" 
dUll'. d""ill.nOlIt·d OCP to·K-0021·) applied 10 this 11'51. Within this 
le!'on Ihi" pwct'dur.. is often ref,'ned 10 as OCP-0021. 
TESTS AND ANAL YSES 
Resuhs or l~slS and allahse" nOI compll'le at Ihe time of publication 
of Ihis rt'pon will he conlained in App<"ndix G. Addl'nda and Corrigl'nda. 
CONVERSION OF TIME 
Throu)lhoul Ihis lepOr!, I iml' is slated in Grl'l'nwich Mt'an Timl' (GMT). 
To lom'en GMT to Ea-,Iern Standard Timt' (i.ST). subtract 17 hours• 
•'or example. 23:31 GMT convl'rtl'd is 6:31 p.m. EST. 
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INDEX OF WITt'lESSES 

STATEMENTS ENCLOSED 

Number Name Organization Position Location During Accident 
1 Babbitt, Donald O. NAA Project Engineer, 
Pad Leader 
Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
2 Gleaves, James D. NAA Mechanical Lead Tech­
nician 
Adjustable Level AS, Service 
Structure 
3 Curatolo, Lewis NAA Project Engineer, 
Pad Leader 
..Adjustable Level AS, Service 
Structure 
• 
• 
4 
5 
6 
Reece, L. D. 
Hagar, Richard A. 
Bachand, Richard L. 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA 
Systems Technician 
Systems Technician, 
(Electrician) 
Systems Technician 
Adjustable Level AS, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
7 Clemmons, Stephen B. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
8 Cromer, James Earl PAA Elevator Technician 200-foot 
Tower 
Level, Umbilical 
9 Pleasant, Joseph H. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
10 Davis, Bruce W. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
11 Hickenbottom, 
Friend Dale 
NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
• 12 Hawkins, Jerry W. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
13 Brown, W. Donald NAA Mechanical Inspector Command Module - Adjust­
able Level A8 
14 Owens, Jessie L. NAA Systems Engineer Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
15 Hedlund, Robert C. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
16 Markovich, John E. NASA QC Inspector Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
.. Left Adjustable Level A8 at 1730. Returned to relieve Babbitt at approximately 1838 . 
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17 Stoeckl, Joseph L. 

18 Rogers, Henry H., Jr. 

19 Journey, Creed A. 

22 Schneider, William J. 

21 Howard, Dave E. 

22 Scott, J. C. 

23 Bass, Robert I. 

24 McConnell, John C. 

25 Belt, Burt B. 

26 Rackleff, George W. 

27 Williams, Samuel 

28 Rooker, Forrest R. 

29 Wingfield, William H. 

30 Nelson, Marvin L. 

31 Mitchell, Patrick E. 

32 Deaver, William C. 

33 Medcalf, Willis M. 

34 Foster, Robert C. 

35 Chauvin, Clarence A. 
NASA 
NASA 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA-Tulsa 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA 
NASA 
NASA 
NAA 
NAA 
NAA 
NASA/KSC 
QC Inspector 
QC Inspector 
Electrical Leadman 
GSE Technician 
Systems Technician 
QC Inspector 
Systems Technician 
GSE Technician 
GSE Leadman 
Systems Technician 
GSE Technician 
GSE Technician 
GSE Electrical 
Technician 
QC Inspector 
QC Inspector 
Electronic Technician 
Mechanical Technician 
QC Inspector 
Test Conductor 
Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A8, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure 
• 
200 Foot 
Tower 
Level, Umbilical 
Umbilical Tower 
Level 
190 Foot 
Elevator, 2nd Level, Pad 34 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A5 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure • 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure 
Adjustable Level A7, Service 
Structure 
Elevator (3rd level going up 
to A8) Complex 34 
Complex 34 Fuel Area 
Acceptance Checkout Equip­
ment, Room 1, MSO Bldg. 
36 Schick, William H. 
37 Propst, Gary W. 
38 Caswell, Alan R. 
39 Slayton, Donald K. 
40 Cain, DarylO. 
41 Jones, Donald R. 
42 Eybel, Charles G.,Jr. 
and Rubio, Jose Manuel 
43 JOMlan, Albert E. 
44 West, LeRoy G. 
45 Burch, James A., Jr. 
46 Mooney, James C. 
• 
NASA/KSC 
(DLO) 
RCA 
RCA 
NASAIMSC 
NAA 
NASA/KSC 
GE 
NASA/KSC 
NAA 
PAA 
PAA 
Assistant Test 
Supervisor 
Technician, OTV, 
Control Racks 
Communications 
Controller 
Director of Flight 
Crew Operations 
Spacecraft Test 
Conductor (017) 
Chief, S-IVB, Elect­
trical Systems 
Technical Audio 
Monitors 
LVO Measuring In­
strumentation Engineer 
Spacecraft Technician 
Fireman 
Asst. Chief, Fire Dept. 
Test Supervisor's Console 
LCC 34 Blockhouse 
Communication Control 
Racks LC 34 Blockhouse 
Communication Control 
Racks LC 34 Blockhouse 
Astronaut Console - LCC 34 
Acceptance Checkout Equip­
ment Room 2, MSO Bldg. 
LC 34 Blockhouse, VIP 
Room 
CIF Building 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34, Level A-8 at Ingress 
Cape Kennedy Fire Station 
Cape Kennedy Fire Station 
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INDEX OF WITNESSES STATEMENTS IN GENERAL FILE 

Name 
Allen, Ernest E. 
Anderson, Robert L. III 
Barwick, Dean E. 
Bishop, Charles M. 
.. 
Blasky, M. 
Blocker, R. D. 
Brinda, W. 
Broadbent, Joseph W. 
Brown, William O. 
Brunais, Ellsworth G. 
Bunyak, R. S. 
Carothers, Dale 
.. 
Cheesborough, Richard S. 
• 
Childers, Leonard H., Jr. 
Coleman, Gerald C. 
Conely, F. E. 
Coonce, James M. 
Dillon, James E. 
A. 
Organization 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
Douglas 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
NASA/KSC 
NASA/KSC 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
Douglas 
NASA/KSC 
Chrysler 
T.V. MONITORS 
Position 

Supervisor 

Technician 

Flight Crew 

Systems Engineer 
S-IB Events Display 
Console Monitor 
Associate Engineer 
Scientist 
S- IVB Stage Historian 
Engineer, Measuring 
Panel Monitor 

Console Operator 

OIS Monitor 

Flight Control 

Console Monitor 
Propulsion Panel 

Monitor 

Spacecraft Test 

Conductor 
ST-I84-M Systems 
Engineer 
Monitor Swing Arm 
Panels 
Branch Chief 
Development Engineer 
S-IV B Test 
Conductor 
Operator Console A4 
ECS Technician 
Location During Accident 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
CIF Building Room 307 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
ACE Control Room #1 MSO 
Bldg. 
CIF Building Room 307 
Complex 34 Trailer 1-048 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Donnelly, Paul C. NASA/KSC Launch Operations 
Manager LC 34 Blockhouse 
Eddy, Robert W. Chrysler Monitor, Firing 
Panels LC 34 Blockhouse 
Edson, William NAA Test Conductor ACE Control Room 1MSO 
Elliott, John G. Douglas Supervisor, IB, Mech­
anics & Reliability CIF Building 
Eri, Donald G. RCA Manager RCA Oper­
ations LCC 34 and 37 LC 34 
Gaskins, R. B. NASA/KSC Test Project Engineer 
(SIC 017) Observation Room 2MSO 
Gay, Charles D. NASA/KSC Chief, Spacecraft Test 
Conductor LC 34 Blockhouse 
Gehres, Charles E. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse 
Grant, Fred C. Douglas Associate Engineer 
Scientist CIF Building Room 307 
Gruene, Hans F. Dr. NASA/KSC Director, Launch 
Vehicle Operations LC 34 Blockhouse 
Harris, Robert V. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse 
Hoenstine, T.V. IBM I.D. Measuring and 
Tracking Panel Operator LC 34 Blockhouse 
J atulso, A. J. Douglas Electronics Supervisor LC 34 Blockhouse 
Jolly, Dennis M. NAA Environmental Control 
System Engineer ACE Control Room 1MSO 
Jumpa,J.J. GE/ASD ACE Display Monitor LC 34 Blockhouse 
.. 
Kapryan, Walter J. NASA/MSC Assistant Apollo 
Program Manager LC 34 Blockhouse 
• 
Kelley, James A. NASA/KSC Monitor TV Console LC 34 Blockhouse 
King, John W. NASA/KSC Chief Public Information LC 34 Blockhouse 
Kleinschmidt, ClL. Douglas Group Engineer -
ORD/HYD LC 34 Blockhouse 
Kranzfelder, William J. AC Electronics Associate Project ACE Control Room 
Engineer (G&N) 1 MSO 
Kuznicki, Henry S. NAA Test Conductor ACE Control Room 
1 MSO 
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Lealman, Roy E. NASA/KSC Electrical Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse 
Lee, Chet M. NASA Hqs. Observer LC 34 Blockhouse 
Levetto, Mario J ., J r. Chrysler Technician ECS LC 34 Blockhouse 
Linsday, Thomas H. Jr. NAA Lead Engineer ­
Procedures LC 34 Blockhouse 
McDonald, Randolph D. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse 
McCreary, Martin E. NASA/KSC SII Electrical Systems LC 34 Blockhouse 
McNally, Edward Chrysler Swing Arm Electrical 
Design Monitor CIF Room 307 
McNeely, Maurice L. Douglas Mechanical Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse 
Martin, Virgil M. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse 
Mason, Lyman, H. Chrysler Electrical Monitor CIF Room 307 
Mercier, Alfred B. Chrysler Console Operator LC 34 Blockhouse 
Meyer, George C. PAA Pad Safety LC 34 Blockhouse 
Miller, K.J. NASA/KSC Electrical Engineer OIS Monitor LC 34 
Monshor, Raymond M. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse 
Moser, Robert E. NASA/KSC Apollo/Saturn Test 
Manager LC 34 Blockhouse 
Neely, R. D. Chrysler Technician Firing Room LC 34 
Blockhouse 
Nelson, Isaac H. Chrysler Water Control Panel 
Operator LC 34 Blockhouse 
Orman, Donald L. NASA/KSC Engineer, G&C LC 34 Blockhouse 
Page, George F. NASA/KSC Test Supervisor LC 34 Blockhouse 
Parker, Marion, J. Chrysler Fluid & Pneumatics 
Group Electrical Unit CIF Room 208 
.. 
Payne, Viron E. NASA/KSC Test Support Controller LC 34 Blockhouse 
Peacock, Max J . Chrysler S-IB Test Conductor LC 34 . Blockhouse 
Perry, Earl M. Chrysler Monitor, Propellant 
Event Display Panel LC 34 Blockhouse 
Petrone, Rocco A. NASA/KSC Director of Launch 
Operations LC 34 Blockhouse 
Ragusa, James M. NASA/KSC Engineer (Egress 
Committee) LC 34 Blockhouse 
Rengers, William C. Chrysler Monitor, SIB Pro­
pellant Dispersion 
Panel LC 34 Blockhouse 
Rockwell, Richard G. Chrysler Procedure Coordinator LC 34 Blockhouse 
Roosa, Stuart A., Capt. NASA/MSC Astronaut LC 34 Blockhouse 
Sassard, Jack P. FEC Technician LC 34 Blockhouse 
Schiedel, Gerald F. NASA/KSC Test Conductor, ACE Control Room 
Spacecraft 017 2MSO 
Scoville, Donald A. NASA/KSC Mechanical Systems 
Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse • 
Siskind, Jay S. NASA/KSC Electrical Systems 
Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse 
Smith, George E. Chrysler Power Supply & Launch 
Sequence Panel Operator LC 34 Blockhouse 
Smith, Joe R. NASA/KSC Staff/Director of 
Information Systems LC 34 Blockhouse 
Smith, Wallace S. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse 
Talone, John J. NASA Program Coordinator CIF Building 
with MSFC Room 307 
Terry, James F. NASA/KSC Guidance & Control 
Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse 
Toback, D.S. IBM. Technician, Telemetry LC 34 Blockhouse 
Turner, Charles A. General Egress Committee LC 34 Blockhouse 
Electric 
Turner, John T. NASA/KSC Flight Compo Systems 
Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse 
Weaver, Billy H. Douglas Test Planning and CIF Buidling Room 
Evaluation 307 
Williams, Michael F. NAA Flight Test Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse 
Wilson, Virgil C. Chrysler Console Supervisor LC 34 Blockhouse 
Yount, Lawrence H. Chrysler Manager, Launch Systems LC 34 Blockhouse 
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Name 

Barber, Chester E. 

Branch, Robert B. 

Crane, John D. 

Daniher, Pete M. 

Eldridge, Robert T. 

Gillespie, Dallas K. 

• 
Ham, Edwin J. 

Kelley, Dean W. 

Kelley, John E. 

Kemppainen, Willard K. 
Leckie, G.E. 
Lindemann, Vincent J. 
Martin, Obrey E. 
• 
Matson, Claude D. 
Pendleton, Philip L. 
Perkins, William J. 
Rogers, Lyman F. 
Roof, Jesse M., Jr. 
Schlict, Wilber G. 
B. 
Organization 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
IBM 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
Douglas 
FEC 
AUDIO WITNESSES 
Position 

Technician 

Acting SIOT 
Electronics Tech. 
VehicIe Checkout 
Engineer 
Technician 
Assistant SlOT 
Technician (SIOR 
Recorder Operator 
Technician 
Technician Umbilical 
Eject Test 
Engineer (Egress 
Monitor) 
Technician 
Flight Control 
Recorder Operator 
Technician 
Technician 

Technician 

Technician 

SI Quality 

Surveillance 
Engineer, GSE 
Technician 
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Location During Accident 
LC 34 Service Structure 
1st Floor West Side 
LC 34 OAT Room 152-foot 
Level 
LC 34 116-{oot Level 
LC 34 Measuring Station 
LC 34 116-{oot Level 
LC 34 OAT Room 152-£oot 
Level 
LC 34 OAT Station 152­
foot Level 
LC 34, 152-foot Level 
LC 34 88-foot Level 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 IU OAT Station 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34, Support Bldg. Room 
123 
LC 34, 116-(oot Level 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Measuring Station 
LC 34 House Trailer 
LC 34 Level A-4 outside 
IU door 
LC 34, AGCS Area 
Tipton, Charles J. 
Whitaker, Billy B. 
Whitehead, Claudius D. III 
Name 

Aderhold, T. R. 

Anderson, Deal L. 

Barnum, George V. 

Batts, Bruce H. 

Beavan, Harry E. 

Bilbrey, H.F. 

Blankenship, James R. 

Bohlmann, R.R. 

Brandon, R.E. 

Bruckner, H. P. 

Cain, James L. 

Caris, Robert D. 

Colevell, William E. 

Creighton, Henry C. 

Darnell, Burnard E. 

Dawes, Benny L. 

Dike,J.L. 

Douglas 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
C. 
Organization 
FEC 
Bendix 
Douglas 
PAA 
PAA 
PAA 
PAA 
NASA/KSC 
NAA 
Bendix 
NASA/KSC 
NAA 
NAA 
NASA/KSC 
PAA 
PAA 
Douglas 
Electrical Technician 
Technician Monitor 
OIS 
Technician RF &TM 
RELATED AREAS 
Position 
Telemetry Technician 
Engineering Specialist 
(02) 
Operations 
Engineer 
Crew Chief, Fire Dept. 
Elevator Technician 
Sgt. Security Police 

Fireman 

Communications 

Engineer 
Power and Sequential 
Engineer 
Manager, Support 
Branch 

Q C Inspector 

Technician 

Technician 

Proj ect Engineer 

Security Police 
Fireman 
Propulsion Engineer 
LC 34, Level A-4 
forward interstage 
Near 
LC 
LC 
34, AGCS Trailer 609 
34 
Location During Accident 
CIF Building Room 291 
LC 34 Umbilical Tower 220­
foot Level 
LC 34, outside aft inter­
stage of Launch Vehicle 
PAA Fire Station 
• 
LC 34, Ground Level Um­
bilical Tower 
LC 34 Level A-4 
'PAA Fire Station 
ACE Control Room 1 MSO 
ACE Control Room 1 MSO 
Unknown 
LC Q C Trailer 
LC 34 Ist Level 
.. 
Home 
VIP Room of Control Room 
1 MSO Building 
LC 34 Main Gate 
P AA Fire Station 
LC 34 inside SIVB Aft Inter­
stage 
B -14 
Fannin, Lionel E. 
Fultz, James D., Jr. 
Gallagher, Martin E. Dr. 
Goodwin, Gewin H. 
Gorman, George W. 
Gornto, Jack P. 
Guidry, Mark 
Hanna, Paul R. 
Hennigan, Thomas R. 
Hinton, J .H. 
Hipp, W.L. 
Hughes, Maynard S. 
J ames, George H. 
Jennings, J .B. 
Jones, 	 Ronald H. 
Kincaid, Randal L. 
• 	 McMillan, Kenneth C. 
McMyler, William F. 
• 
Mills, 	 Edmunc;l B., Jr. 
Minnich, William T., Jr. 
Moody, Samuel P., Jr. 
Moore, 	Dan L. 
NASA/KSC 
NAA 
PAA 
NAA 
Chrysler 
PAA 
NASAjKSC 
PAA 
PAA 
Bendix 
PAA 
PAA 
NASA/KSC 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
PAA 
Bendix 
Douglas 
NAA 
NAA 
Douglas 
Mechanical Engineer 
Spacecraft Technician 
PAA Doctor 
Technician 
Q C Inspector 
Asst. Chief Fire 
Department 
Electrical Sequential 
Systems Engineer 
Fireman 
Security Policeman 
Manager, Propellant 
Syst. Component Dept. 
Chief, Fire Department 
Supervisor 
Q C Inspector 
Engineer Scientist 
ECS Technician 
Electronic Technician 
Assistant Chief, Fire Dept. 
Navigation and Control 
Test 
Electrical Leadman 
Spacecraft Technician 
Environmental Control 
System Supervisor 
Missile Technician 
LC Blockhouse Console SA 
LC 34 Level AS at Ingress 
P AA Cape Dispensary 
LC 34 - Level 7 
LC 34 Level A4 
PAA Fire Station 
ACE Control Room 1 MSO 
P AA Fire Station 
LC 34 Ground Level West 
Side 
Laboratory 
Home 
LC 34, Umbilical Tower 70' 
Level 
Ground Level of Launch Stru­
cture 
LC 34 Inside Launch 
Vehicle aft interstage 
LC 34 Service Structure 
ECS Room 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
PAA Fire Station 
CIF Building Room 307 
LC 34 inside Launch Ve­
hide aft interstage 
LC 34 Level AS at Ingress 
Office MSO Building 
LC 34 inside Launch Ve­
hicle aft interstage 
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Neal, Cecil E. 
Olson, R.D. 
Ostiguy, J .J. 
Plomer, Milt J . 
Pride, Jim 
Rector, Murray M. 

Rink, Elmer B. 

Salyer, Walter D. 

Scarborough, Robert K. 

Schmyser, Clayton F. 
Sheeley, Vester 
Sutton, Cermon S. 

Vall in, Jose 

Van Hooser,JohnC.Jr. 

Vaughn, Charles M. 

Warner, Alonzo E. 

Watts, Wilburn Virgil 

Wilde, Walter L. 

Wisenbaker, Harvey M. Jr. 

Wright, Edward E. Jr. 

Yon, TedJr. 

PAA 
Douglas 
NAA 
Douglas 
IBM 
PAA 
Bendix 
NASA/MSC 
PAA 
Chrysler 
NAA 
NASA/KSC 
NAA 
NASA/KSC 
NASA/MSC 
NAA 
Douglas 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
NAA 
Crew Chief, Fire 
Department 
Electronic Technician 
Communication 
Engineer 
Section Chief, Structural 
Mechanical 
Measuring Technician 
Fireman 
Propellant Sampler 
Suit Technician 
Pad Safety 
Technician Leadman 
Weight Engineer 
Q C Inspector S- IB 
Electrical Systems 
Engineer 
Technician-Biomed. 
Engineer, RASPO I MSC 
Electrical Power Systems 
Engineer 
Inspector, Missile Field 
Electrical Technician 
ECS Technician 
Environmental Control 
Systems Engineer 
Supervisor Mechanical 
Systems 
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Enroute from LC 
Station 
37 to Fire 
LC 34 Inside Launch Ve­
hicle aft interstage 
ACE Control Room 1 MSO 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Cruising run crew 
Home 
LC 34 Trailer 
N/E Corner of LC 
Area 
34 Pad 
LC 34 Service Structure 
152-£oot Level 
LC 34 Level A8 at Ingress 
Launch Complex 37 
Office MSO Building 
ACEControlRoom 1 MSO 
Location Unknown 
ACE Control Room 1 MSO 
LC 34 inside Launch Ve­
hicle aft interstage 
LC 34 inside Launch Ve­
hicle aft interstage 
LC 34 Service Structure 
ECS Room 
• 
• 
ACE Control Room ' 1 MSO 
White Room during Ingress 
D. MISCELLANEOUS 

Name 
Abrams, Robert D. 
Acuna, R. 
Adams, John P. 
Adrian, Kenneth R. 
... Albright, Charles G. 
Allen, R. H. 
Allen, Ronald D. 
Allshouse, Dennis W. 
• 
Alva, Martin 
Arlotti, Elio 
Arrington, H. M. 
Avery, Charles B. 
Ayling, William T . 
.. 
Baer, John D. 
Bailey, James A. 
Ball, George D. 
Ball, Melvin B. 
Banks, Samuel B. 
26H03 0 - &7 - 2 
Organization 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
FEC 
PAA 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
NASA/KSC 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Position 
Launch Operations 
Inspector 
Launch Operations 
Inspector 
Station Patching/ 
Oscillograph Monitor 
Measuring System En 
gineer (RIME) 
Technician 
Security Police 
Quali ty Surveillance 
Structure RF Technician 
RF Unit Supervisor 
Laboratory Technician 
Technician 
Support Engineer 
Launch Branch In­
spection Propellant Net­
works 
Launch Operations 
Inspector 
Flight Control Engineer 
Technician 
Magnetic Tape Recorder 
Operator 
Trailing Wire Recorder 
Operator 
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Location During Accident 
Complex 34 Launcher 
LH2 Facility 
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1 
Blockhouse 34, Rack C·24 
Blockhouse 34 2nd Floor EA 
Recorder 1 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Complex 34, Vehicle Mech. 
Off. 
Service Structure, RF Room 
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1 
At Home 
At Home 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
Complex 34 Inspection Trail· 
er 
Complex 34, PCD 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
At Home 
Blockhouse 34, GSE Station 
Blockhouse 34 C-17 
Barkdoll, Milton E. Chrysler 
Baron, Thomas Ronald N/A 
Barnes, Harold F. NASA·KSC 
Barrow, John M. NASA/KSC 
Bassett, Paul J. Chrysler 
Bauserman, C. R. NAA 
Bayless, D. A. Douglas 
Beagley, Richard C. Bendix 
Beale, W. David NASA/KSC 
Becker, Donald E. Bendix 
Bedsole, H. D. NAA 
Bell, C. H. IBM 
Bennett, John Douglas 
Benton, Edward G. Bendix 
Benziger, Ernest T. Chrysl,er 
Bielling, R. IBM 
Birch, Ken W. Douglas 
Bitterling, M. D. Douglas 
Blocher, Richard H. Bendix 
Bolster, Donalcl T. Chrysler 
Bond, Raymond H. Chrysler 
Boot, Clifford O. Chrysler 
Borland, Thomas IBM 
Monitor Hydraulic 
Recorders on SIB 
Q C Inspector 
Q C Inspector 
Supporting Test MGSE 
SPS Engineer 
Engineer Scientist 
Systems Safety Supervisor 
Instrumentation Engineer 
Chemist 
Technician 
BUTM Oscillograph 
Branch Chief 
Technician 
Launch Operations 
Inspector 
AGCS Stabilizer Panel 
Monitor 
Associate Supervisor 
Group Engineer 
Foreman 
Work Order Control 
Chrysler Test Office 
Group Leader, Technical 
Documentation Unit 
Mechanical Systems 
Technician 
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Blockhouse 34 Firing Room 
N/A 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34, LVOQualityTrail. 
er 254 
Service Structure 17' Level 
ACE Control 1 MSO 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Left Complex for Dinner 
LC 34 Computer Room 
Lab. Building H5·994 
LC 34 188-foot Level 
Blockhouse Ist floor RF sta­
tion 
LC 34 Operations Office 
South Center side of 4th ad­
justable level (34) 
Complex 34, ECS Bldg. 
AGCS 
LC 
LC 
34, Operations Office 
34 Blockhouse 
.. 
Bldg, 3-66220 (Cape) 
Complex 34, Trailer 169 
... 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
LC 
641 
34, Mechanical Trailer 
Braun, James E. 
Bouwsma, William J . 
Brecken, E. R. 
Bryan, Frank 
Bretzius, Edward D. 
Brewer, Charles W. 
Brown, Donald L. 
Brown, Julius
.. 
Bruce, David L. 
Buchanan, D. E. 
Bumgardner, Albert 
Burke, Edwin L. 
Burlington, D. 

Burmeister, Gerald A. 

Burns, Robert 

Byers, Andy 

• 
Byrd, Herman C. 
• 
Byrd, William R. 
Call, John E. 
Carlson, Norman M. 
Carlson, R. D. 
Carnes, Thomas H. 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
NASA/KSC 
Chrysler 
PAA 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
IBM 
NAA 
Chrysler 
IBM 
Douglas 
FEC 
Douglas 
NAA 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
Quality Assurance 
Technician 
DEE-6 
Engineer Hydraulics 
Panel Operator 
Electrical Engineer 
Vehicle Measuring 
Unit Supervisor 
Security Police 
Field Technician in 
MSAU 
Battery Attendant 
Propellant Sampler 
Stabilizer Panel Monitor 
Mechanical Technician 
Engineer, SIB Airborne 
Networks 
Technician 
Propulsion Engineer 
Technician 
Mechanical Technician 
Technician 
Systems Safety Supervisor 
Launch Crew Manager 
SI Test Operations 
Branch Chief 
Electronics Propulsion 
Coordinator 
AGCS Networks En· 
gineer (AINW) 
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Complex 34/37 
Blockhouse 34, Floor 2 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Service Structure, Measuring 
Station 
LC 34, 27-foot level of Service 
Structure 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
Complex 34, AGCS 
At Home 
LC 34, Rack B57, Stabilizer 
LC 34, Service Structure 
Elevator, bottom 
Service Struc;ture, Floor 2 
LC 34, AGCS 
Umbilical Tower, 100-foot 
Level 
At Home 
LC 34, Umbilical Tower, 
10th Level 
ACE Control Room 2. 
MSO Building 
Complex 37 
Blockhouse 34, VIP Room 
LC 34, Blockhouse Firing 
Room, Console A-12 
LC 34, Blockhouse, 4B Fir­
ing Room 
Blockhouse 34, Power Racks 
Carnley, Macey H. 
Carpenter, Warner H. 
Cesare, Donald E. 
Chaille, William N. 
Chaitoff, Milton 
Chambers, Milton 
Charvet, Andre John 
Clements, R. D. 
Clifford, Harold S. 
Cobrin, R. 
Collier, J. G. 
Collins, William C. 
Comptom, R. L. 
Conner, R. P. 
Conrad, Harold E. 
Cook, Ross L. 
Cooley, Dudley M. 
Correll, Carl C. 
Cortez, Romo V. 
Cottingham, Robert R. 
Cressman, John H. P. 
Crosswell, A. L. 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
Douglas 
NASA/KSC 
Douglas 
IBM 
FEC 
Douglas 
IBM 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
IBM 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
FEC 
NASA/KSC 
NASA/KSC 
Special Systems 
Q C Inspector 
Lead Man Mechanic 
Technician 
DRSC GSE Ground 
Station 
Chief, Gyro and Sta­
bilizer Systems Branch 
Technician 
Engineer 
Engineer Scientist 
Technician 
Shift Supervisor 
Electronics Technician 
Technician 
Associate Engineer 
Engineer 
BUTM FM/FM System 
Monitor 
Standby Relief Operator, 
Firing Room 
Field Technician 
(Valve Lab) 
Telemetry Technician 
ECS Measuring Monitor 
Q C Inspector 
Measuring Engineer 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
Service Structure, 152-foot 
Level 
LC 34, SS, 116-foot Level 
At Home 
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1 
CIF Building 
LC 34, SS, OAT Room 
LC 34, Support Bldg., 
Room 129 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34, Stabilizer System 
B56 
'CIF Building, Room 297 
LC 34, SS, Measuring Sta­
tion 
LC 34, Ground Computer, 
AGCS 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Complex 34, DEE-6 
LC 34, BUTM FM/FM 
Monitor 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
LC 34, Blockhouse TM 
Ground Station 
Blockhouse 34, Rack G54 
LC 34, Trailer 1-254 
Service Structure Measuring 
Station 
• 
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Cuchens, James K. Jr. 
Dahlgren, Richard S. 
Dasse, H. D. 
Dean,John O. 
Dearth, Alfred E. 
Demeo, Alan 
DiGiorgio, George R. 
Dobbs, Bruce S. 
Drott, Art G. 
Dryden, Guy 
DuPriest, W. R. 
Durnin, Chester W. 
Dybevick, Lowell H. 
Ebbert, Carl S. 
Edgar, Lawrence A. 
Edlund, L. R. 
Elder, J. 

Edmunds, Edward C., Jr. 

Ellis, W. P. 

Ely, George W. 

Bendix 
Douglas 
PAA 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
Douglas 
IBM 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
IBM 
Chrysler 
IBM 
NASA/KSC 
Life Support Technician 
Checkout Engineer 
Security Police 
Propellant Mechanic 
Vehicle Inspection 
Supervisor 
Instrumentation 
Technician 
Pneumatics System 
Engineer GSE 
Group Engineer, 
Electronics 
Engineer Scientist 
Technician 
Acting Foreman 
SIB Vehicle Instrumen­
tation Measuring Engineer 
Associate Engineer / 
Scientist 
Launch Operations 
Inspector 
Simulated Propellant 
Loading, LOX System 
Engineer I Scientist 
Technician 
ESE Measuring Unit 
Supervisor 
Technician 
Guidance and Control 
Technician 
South Center of 4th Adjust· 
able Level (Complex 34) 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Security Headquarters 
Spaceline Shop - Complex 34 
Complex 34 
LC 34, Blockhouse, DDAS 
Ground Station 
Complex 34, AGCS 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
CIF Building, Room 307 
At Home 
Service Structure, Measuring 
Station 
CIF Building 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
Blockhouse 34, LOX Racks 
LC 34 Structural Mechani­
cal Trailer 
LC 34, IU Doorway 
Blockhouse 34, C-19 
LC 34, Blockhouse 1st Floor, 
Ground Computer 
CIF Building, Room 307 
Evans, Ralph M. 

Evans, Raymond T.,]r. 

Evitt, Johnnie E. 

Evjen,] . 

Fairman,]. W. 

Fickey, Edsel W. 
Ford, Francis B. 

Forknall, George 

Foster,]. S. 

Fox, Beecher, H. 

Fredlock, Armistead III 

Freeze, Daniel S. 

Fritz, Richard]. 

Frost,]. C. 

Furr, Glynn R. 

Galasso, Vincent F. 

Gavazzi, Trent D. 

Gay,]ohn B. 

Gerard, Jerry 

Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
Bendix 
IBM 
NAA 
Bendix 
Bendix 
Bendix 
PAA 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
Douglas 
Douglas 
General Elec. 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
Launch Operations 
Inspector Unit Supervisor 
Propulsion and Mechani­
cal Technician 
Operator of 02 Condition­
ing System 
Technician 
Technician 
Chief Chemist 
Quality Assurance 
Technician 
High Pressure Mechanic 
Pad Safety Supervisor 
Electrician 
Telemetry Technician 
Engineer / Scieh tist 
AGCS Technician-Guid­
ance Control System 
Quality Control Spec­
ialist 
Operator & Monitor TM 
Receiving Equipment 
Vehicle Networks 
Electrical 
Senior Systems Launch 
and Test Engineer 
Launch Technician Field 
Supervisor 
Engineer IScientist 
Complex 34, Trailer 1-069 
LC 34, Level A-4 
At Home 
LC 34, Blockhouse, 1st 
Floor, Ground Computer 
LC 34, Level A-6 
At Home 
At Home 
At Home 
At Home 
Complex 34, ECS Breaker 
Con trol Room 
LC 34, Blockhouse, DDAS 
Area 
LC 34 Douglas Electronics 
Trailer 
LC 34 AGCS 
Operations Mobile Trailer 
Located South of the Block­
house 
Blockhouse 34, TM Checkout 
Station 
Service Structure, 27· foot Le­ .., 
vel 
Service Structure, 27· foot Le­
vel 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
LC 34, Douglas Electronics 
Trailer 
B .. 22 
0J
Gib[,ons, Timmas D.
Gfl}son, John H.
Givens, Charles
Glusing, W. H.
Goard, Garnett D."
Goodwin, Gilbert D.
Gordon, Eleanor L.
Gorrel], Gene p.
Graboski, Diana L.
Graham, Ira F.,Jr.
Gray, Stanley D.
Grenier, Frederick C.
Gustafson, Gary F.
Hacker, Ford
Haffncr, Gordon j.
Hanson, R. O.
IIarbaugh_ Weldon R.
Chrysler
Chrysler
Bendix
NASA/KSC
Bendix
Chrysler
PAA
Chrysler
Chrysler
Chrysler
Chrysler
Chrysler
IBM
Chrysler
Chrysler
Douglas
Chryslt.,-
Harms, Eugene H. Chrysler
tlarman, Joseph F. Chrysler
t Hartman, William L. Chrysler
}
;_(;CS Networks En-
gineer (2\1NW)
Pull Trailing Wire
leasurcnm,lts Cable .-\fi rr
Liftoff +5 Seconds
Electronic Technician
Instrumentation
Engineer
Propellant Sampler
Monitor. A1 Engine
Actuators During Ity-
draulic Runs
PA.A Nurse
Senior Systems Engin-
eer, Launch er & Firing
. Accessories
Systems Design Clerk
Engineer, S1B Airborne
Networks
DEE-3
Launch Operations
Inspector
Oscillograph Monitor,
BUTM
I
Comple_ 34. L/rancher
Complex 34, AGCS IIM:;.
Complex 37 Storage Battery
ACE Control Room 1.
MSO Building
LAB Building tt5-995
Service Structiare
PAA Cape Dispensary
Service Structure, 27-foot Le-
vel
Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Service Structure, Level 2
Blockhouse 34, Firing Room
Complex 34, Trailer 1-069
LC 34, BUTM Oscillograpia .
• Monitor
Field Technician Service Structure. 27-foot Le-
Supervisor (.XIGSE) vcl
OperateDRscXroni,;i}  '
Tape Recorder : :!i"i_->_.:_._ Biockhouse 34. Floor 1
Elei_tronies re c h ,-;;,_i_'_;;'_2{#
•-" -7'i'r:: '" LC 34 Lqockhouse
Service Structure. 27-h_ot I.e-
VC]
Blockhouse 34, Console 17
Complex 3,t, Support Bldg.
L'ilit <, " "
,._d[ 'L'I".'ISOI. /.f:l.lil-
ehcr t,' l"ixiug-'\cccs._'.n'ies
LO2 Systems Engineer
Stock Man
AGcS Power Technician
Blockhouse 34, Power Racks
& PCD
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l lawk, Larry A. Chwslcr
l la.vcs, Oliver B. PAA
llayes, Raymond E. PAA
tlayncs, Bill L ..... NASAIKSC
Ha-zehon, James T. Chrysler
lleinbaugh, James R. Chrysler
I Icimniller, Waher R. FEC
Heins, Don IBM
I
!
!
Ilennig, Robert L. Chrysler
Hems, Edward E. Douglas
Hillman, Harry E., Jr. Chrysler
IHnkle, R. R. IBM
Hoblitzell, Wm. Roy, Jr.
Hoeweler,'- Harold H.
Hogston, Wm. Charles
ltoisington, Robert E.
Holland, D. L.
{
4
,i
llo!mes, Earle C., Jr.
!! ;_i_:gor. Jnmcs L.
llopkins, Robert L.
tlopper, U. E.
lloraseholder, LeRoy XV.
} loward, J. Ron
• ° ! •
Techuician/I'(:D Blockhouse 34, IPCD Area !_
Security Police l,C 3.t, Main Gate '
_'2
• Security Police LC 34, Rest Room - ,_]
Bendix
Chrysler
Electrical Systems
Engineer
CITC Backup
LH2 Technician
ECS Technician
Backup Test Conductor
Measuring System
Technician
Electronic Technician
S1B Telemetry Monitor
Technician
Propellant Mechanic
Field Technician
LC 34, Blockhouse
Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Blockhouse 34, LH 2 Facility
Complex 34, AGCS
LC 34, Support Bids, Room
117
Service Structure, Floor 2
LC 34 Blockhouse
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1
LC 34, Vehicle Networks
Office, £nd Floor
Spacecraft Line Shop - Com-
plex 34
Service Structure, A-1 Level
t_
B
D
Bendix
Chrysler
A°C° "
Electronics
Chrysler
NASA!KSC
Chrysler
Bendix
Douglas
Chrysler
Propellant Sampler
Monitor S1 Engine Move-
merit During "I'cst
Guidan.ce & Navigation
System Engineer
Technician, Propellant
Tanking Computer
.tD_u_diry Coqu'oi
Complex 34/47
Service Structurc
MSOB]ACE Control Room
1
Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Sea-vice ,_tructure P
LO2 "Fechnicial_
Technician
Complex 34, LOX Trailer
At Home"
Electronics Engineer
Telemetry GSE Operations
LC 34 Blockhouse
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1
t
B - 24
f"7
U
t
D
8
0
cA
Howell, Harold V., Jr.
t tubble, E. E.
Hughes, K. L.
Hughes, W.
Hunter, H. D.
Hutchinson, Bcrtie O.
Iniestra, P. O.
Jackson, Richard F.
Jacobs,Thomas W.
• Jensen, Gerald L.
Jewell, W. O.
Johnson, Frank O.
Johnson, French F_,
Johnmn,. Robert W.
Johnson, William A.
Jones, C. W.
Jones, Lawrcnce D.
Joslin, John j.
Joyner, A. L.
Kaminski, Leonard T.
Kammerude, Stanley D.
Karli, Richard O.
"Keefe, John J.
NAA
NASA IKSC
Douglas
NASA/KSC
NASA/KSC
Chrysler
GE
Bendix
Chrysler
Chrysler
NASAIKSC
GE
NASAIKSC
Chrysler
Douglas
Chrysler
Bendix
NAA
Chrysler
C_11_er
Z agL 
_las
Technician
Pneumn tics Technician
Technician
LOX Area Inspector
IU Technician
Recorder Monitor
ACE Moni tor Equipment
Special Pneumatics ttigh
Pressure Gas Mechanic
Support S1B Telemetry
Checkout
Project Technician
Electrical Technician
Computer Maintenance
Specialist
Electrical "l_echnician
QC Surveillance
Electronic Technician
S1B Stage Electrical
Networks Engineer
Technician
Monitoring oDoP
Ground Station
Instrumentation Engineer
l.aut,ch Operations Group
Supervisor
RP-1 Technician
Lead Engincer-SIVB
Associate Engineer/
Scientist
LC 34, iLevcl A-6
• LC 34, 'Frailcr-148
LC 34 Blockhouse
I.C 34, LOX Trailer
LC-37 "
.Blockhouse 34, Firing Room -
LC 34 Bloc ldmusc, 1st Floor
At Home
Complex 34, Trailer 2-045
Complex 34, Trailer 847
LC 34
Computer Room 1, MSO
Building
LC 34, Blockhouse
Service Structure, Measuring
Station
LC 34, Service Structure
27' Level
Service Structure, Floor 2
Titusvitte Fishing Pier
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1
ACE Control Room i,
,MSO Buil.!ing
Complex 34, Trailer 1-069
Complex 34, RP-1
LC 34 Blockhouse --:
LC 34, Service Structure
Aft lnterstage
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Neever,N. IBM Technician LC 34,124 Sta ilizers, Rack ."_-
B55
,- Kelley, Donald E. Bendix Superviso D. Engineer, ¢ _
, System Safety Support f_
] Department At Home
Kenny, B. IBM .Technician LC 34, Blockhouse, 1st Floor ._
Kiernan, John Bendix Systems SaIety• up rvisor At tlome
: King, John W. FEC Technician (;IF Building, Room 297,
?_ TM Station
" King, joseph J. NASA/KSC .Planning Technician LC 34, Blockhouse
NKirby, R.G. IBM Teehnician CIF Building, Room 307 ._.
II
Kitchens, T.R. IBM IU Ground Electrician LC 34
•
Koby, Raymond Chrysler Telemetry TRS-1 Station Blockhouse 34
Koivu, Ray A. Chrysler GSE Mechanical Tech-niclan Service Structure, A-1 -
!
,i
]
i
?
i
Kubasko, James
Lambert, Walter A.
Lambert, William F.
Langston, Gerald R.
NASAIKSC
Chrysler
Bendix
FEC
Quality Surveillance
Turn-Off Circuit
Breaker
Propellant Mechanic
Teehnieian
LC 34, Service Structure
/ •
/
Complex 34, AGCS Area
In Shop - Complex 34
CIF Building, Datacore Mod-
ule
l.ane, R. E.
• L'tudermilch, Ray H.
Lee, Robert E.
PAA
NNSAIKSC
• NASA/KSC
Security Police
Telemetry Technician
Instrumentation Tech-
nician
Security Headquarters
LC 34, Blockhouse
LC 34, OfficeTrailer
4
!
I
!
I.c:nnmn, t"toyd C.
Lewis, J. E.
Lewis, John D.
Lewis, William K.
Lewis, Richard W.
Chrysler
IBM
Bendix
NASA/KSC
Chrysler
Pneumatics Control
System "lcc i,;,ic [a_
IU Complex Manager
System Safet y Supervisor
Technician
Q C Inspector
(,omp:c•: o-_, PC;D Area
LC 34, 2nd Floor
Driving in Cocoa Beach, Fla.
LC 34 Blockhouse
Service Structure, A-1
L-
-i
r
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Long, R. G. 
Luke, Rodney C. 
Mack, C.J. 

Mahoney, Richard H. 

Maki, Paul W. 

Malkemes, R. F. 

.. Mann, Richard C . 
Martin, John D. 
Martin, John D. 
McCarthy, Daniel J. 
McEachern, Charles A. 
McMechen, Margaret A. 
McRae, Walter LeRoy 
Meisch, John A. 
Mellott, Douglas W. 
Miner, James W.
.. 
Merrill, K. R. 
Mook, Gerald L. 
Moors, Dave 
Morrison, Joseph E. 
Muldoon, Raymond 
NASA/KSC 
Douglas 
PAA 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
NASA/KSC 
PAA 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
NASA/KSC 
Chrysler 
PAA 
Douglas 
IBM 
Bendix 
Douglas 
Chief, Planning & 
Technical Support 
Mechanic 
Security Police 
Pneumatics Technician 
Propellant Mechanic 
Senior Engineer, Spec­
ial Pneumatics Facility, 
High Pressure Gas Dept. 
Monitor SIB Telemetry 
Data 
Quality Assurance 
Technician 
SIB RF/TM System 
Engineer 
Quality Assurance 
Technician 
Propulsion and Mech­
anical Technician 
PAA Nurse 
Propellant Sampler 
Assisting Senior 
Engineer /Test Box 
Guidance and Control 
Technician 
Support Telemetry Checks 
Chief, Security Police 
Lead Engineer/Vehicle 
Systems 
Technician 
Propellant Sampler 
Missile Field Checkout 
Technician 
8-27 
LC 34 Blockhouse, VIP 
Room 
LC 34, Umbilical Tower, 
110·£oot Level 
At Home 
Complex 34, PCD Area 
At Home 
22O·foot Level of Complex 34, 
Umbilical Tower 
CIF Telemetry Station 
Spacecraft Lines Office 
Complex 34 
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1 
At Home 
CIF, Room 307 

At Home 

Driving in Cocoa Beach, Fla. 

Service Structure. Z'l-foot Le­

vel 

CIF 

Service Structure, A·I 

At Home 

LC 34 Blockhouse 

LC 34, RUBM, Rack C-7 

Winter Garden, Florida 

LC 34 AGCS 

Mullin, J. T., Jr. NASA/KSC 
Munson, Harry G. Douglas 
Muys, Paul RCA 
Nadeau, Robert T. Chrysler 
Nicholson, John L. PAA 
Niedert, Myron A. Douglas 
Norvell, G. C. Douglas 
Oberlin, Donald Chrysler 
O'Brien, J. J. IBM 
O'Hara, A. D. NASA/KSC 
Olsen, Stanley Chrysler 
O'Neal, E. H. Douglas 
Otto, William E. Douglas 
Overstreet, Clyde F. NASA/KSC 
Overton, T. L. Douglas 
Parker, Sanford Douglas 
Payne, W. D. Douglas 
Pearson, Charles A. Bendix 
Penovich, F. R. NASA/KSC 
Electrical Systems 
Engineer 
Supervisor Manufact­
uring Operations 
Communications Tech­
nician 
Technician, Vehicle 
Measuring Station 
Security Police 
Engineer 
Structural Mechanical 
Engineer 
SIB Hydraulic Pnl. 
Operator 
Technician 
LV & Test Ops. Mgr., 
Saturn IB 
Supervisor, SIB 
Vehicle Telemetry 
Mechanical Leadman 
Associate Engineer 
Electrical Systems 
Engineer 
Engineer Draftsman 
Missile Mechanic 
Inspector 
Propellant Sampler 
Guidan~e & Control 
Technician 
B-28 
LC 34 
LC 34 Operations Room 
MSO Bldg. Room 4440 
Service Structure 
Road at N. E. Corner of LC 
34 
CIF Building, Room 307 
CIF Building 
Blockhouse 34, Rack 44 
LC 34, OAT Room 1521 
Level 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1 
LC 34, Mechanical 
Trailer 
LC 34, Service Structure 
OAT Room, 152' Level 
LC 34, Blockhouse 

LC 34, Service Structure, 

.. 
114-foot Level 
LC 34, Service Structure, 
116·foot Level 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Lab Bldg. H5-995 
LC 34, Support Bldg. 
Perry, William 
Phyllis, Howard L.,Jr. 
Pigg, Robert W., Jr. 
Pipher, Marvin 
Pirtle, James E. 
Pittman, William E. 
Platt, Philip C. 
Ploski, B. T. 
Pomeroy, Norman O. 
Pornovets, Michael 
Porter, Earl G. 
Powers, Tim L. 
Puckett, Paul E. 
Rainey, C. R. 
Raley, E. O. 
Reynolds, E. A. 
Ricci, P. A. 
Richards, Charles W. 
.. 
Richards, Jerry L. 
Richards, Ronald F. 
Richardson, F. G. 
Rickert, James D. 
Riddle, Albert L., Jr. 
IBM 
Bendix 
GE 
Douglas 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
IBM 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
FEC 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
IBM 
NASA/KSC 
NASA/KSC 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
Bendix 
GE 
Chrysler 
PAA 
Tecnnician 
Propellant Sampler 
Computer Maintenance 
Specialist 
Lead Engineer - TM 
& RF 
Lab Technician 
OAT Battery Room 
Launch Operations 
Inspector 
Technician 
Lab Technician 
Propellant Sampler 
Tape Recorder Operator 
LOX Technician 
Support GSE Operations 
Technician 
Instrumentation Engineer 
G & N Engineer 
Senior Engineer-Launch 
Operations 
Mechanical Support 
Special Pneumatics, High 
Pressure Gas Mechanic 
Technician 
Project Engineer 
Monitor Umbilical 
Housing Eject 
Security Police 
B·29 
LC 34, Blockhouse RUCP 
Console 
At Home 
Computer Room 1, Bldg. 
LC 34 Blockhouse 
Lab. Bldg. H5·995 
Service Structure, 116·foot 
Level 
Complex 34, AGCS 
CIF Building, Computer 
Room 231 
Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
At Home 
Operating Tape Recorder 
Complex 34, LOX Trailer 
Service Structure, 17-foot Le· 
vel 
LC 34, Flight Control Rack 
B47 
LC 34, Service Structure 
ACE Control Rm/MSOB 
LC 34, Operations Office 
Service Structure, 27· foot Le • 
vel 
At Home 
At Home 
Unknown 
Service Structure, A·l 
LC 34, Blockhouse 
Ridlehoover, J. O. 

Ries, Edward E. 

Ritchie, A. 

Robelen, Kenneth F. 

Roberts, Wayne Elton 

Robinson, Wilbert L. 

Rogers, Perry M. 

Rouse, Carroll R. 

Rowe, D. O. 

Ruch, Herbert E., Jr. 

Rudasill, Charles H. 
Rush, Russell D. 
Russell, Orlando L. 
Ryder, Barry A. 
Sales, Amos H. 
Sample, Carl W. 
Samples, Robert E. 
Sanders, William M. 
Santos, Tomas 
Sapp, L. A. 
Satterfield, Walter D. 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
IBM 
GE 
FEC 
Bendix 
NASA/KSC 
NASA/KSC 
NAA 
Bendix 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
GE 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
IBM 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
Safety & Security 
Supervisor 
Digital Range Safety 
Ground Station 
Technician 
Quality Control Specialist 
Magnetic Tape Recorder 
Operator 
Systems Safety Supervisor 
Measuring Branch 
Technician 
Electrical Systems 
Engineer 
Technician 
Engineering Specialist 
Foreman 
LH2 Technician 
System Test & Launch 
Engr. Supv. 
Propellant Sampler 
Launch Operations 
Inspector 
Decommutation Main­
tenance Specialist 
Laboratory Supervisor, 
Gas Analysis Lab 
Technician, PREV 
Technician 
Electronics Technician 
Field Technician 
B ·30 
At Home 
Blockhouse 34, Floor 1 
Theodelite Hut-124 Systems 
MSO Building, ACE Stations 
1&3 
CIF Building, Module II 
At Home 
LC 34, Blockhouse 
LC 34, Blockhouse 
LC 34, 1oo-foot Level S. E. 
of gantry 
At Home 
Complex 39A 
Complex 34, LH2 Facility 
Complex 34, PCD Area 
At Home 
Complex 34, Liquid Oxygen 
Fac. 
MSO Building, Computer 
Room 1 
At Home 
Blockhouse 34 
LC 34, Rack B-53 Computer 
Console 
LC 34, Service Structure, 
Forward Interstage 
Complex 34, Valve Lab 
Sawyer, Arthur L. 
Schlaefer, Bryant C. 
Schoultz, p. A. 
Shackelford, David A. 
Shoaf, Joseph M. 
Secor, Ray L. 
Shockley, R. L. 
Short, Jack 
Shramko, JohnJr. 
Shreves, Dolores C. 
Sibley, L. F. 
Simon, Marion 
Simonelli, R. B. 
Skog, Roy E. 
Sonnenthal, William L. 
Spiller, Henry W. 
Solo, Dennis 
Staveland, Allen R. 
Stelly, J. N. 
Stewart, David D. 
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Blockhouse 34, Firing Room 
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LC 34, Service Structure, 116­
foot Level 

LC 34, Service Structure 

LC 34, Blockhouse 
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LC 34, Service Structure 

At Home 
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vel 

Service Structure, A-2 
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Chrysler 
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NASA/KSC 
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At Home 
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LC 34, Blockhouse 
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Blockhouse 34, Firing Room 
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ACE Control Room 1, 
MSO Building 
Complex 34, ECS 
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ACE Control Room 1, 
MSO Building 
LC 34, Blockhouse 
Turner, Charles A. 
Turner, Clark C. 
Tussler, H. R. 
Tutwiler, C. W. 
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Van Skaik, Albert L. 
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Vreeland, Arthur E. Jr. 
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Ware, Edward J. 
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Douglas 
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Chrysler 
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FEC 
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CIF Building 
Complex 34, PCD Area 
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LC 34 Blockhouse 
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Complex 34, Trailer (RP-I) 
LC 34, Rack C5 
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Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
Complex 34, 02 Conditioning 
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Complex 34, Support Bldg. 
LC 34, Rack B-52 
Complex 34, AGCS 
Service Structure, A·I 
At Home 
CIF Building, Room 307 
ACE Control Room 1, 
MSO Building 
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Williams, Arthur]. 
Williams, Carl M. 
Williams, Terry A. 
Williamson, E. L. 
Wilson, Dwayne W. 

Wilson, James C. Jr. 

Winborn,]. E. 

Wise, Harry E. 

Woodson, Mason C. 

Wright, Roger N. 

Wybranowski, Edward W. 
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Chrysler 
Bendix 
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Douglas 
Chrysler 
IBM 
Douglas 
Chrysler 
Bendix 
Chrysler 
Douglas 
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Pneumatics System 
Engineer 
System Safety Supervisor 
Technician 
Propellant Mechanic 
Supervisory Engineer, 
PSCL Dept., Analytical 
Laboratory 
Missile Field Test 
Technician 
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Launch Oprs. Insp. 
Unit Supv. 
Technician 
Missile Mechanic' 
SIB Vehicle Electrical 
Networks 
Laboratory Technician 
LH2 Panel Operator 
Associate Engineer 
Scientist 
Technician 
Complex 34, AGCS 
School PTA Dinner 
Main Gate, Complex 34 
At Home 
At Home 
LC 34, Service Structure, 116­
foot Level 
Complex 34, Trailer 1-069 
LC 34, Blockhouse 1st floor, 
Ground Computer 
LC 34, Service Structure 
Structure, 116-foot Level 
Service Structure, Floor 2 
At Home 
Complex 34, LH2 Auto Load 
Panel 
At Home 
LC 34, Flight Control Room 
Rack B45 
.. 
B ·34 

ACE 
AFET 
AGCS 
APDS 
BIH, BH 
BPC 
CAST 
CIF 
CIM 
Comm 
CPX 
CSTC 
CVTS 
ECS 
EDS 
G&H 
GSE 
lOR 
IHST 
LC 
LCC 
LES 
MILA 
MRCS 
HM 
COMMON ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
Acceptance Checkout Equipment 
Facility Electrical Technician - (CALL SIGH) 

(AGCS Room) 

Automatic Ground Control System 

Power Distribution System - (CALL SIGH) 

(AGCS Room) 
Blockhouse 
Boost Protective Cover 
Astronauts Communications Console - (CALL SIGH) 
Central Instrumentation Facility 
Command Module of the Spacecraft 
Communications and Radio Frequency 
Complex 
Spacecraft Te,st Conductor - (CALL SIGH) 
Space Vehicle Test Supervisor - (CALL SIGH) 
Environmental Control System 
Emergency Detection System 
Guidance and Havigation 
Ground Support Equipment 
Interim Deviation Report 
Instrumentation and Telemetry 
Launch Complex 
Launch Control Center 
Launch Escape System 
Merritt Island Launch Area (now Kennedy Space 
Center, KSC) 

Reaction Control System - (CALL SIGH) 

Horth American Aviation, Inc. 
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NASA 
OCP 
OIS 
OTV 
PA or PIA 
PAA 
P&S 
PL or P/L 
PLSS 
QC 
RCS 
RF 
SIC 
SCS 
SCET 
SCMD 
SCMT 
SFDS 
SLA 
S/M 
SPAD 
SPLT 
SPS 
SSET 
SSRP 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Operational Checkout Procedure 
Operational Intercommunications System 
Operational Television 
Publ ic Address System 
Pan American World Airways, Inc. 
Power and Sequential 
Pad Leader 
Portable Life Support System 
Quality Control 
Reaction Control System 
Radio Frequency 
Spacecraft 
Stabilization and Control System 
Command Module Electrical Technician (Service Structure) 
(CALL SIGN-A8) 
Command Pilot - (CALL SIGN) 

Command Module Mechanical Technician (Service Structure 

(CALL SIGN -A8) 

Fluid Distribution System (Service Structure) 

(CALL SIGN-A7) 

Spacecraft/Lunar Module Adapter 

Servi ce Modu Ie 

• 
Pad Leader - (CALL SIGN) 

Pilot - (CALL SIGN) 

Service Propulsion System 

Service Module Electrical Technician (Service Structure) 

(CALL SIGN-A7) 

Senior Pilot - (CALL SIGN) 
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STC 
TIC, TC, T.C 
TM 
TPE 
T SUPER 
UFET 
VOX 
W/R 
Spacecraft Test Conductor 
Test Conductor 
Telemetry 
Test Project Engineer 
Test Supervisor 
Umbilical Tower Facility Electrical Technician 
Voice Transmission 
White Room 
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DONALD O. BABBI TT 

NAA 

JANUARY 28, 1967 

I was stationed at the Pad Leader's desk, verifying that per the procedure, support was ready for um­
bilical pull at T-O. The time period in here I can only estimate as 5 to 15 seconds. I heard on the 
head set (Channel Black·3) Mr. Chaffee say, "There is a fire in here," (or words to thiseffe£~). I ~ 
ordered the mechanical lead man, Mr. Gleaves, to "Getiliem out6rthere"6neaning i'~ove' the 
hatches and get the crew out of the Command Module). I started to turn toward the Communications 
Box (on my left), when out of the corner of my eye, I saw flame come out from under the boost near 
the steam duct. I almost completed my turn when I was hit by a concussion or sheet of flao;le (I don't 
remember hearing an explosion) and was pushed toward the communication boxes. My next thoughts 
were to get out of there. (I never had time to notify the blockhouse). I went to the umbilical (White 
Room) arm, and went across it to the umbilical tower where I encountered three of the spacecraft 
mechanics and an elevator talker who had a head set. I told the talker to inform the test supervisor 
that we were on fire and that I need firemen, ambulances, and equipment. With the three mechanics 
(Messrs. Gleaves, Hawkins, and Clemmons) we grabbed the only C02 bottle available and went back 
to the White Room to try to remove the hatches. The smoke and heat was so intense that we could 
only spend a short time in the White Room (possibly 1·2 minutes). After several trips back and forth 
Mr. Gleaves almost passed out due to smoke inhalation so I ordered him to stay out, which he did 
but for only a short time. 
After the smoke had cleared some, I could see that the Spacecraft Technicians and Quality Control 
(NASA and NAA) had been able to get back into level A·8 and were fighting fires with everything 
available, so I got some more men' and continued as best we could (because of the smoke and heat) 
to remove the hatches. We attempted to both remove the inner hatch or lower the hatch down inside 
the Command Module. We were not successful in removing the inner hatch and could only lower the 
hatch about 75 to 80% of the way because of obstructions. I was at that time only able, again because 
of the smoke which was considerable, to observe only two of the flight crew but could not recognize 
who it was. The inner hatch was extremely hot and we could only handle it with the handles attached 
to the hatch. My observation at the time of hatch removal was that the flight crew were dead and 
that the destruction inside the Command Module was considerable. After informing the test supervisor 
of what I had observed (while adhering to security guidelines wherever possible) and continued to direct 
the crew in putting out the fires. I asked the senior Pan American firemen to specifically check the 
Launch Escape Motor for hot spots and general heat. 
I was relieved by Mr. Curatolo, NAA 1st shift pad leader. 
I proceeded down the umbilical tower elevator, met the two NASA doctors and briefed them on what 
they would find. I then proceeded to the Pan American Dispensary, with a short stop at the NAA 
Shop Trailer, for treatment and checkup. I was treated for smoke inhalation, flash burns, and eye 
irritation, and ordered to remain overnight. 
I feel that the Spacecraft Crew (Technical, Mechanical, NAA Quality Control, and NASA Quality 
Control) performed commendably well in this emergency. 
I feel that there should be a number of things taken care of immediately by safety from the standpoint 
of working crew and Equipment Safety. 
lsI Donald 0. Babbitt 
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WILLIAMS: 
PETRONE: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
PETRONE: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
PETRONE: 
JANUARY 29, 1967 
The Pad Leader is on the upper level by the spacecraft. He is more or less in 
charge of pad operations, He reports back to the blockhouse and who in turn 
reports back to the control room where the test is being run from. The test is 
run from the blockhouse and the control room is back here in this building. He 
was taking direction from the blockhouse or the North American project engineer 
who is back here. The activities up there fall under his responsibility. 
Where would you want him to sit or speak from the microphone? Put him there 
next to you, Dr. Thompson. 
One thing I think we should say is that the statement that you make will remain 
in the same -- leave yourself in the same category in keeping all this testimony 
within the same restraints that have operated up to now. The fact that you have 
talked to us doesn't relieve you of that obligation. 
I understand perfectly. 
We cannot hear you. 
I have a hoarseness because of smoke damage, so I ask if I can move a little 
closer. May I speak freely or ...... 
Go ahead. Tell us what happened, to your observation. 
Well, as the North American pad leader on the 2nd shift, I was stationed at the 
pad leader's desk. At the time of the incident I was verifying that we were ready 
at T minus zero f~r umbilical pull as per the procedures. This is a manual pull 
and we were checking to make sure all our lines were clear. At the time it had 
happened, I heard and I can almost definitely state that I believe it was Mr. 
Chaffee say something to the effect of fire in the command module, fire in the 
spacecraft, the term fire sticks to me more than anything else. I ordered my 
mechanical lead man, Mr. Gleeves, to proceed toward the hatch for removing 
the crew, and started to turn, I was facing the spacecraft. You gentlemen are 
familiar with the layout up there. 
We have been there. 
You know where the pad leader's desk is? 
That the desk with the telephone on it? 
Yes, sir. 
You were at the desk? 
Yes, sir, I was facing the umbilical at the time. 
Were you sitting down? 
B-40 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
LONG: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
MATHEWS: 
BABBITT: 
No, I was standing. I had started to turn toward the comm box to call the 
blockhouse either on normal comm line or page whichever was open. Out of 
the corner of my eye I believe I saw which was flame from under the boost 
protective cover in the area what could be the steam duct and continuing my 
turn. I never made it to the comm box because at that time more or less over 
my head I felt a pressure and heat and flame and I never made the call to the 
blockhouse. My next thoughts were to get out of there as quickly as I could. 
I proceeded out across the umbilical arm, the walkway there, to where I got 
to a telephone talker who was at the elevator of a crew standing by which 
would have been the normal emergency egress test and they had a man stationed 
there and told him to inform the blockhouse through his channels of what was 
taking place. I was preceeded out the umbilical arm by. three of my mechanics, 
Mr. Gleeves, Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Clements. From that time on it was· 
we were spent as quickly as we could, but with the amount of smoke, removing 
the hatches. I probably could answer questions better than I could speak freely 
on this. If there is anything specific. 
Let me ask you one question about the full length of time involved between any 
untoward event and /or enveloping flames. How long a period of time do you 
think that full action? 
I can only guess, sir, there would be a matter of at the most maybe two to 
three seconds and the time it would take me to turn approximately 90 degrees 
to the comm box. 
Is this two to three seconds from when you heard Chaffee's voice until you per­
sonally felt ...... 
Yes, sir. 
That is, this means then that the first evidence you had there was anything 
untoward happening was that voice. 
Yes, sir. 
And almost simultaneously you saw this flame coming .. 
As I was turning I saw it from under the boost cover. 
Two or three seconds after that you felt the big pressure? 
Yes, sir. In seeing the flame under the boost cover we, also, having been out 
there and been at the spacecraft many times when we do a normal cabin press­
ure check to where the relief valve goes on the cabin, we hear the, I believe 
I heard and at the same time saw the flame - the normal noise that we hear 
with this cabin relief valve going with the steam duct. The noise is sort of hard 
to describe but it is something that we hear all the time and know what is 
taking place at that time. 
Were you turning .. 
To my left. 
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MATHEWS: 
BABBITT: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
FAGET: 
BABBITT: 
VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
VOICE: 
YARDLEY: 
VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
To your left - but you saw the flames under the boost protective cover and not 

coming out of the RCS doors!) 

Right, I would attribute .this to be in the area of the steam duct. It would be' 

only speculation for me to say that maybe the command pilot had dumped the 

cabin or maybe the normal relief valve had dumped. 

You say you hear this relief valve all the time and are familiar with it. 

When we are doing a cabin pressure check. 

In other words, it dumps normally at 5 psi differential. 

Yes, sir, and its noise that most of us arc familiar with having heard it a num­

ber of times, not only in the altitude chambers prior to the altitude runs there 

but also I heard it the same day. 

That was before you saw the fire or after:) 

It was before the main flame came. But we - I saw and I heard the venting 

sound and then as I say I continued my turn and a sheet of flame came to­

wards me. 

Who did you instruct to go to the hatch opening;) 

My mechanical lead man, Mr. Gleeves, and as required he takes a crew with 

him. I understand it was Mr. Clements and Mr. Hawkins also. 

There is, 1. understand, an override on this relief, the pilot pressure relief that 

the pilot can use as an automatic relief of pressure, too. 

Yes, sir. 

The pressure relief knot last night were not in the manual order. 

That would indicate that the pressure had built up in a very short time from 

16 absolute to say 20? 

What is this steam tube? 

There is a hole coming up it is a duct coming off the ECU coming out the 

side of the spacecraft, and we have a, with a boost cover on, would have a 

tube inserted in there - to vent this downward. 

There's one impression we got out there, that the flame shot out way over the 

desk. 

Yes, sir. 

With the paper -- did you see that flame. Was it a jet of flame or can you 

describe it in anyway? 
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BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
THOMPSON: 
BABBITT: 
MATHEWS: 
BABBITT: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
FAGET: 
BABBITT: 
VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
All I saw was flame coming overhead as I was almost turned toward thc com­
munications box. My back was more or less, toward the command module. 
was turned maybe of a possible 90 degree turn there, we'll say 75 degrees, all 
I saw flame come overhead and felt the heat and concussion of it. 
The papers on the desk, though, were charred. 

Yes, sir. 

The distance is, what do you think, 10 to 12 feee 

I would say it must be 12 feet. 

On a horizontal, on a level with only desk height. 

Yes, sir. 

Our question was, it was a rather narrow confined area that got the full ex­

tension of the that flame? 

As I understand it, I have not been out to the pad since this has happened, as 

I understand it, but I believe myself and several people who were very near 
there, the desk, were very lucky to get away. 
They were rather dose to the desk despite the fact that the desk itself, the 
papers on the desk were burned? 

Yes, sir. 

I think you have to be careful to assume that was a jet because there are a 

number of evidences around that are more direct that indicated it was pieces 

of flaming material that fell in the area. 
l\[ight I answer that. My white coat that I had on and my shirt that I had on 
which were . well, the white coat looked like it had been hit with material or 
something like this to burn holes in it. My white shirt looks like it would be 
residue from, the shirt that I had on looks like it would be the residue from the 
white coat, from being burned as such. 
Like a cigarette ash burn hole? 

Yes, sir. 

There were a number of these holes? 

Yes, sir. They were mostly on my right shoulder which as I say, I would be 

turning to the left. May I illustrate? 

Why don't you make us a sketch? 

I think I can do it assuming the spacecraft is in front of me here and my 

comm boxes are over here, I was turning, the comm boxes are a little low, so 
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VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
FAGET: 
BABBITT: 
FAGET: 
BABBITT: 
VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
WHITE: 
BABBITT: 
MATHEWS: 
I was turning down towards those and it was more my right shoulder that 
was hit with it. 
Where are the desks in relation to where you were standing? 
It would have been behind me. 
Do you have a feeling that this area round you was pretty well filled with 
flames. 
Yes, sir, very much so. I had the feeling that if I stayed low, I could get out 
all right and I had the feeling, too, that the only direction that I had open 
to go from there was toward the umbilical arm. It just looked to me, although 
I honestly can't answer whether I even looked at the other direction - it looked 
to me that was the only area open for me to go towards. 
You had on a head set and a hard hat!' 
I had on a head set and a white hat. 
And you say you felt pressure on your head? 
Yes, sir. I felt a pressure not as a blast or anything, but a posItive pressure 
to where I was forced toward the comm boxes or towards .... away from the 
spacecraft. 
Did this over-pressure last very long? 
No, sir, it did not. 
(Background discussion) 
Was the kind of pressure you felt the kind you would feel if someone opened 
a furnace door? Was it that combination? 
Yes sir, more that or the pressure of someone gently but suddenly pushing you. 
lt wasn't a hard pressure or anything of that sort but just a positive pressure. 
Have you ever lit a gasoline or something in a bottle or bottom of a can and 
thrown a match in it? Was it that type? 
Yes, it was. (Looking at drawing) This would be the umbilical arm. I was 
standing looking at the umbilical arm, the pad leaders desk being here, I would 
be facing in this direction when I heard the words, "Fire" and I turned in 
this direction toward -- which would be the communications boxes, and as I 
say, the boxes are a little low so I had to bend over slightly to get to them. 
The umbilical arm being here, I went out this direction to the arm and then 
out here. 
In other words, you went out past the place where the flame was coming out 
thru the boost protective cover. 
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VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
VOICE:. 
BABBITT: 
PETRONE: 
BABBITT: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
MATHEWS: 
BABBITT: 
• 
MATHEWS: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
YARDLEY: 
BABBITT: 
MATHEWS: 
BABBITT: 
I think - that would be where the white room would be attached. That would 
be approximately here. The length of the white room here. I would be in this 
area here. The steam duct. It is, as you face the hatch, it's to the left and be­
low the hatch. 
Where is the cabin vent valve? 

It is right here. 

Does it come out through the steam duct? 

This is what we call the steam duct. It vents through this duct. 

The boost protective cover limits might be interesting. Where were the limits 

of the boost protective cover? 

The -- it would be in this general area. I can see it from where I am. 

You didn't see it coming out the side, over there? Right behind the desk? 

No, sir, I did not. The limits of the boost cover is the sections that we had on, 

would be approximately here and say over here. 

But you saw it over on this side? 

We saw it here, underneath here, which would be in the general area of the 

steam duct. 

Was this the initial thing that you saw? 

This was the initial thing that we saw. I saw it as I was turning, which an 

over pressure would cause the thing to vent. 

When did you hear that? Can you give us any estimate of time between that 

period and when you fin;t heard the fire signal? 

I heard the fire signals, well, you mean as to clock time. 

No, the estimate of how many seconds. 

In relation to hearing the fire signal. The time it would take me to say to a 
man standing in front of me, "Get them out" and turn, like that. Whatever 
length of time that is. 
Was that valve sound a single sound or....... 

Sort of a whooshing sound. 

Did it signal more than once? 

All I heard was once. 
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PETRONE: Was there a definite click or just a whoosh? 
BABBITT: 
VOICE: 
BABBITT: 
FACET: 
BABBITT: 
There is a definite whoosh and a cutoff, in normal conditions. 
You used the phrase earlier when you were talking about this Dame by the 
steam duct area. You used this phrase, "Seeing it out of the corner of your 
eye". Is there any doubt in your mind as to whether you saw a flame? 
No, sir, there is not. There is no real doubt in my mind that I saw it. It's 
an outstanding feature of things that we normally see in there. There is some­
thing that was unusual, but I was still making my turn towards the communi· 
cations box. 
When did you inhale the smoke to your knowledge? 
After we had proceeded out on the umbilical arm. The - I talked to the tele­
phone talker, to the talker at the top of the elevator. Then I proceeded back .. 
in with the three mechanics who were with me to get to the hatch if possible. 
We were in there - time is . it's hard to say how much time there was. I 
would say not more than 30 seconds. In there long enough to know and be 
able to tell that we could feel the hatch. We could see it up very close but 
the smoke was so thick that we couldn't stay in there very long. We went out, 
grabbed the only C02 bottle on the umbilical arm on that level, went back 
in again, spent a little longer in there, we got the boost cover hatch off. The 
tools were in the white room. We had placed them there for the emergency 
egress test anyway. So we knew where those were. It was just a single multi­
purpose tool. After taking that off, we left again. We made any number of 
trips in and out of there. I guess on possibly the third trip the smoke had 
cleared enough down on the deck below the umbilical arm to where I could 
see my head set and I stepped down and put it on and that's the first contact 
I had with the blockhouse, then. From that time on, we made a number of 
trips in and out. We did as we could as long as we could stay in there and 
then came out. We more or less went in as a group and came out as a group. 
As I was coming out I would report to the blockhouse, as best I could at the 
time. I know Mr. Page probably thought that there was something wrong that 
I kept yelling for people and equipment and things. At the time the smoke 
was so heavy that I couldn't see that there were people. My own spacecraft 
technicians, mechanic!), NASA QC, NAA QC had gotten back into the level 
. 
and were on the other side and were working on the fires in the area. We 
needed, at the time, we needed some sort of as I call it some sort of a battle 
lantern. These old Navy lanterns that you pick up. We couldn't see the hatches 
well enough to work very long. At one trip in we had to spend more than half 
of the time in there looking for the tool because as we came out we must have 
placed it in a little different position. As I was informed later on, it was about 
five minutes before we got the hatch off. I may very honestly have been possible 
15 to 30 seconds late in reporting it to the blockhouse, because during that 
period of time we were trying to maneuver the inner hatch, to either take it 
out which has to be rotated to get it out or to get it down, to drop it down 
inside. We finally, I told them to drop it inside to place it in there as close 
as they could and then I reported it to the blockhouse that the hatches were 
off. Then I went back in and made my own observations on what I saw. 
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There are handles on the inner hatch which, fortunately, were hot, yes, but 
they could handled. The face of the hatch itself was extremely hot, but the 
handles were cool enough where we could handle it and could lower it or 
maneuver it. 
With your bare hands? 
Yes, sir. 
What exactly was this fire indication at the steam vent? Was that the only part 
of the time you took off for the umbilical arm? Was that the only evidence of 
fire? 
Prior to the main force, yes sir, that was the only impression that I had. As I 
say other than the call that I heard. 
As to the· I'm interested in the sequence again. As to the time you heard the 
fire sounded by one of the individuals the time you saw the flame coming out 
of the vent the time you could tell it on the back of your neck. Could you 
give us this one time again? 
Colonel, that's the thing I can't give you in time unless I timed it myself. 
Maybe one to two seconds. That's in the time it would take as I tried to 
illustrate to tell a man to get the crew out and start turning towards there. 
Seeing this but continuing to turn anyway one to two seconds, was all that I 
can say. 
First time was the signal that you heard over the intercom? 
Yes sir, the term fire, I couldn't tell you whether he said, in the Spacecraft, or 
in here or Command Module. 
Fire? 
Right. 
Then the vent valve? 
Then the vent valve. 
Then on the back of the neck? 
Right, yes sir. 
Did you hear any other noise after the vent valve immediately preceeding this 
big rush of heat? 
No sir, I don't remember hearing the pressure release, the mam force. Maybe 
it was because I had my back to it. I didn't hear it. 
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Have you given all of this also on tape, has all this been recorded? 

I have only spoken to my own management. 

Did you make a written statement? 

Yes sir, I have. 

The reason I'm interested is that the some of these sequences, events, that 

followed for plus 30 seconds· would be interesting to look at but the problem 
is somewhat lengthy. Maybe it would be better if we have it in a statement. 
Is that available? 
I have written a statement, yes sir. I may be able to amplify possible the first 
30 seconds a little bit more if you wish me to in writing, but the first 30 sec­
onds, it happened so fast, it's hard to explain it any better. 
I'd like to ask you some more questions. Now on the events when you first 

went into the white room. 

After we had evacuated? 

The first time in and tell me when that was. 

My very first time in the white room that day, was when...... 

No, no, after the fire. 

O.K. 
How long after the fire when you first went in and I'd like to know about the 
condition about the smoke in the white room, what your impr~ssion where it 
was coming from and could you see in the window. 
O. K. As we proceeded into- across the umbilical arm, there was billowing 
smoke coming out the level. 
Billowing smoke, what color? 

It was a very dark gray. Seems to stick in my mind. It was a very heavy, 

thick smoke. As we proceeded in farther, knowing the umbilical arm as we 

spent quite a bit of time on it, the smoke was there we could see to a certain 

extent towards our feet and our hands. The hatch window -- I honestly don't 

remember looking at it. 

You didn't see any flames, is that it? 

No sir, I don't believe I did, but I don't honestly remember looking in there. 

Can you recall seeing fire or lighting? 

I did see fire in there, yes sir, but the fire that I saw primarily was from under-
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neath, coming up under the hood of the white room outside the command mod· 
ule. We used the one fire extinguisher that we had to put out any small local 
fires in the white room of which they were only around the hood of the white 
room. Then as I say, the smoke was heavy and billowing enough to where we 
could only see in a small area we were trying to work in. We had to be pretty 
close to do that. 
That first moment you did not locate the tool. 
Yes sir, we did locate the tool, because we had placed it in a specific spot. As 
I say, we had done preparations for the emergency egress teams that would have 
made a normal emergency egress test later on, so we knew where the tool was. 
I've got a question I may pose to the Board to ask you. 
Yes sir. 
The white room quite large is up high. This area over the hatch is up fairly 
high and the boost protective cover is about right to the right of the shelter 
there's a gap in there now which has been blown out a couple of inches be­
tween the boost protective cover and the heat shield. You were standing here as 
you looked. Just where did you see the flame? Did you see it in this area or 
did you see something come up over the top? 
Before all of this happened, the boost protective cover was laying not perfectly 
flat against the command module, but we will say within 1/4 to 3/8 of an inch 
from it. It was faired in as it would normally be. There was no large gap 
there. As I say I - it appeared to me to be more underneath the white room 
which is where the steam duct would be. 
The steam duct is on this corner. 
Yes, sir. 
And roughly how far from the aft heat shield? 
The steam duct itself is about, I'd say a foot above the aft heat shield. 
Fairly low, then isn't it? 
Right, but where I would see it would be below the aft heat shield because of 
the section of the boost protective cover that was on there. In fact we would 
see it to a certain extent almost down at the service module. 
Looking from here, your line of sight would take you to here. 
My line of sight being - my drawing isn't too well in scale. Standing here we 
can'see this area underneath here, and it was underneath the hood of the white 
room. 
You looked then underneath the hood when you first saw flame and what dir­
ection was it going? 
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It was more or less down, more or less down under the heat shield - boost 
protective cover. 
And what color was it? 

Oh, I would say a bright orange - it wasn't a yellow flame. It was more like 

a bright orange. 

This was after you felt the heat. 

No, this was before. 

Before you felt the heat. 

Yes, sir. 

You never saw the thing coming out other than 

As I say, I did not see the main flame. 

Prior to all this, you saw no smoke or smelled no odors whatsoever. 
No sir, I might point out as I believe hal been pointed out before. I came in 
my normal shift around 3:30. Mr. Cartalla the first shift pad leader remained 
on since he had started the .- he had put the crew in and had started the 
closeout. We normally do this rather than relieve and make a break in the 
middle of an operation like that. I was present when there was an odor detected 
coming out. We had a sensing port which we use to check the oxygen level 
in the spacecraft as a part of the cabin pressurization and this sensing port is 
right, very near the white room door and I ah - the other people working in 

there smelled this odor. This is the only unusual item that we ran into. 

That was the odor that Grissom alluded to. 

I believe it is, yes, it was that - the odor that he mentioned was before I had 

come in to work, before I had come up to the white room, to that area. 

You smelled this how long before the fire broke out? 

Oh, it was a good 21/2 hours. The inner hatch was closed. 

What was the odor like? 

It was sort of a pungent odor, an odor like, oh, not carbon tet or anything 

like that, a mixture of maybe ammonia and oh, just a - the way I can describe 
it is a strong potting compound odor, some of the commercial potting com­
pounds. 
It was an oily odor, was it? 
No sir, it wasn't. 
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Was it a volatile material odor? 
It didn't appear to be, no. It reminded me of a potting compound that we had 

been using earlier that we were all familiar with. 

Did it smell more like an overheated potting material? 

No sir, this smelled like removing the cap from this potting compound in pre­

paration to use it. 
How widespread was that odor? 
As I say, we were right near the sensing port where we attach the Beckman 
analyzer and there was just a venting out there. That is right beside the hatch 
going into the white room. The wall on the right as you go in the door.00 
Could you think a little bit more on what that odor would be like and give 

someone a note on what that odor was like? 

Yes sir. 

That sensing port going into the suit loop or into the cabin? 

I t goes into the cabin. It comes out the same point of the hatch that we press­

urize the cabin with. 

You were smelling what corning out of the Beckman? 

Right. 

In other words, this was a sample of what was going through the Beckman into 

the exhaust, to the white room? 

Right. 

And was this just a temporary whiff or did it persist for a long time? 

No, with the Beckman analyzer, you repeatedly squeeze the bulb to get air 

samples, and we were getting it continuously while we were taking our samples. 

So when you sampled, you got it? 

Right. 

Then it went away after a while. 

It appeared to. After we had purged once more, it appeared to lessen. 

You repurged the cabin to get rid of it? 

As I understand it, as I say, I was only observing it at the time because the 

other pad leader still had the control of things. 
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It took them a long time to purge? Correct? You know nominal is 20 minutes 
and you were in there for at least an hour purging. Is that right, George, about 
an hour? 
Yes •• something to the effect of recalling - I think the numbers were that for 
the first 20 minutes they got 50%, then they purged again for 15 minutes. 
About 75% at that time they suspected the Beckman analyzer. They got ano· 
ther Beckman analyzer and did another purge _. (interrupted) (goes right into 
the continued typed sheet) _. and got 92% 
I'd record that for the record that statement by George Page who is Test 
Supervisor. 
Is that sequence of purging in itself unusual? 
No, its been encountered before, it's longer than the nominal time. 
No, it's longer than what you set your sight for, but it has been encountered 
prior in an altitude chamber run. You can't say that it's something new. 
I think the real details on that could be better defined .. by others. 
Are there any other questions that you want to ask while he's here? 
One thing I gather is that none of you was equipped with any kind of mask. 
That is not the procedure for this. 
We had gas masks up there, yes sir, they were the standard, oh, I believe min· 
ing gas masks. I myself tried twice to use them, I had - because well, the first 
time, I pulled the tape off the bottom of one of them and tried it and it just 
sucked up tight at my face like I wasn't getting any air through it, so I tried 
another one and they had the telephone talker because I couldn't see too well, 
because the amount of smoke that I had been in .. had him pull the tape off 
it .. he hadn't been exposed to any smoke. I tried it and it didn't work either. 
I have heard the same comment from a couple of my mechanics also. We did 
have masks at work, yes, but the masks didn't work long enough for anyone to 
spend a long period of time in there. They, the men, said they'd get in there 
maybe spend possibly a minute or a minute and a half and they would start 
choking up, too. 
One thing I would have done, you may have stated, I think you did say you 
initially went into the white room and approached the hatch and thought there 
were flames in that area. 
There, we saw, flames around the hood area of the white room. 
And how long a time was that between the first time, between the fire signal 
and that sighting. 
Possibly 30 seconds. 30 . 45 seconds. As long as it would take me to go out of 
the to the umbilical arm and turn around and come back into the white room. 
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How long once more, how long was it from the time you heard the relief valve 
and you felt to your right side was pressure. 
Nearly simultaneously? or were 
No, they were not simultaneous. There was a delay between them, yes. I could 
speak in terms of two and three tenths of a second but the time isn't, I couldn't 
answer you really how long it was. 
What happened before that .... it was less than 
Yes sir, it was such a quick period of time that I couldn't tell you how long it 
was. 
Dr. Debus asked a question, would you like to answer? 
Yes sir. 
This arrow indicates that you went this way .... 
Yes sir. 
and you gave the others order to tell the blockhouse.... 
I gave, I went out the the talker at the umbilical tower elevator. 
It is all the way .... 
It is all the way out to the end. 
Did you observe at that time anything back towards the white room. 
Smoke and flames, that's all I could see. 
You saw flames in the white room. 
In the whole area there was random fires. 
Including the platform enclosure? 
Inside, yes sir. 
Yes. Can you estimate how long it took for your departure to go back to the 
white room. There is a door I believe. 
Yes sir, there is. That door by the way was opened by the three mechanics 
who went out ahead of me. 

They went out here, opened the door and then went in? 

Yes sir. 
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Was there anybody in the white room at the time? 
Which door, there are two doors there. 
OK, there is a door this thing right here on the white room. There is also a 
door..... 
Does that have an automatic closer? 
That door we have locked open as part of the procedure for the emergency 
egress which would have normally taken place. 

This door here opens inward? 

Yes. 

I came across up the three small steps and out this way through this door. This 

door was already open. As I understand it from my two mechanics, my three 

mechanics, they were approximately somewhere in this area when the main force 

went .. they went out this way. The door was already open when I went 

through it. 

What do you describe as the main force? 

The flame and heat that hit me at the largest part of it. 

While you were still there? 

Yes sir, while I was still up there. 

Where's the other door to the part of the white room that opens into the hatch? 

Is there one on the other side? 

There isn't a door as such, there's a large area. 

There's another door .... 

There's another door on this end.... 

that's always opened close it.. .. 

No it is not, no. 

For the test .... 

For our normal operation we kept this door closed, then we could control the 

access to the white room and try and maintain white room conditions. 

How was this door during the event? 

This door? Was closed. 
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Was it locked? 

I believe it was, yes. 

There was nobody else inside the enclosure? 

To my knowledge, no, Dr. When it happened, my only thoughts were to get 

out. The only way I could see out was across the umbilical. 

Where were your three mechanics that preceded you? 

They were, as I say, I had given the order to get them out. 

Yeah, but I mean where were they before this ever happened? 

Before this ever happened they were right near me because they were the same 

gentlemen who would be working on the umbilical pull at T minus zero. 

Was there anybody up there near the hatch? 

No sir, there was not. 

So you felt that you could not- get the astronauts out that flame sheet and 

therefore you went there. Then when did you decide you could try by now? 

Had it subsided? 
Mter it had subsided my thoughts are sort of confused to be honest with you 
as to which I really thought of first and get back in or to let the blockhouse 
know what was going on. Mter I told the telephone talker up here to notify 
the blockhouse, then the four of us proceeded back in here. 
So by that time something had subsided 

Yes sir, I would say this was possibly 30 to 45 seconds. 

I see. So was there still flames visible in a flow out sheet? Or was there more 

localized? 

No sir, more random fires, small fires. To be honest with you, we couldn't 

even see the smoke was thick enough where we couldn't initially see the fire 

in this area. I saw .... 

That area would be closed by the enclosure, this is outside the enclosure. 

This would be the main .... 

Is that inside the enclosure? 

Yes sir, there is a large portion inside. 

Jumbled questions. Inside what enclosure? 
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This would be the level 8 structure here and this portion is inside that structure. 
When you went in and out you went out here to get some breath of fresh air. 
Yes sir. 
And back in through here. 
Yes sir. The period of time I was talking to Mr. Page, the test supervisor, I 
was approximately here. I found my headset was approximately here. 
Now on the headset, is your assumption you started out with the headset but 
dropped it on the way out? 
I have a feeling that I ran out from, under my headset. I don't think I took it 
off first. 
Were you plugged in at the time? 
Yes sir. 
Where were your gas masks? 
The gas masks would have been in a box right here. 
You had to go back over and get them out. 
Yes, the ..... 
How did you get around to there? 
Well, there was some down on the umbilical tower, there were some on the 
next level below and one of the men got some up to us. 
You didn't actually go down and ..... 
We had about five of them, five or six. 
These were used yes by the crew other people who came back in. There was a 
problem with that, also, which I should point out in that when you went out 
the doors on these levels, on levels, six, seven and eight, they were the crash 
bar type doors. When you went out, you were locked out. One of my mech­
anics, Mr. Metcalf, went down as I understand it about four levels on the 
gantry, came across on the first level he could, and came back up the one sid~ 
only where there is a door that is always unlocked from the outside, which 
would be our normal access, this is done for cleanliness, and 'security reasons. 
So, most of the crew until someone opened the doors was locked outside of the 
level 8. 
How many men were in the enclosure at the time started this and at various 
intervals. 
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Up on this level I would have to estimate about 18 to 20 at the time. We have 
a normal spacecraft crew up here and QC plus we had GSE people also who 
were supporting us for the umbilical pull, down on level A7 but up on struct· 
ures so they could support the umbilical from below to prevent damage was 
more GSE, mechanics and technicians. 
Do you know when the east door, Colonel Baxter, of the white room is open:) 
No sir, I don't, it was much after I left. 
Which door is that, the one right there by .... 
Within your crew, sir, is there any summary responsibility about the question 
of getting crew out in emergency removal crew, you speak of these 18 people, 
was this particular responsibility specifically yours or the three mechanics you 
had with you;) Others that were presumed had orders to be involved at this 
time..... 
It was the responsibility of the mechanical lead man to take his direction from 
me and he had delegated, designated certain mechanics to be with him unless 
properly relieved in case we had some condition where we had to take the hatch 
off. We thought more in terms of test scrub or something like this. Most of 
our mechanics are experienced in handling the hatches anyway. But he picked 
two of his best men to work with this and they were staying right with it. 
I think I understand that the situation relative to what you, the first things 
you saw. The first thing -in sequence, first was audible indication of trouble, 
the voice: 
Yes sir. 
Second, and with a very short period of time, maybe two seconds later, you 
saw flames on the far side. 
Yes sir. 
And from there on there were many, there was flame and smoke and all this 
other action and I don't believe that you said you ever got to see flame inside 
the, this capsule. 
Not to my knowledge. We, in the time that we spent in there I have to be very 
honest with you I don't think we specifically tried to look in there. 
I understood you. This does not mean there wasn't flame, it means as far as 
you're concerned your observation was flames is all identified with external 
sources. 
Yes sir. At the time I will say this, at the time that we did get the inner hatch 
open, we saw no flame then. 
Great deal of smoke inside. 
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Yes sir, there was. 
In fact, what was your, who reported this. Who was there when the hatch 
opened? 
I was. 
What did you report, sir? 
Yes sir, I reported to the test supervisor the hatches were off. 
Do you remember your words, can you describe for us what you saw and re­
ported? In terms of smoke and visibility. 
I have to be honest with you gentlemen, when the hatch came off and I looked 
in, I believe Mr. Page will I may have been evasive on it, I tried to give the 
impression of what I saw, and there was a catastrophe, but knowing that the 
communications circuits are rather open, I tried not to compromise things, too. 
I think I got this impression across, but. .... 
I was wondering, the question of smoke billowing out, did more smoke come, 
was there still a pressure? 
No, there was no pressure. There was smoke in there, yes sir. 
Did it billow out? 
Not necessarily.....BILLOW.... It was more a layer, laying in there. Which, as 
we got the hatch off, 
Did you have a good deal of light when you looked at that point? 
No sir, it is not, even under normal conditions, unless we have lights inside 
the spacecraft. You can't see that well ... .in there. I wish Mr. Petrone, I could 
answer you really on what I did say because I don't remember. 
I did hear you, I wanted the board to hear what you said. 
I said I tried to keep from compromising the situation but get my impression 
across. 
•Some of the words you said were "I can't see much but I can feeL .. 
I recall that. Since it's not possible to describe what it looked like. 
Gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you. May I say one thing? 
I can't commend my crew - by my crew I speak of not only my mechanics 
and technicians but my QC people and NASA QC people enough for what 
they did. The effort they made towards the whole thing. That's really the only 
thing I wanted to say about it, the effort was - it was fantastic - they're highly 
trained and they showed it. 
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QUESTION: Would you identify yourself by name and organization? 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
My name is Donald 'Babbitt and I work for North American Aviation. 
Mr. Babbitt, you are probably aware of the critical nature of the information 
which you have previously furnished and will furnish to this panel, and we ask 
that you do not discuss your observations or viewpoints with anyone other than 
Apollo Review Board members or members of panels or other designated per­
sonneL Mr. Babbitt, we have your written statement and we would like to ask 
that you supplement this with whatever comments you would like to make to 
expand as you feel appropriate, from the time that you first were aware of the 
situation and till you were in the White Room and were able to get to the hatch 
or approximately that period of time. 
As the North American Pad Leader, I was located at the Pad Leader's desk 
which is approximately 90 degrees to the right of the command module hatch 
on the south side of the gantry level 8. The first word that I received of any 
problem started the incident, was over the headset on Channel Black 3, I heard 
the words, "Fire in - it was either in the command module or in here -" The 
term "fire" stuck out more than anything else. I, in turn, gave word to my 
mechanical lead man, Mr. Gleaves, to get the crew out, and had started a 
turn to the left to change my Operations Intercommunications Systems (OIS) 
box, or to get on the Public Address (PA) system to notify the blockhouse. At 
that time I never completed my turn because I was hit with a force of flame 
or pressure, both flame and pressure, that forced me toward the comm. box and 
down slightly.... I was hit by the force of pressure and heat. My immediate 
reaction was to get out of there, to evacuate the area, which I did do, I never 
completed my move to the comm. box. My moves were toward the umbilical 
arm and out of the umbilical arm, out to the umbilical tower itself, and upon 
reaching clear air outside, I came upon a telephone talker who was at the 
umbilical tower elevator standing by for the - which would have been the nor­
mal emergency egress test, and told him to notify the blockhouse that we had 
a bad fire on the level near the command module, and then as I also came 
onto the umbilical arm, I met three of my mechanics, Mr. Gleaves, Mr. Clem­
mons, and Mr. Hawkins. After notifying the telephone talker at the elevator 
on the umbilical tower, the three of us with a C02 bottle, proceeded back 
into the White Room to attempt what we could in removing the hatches. The 
time period as I believe it from the time that I heard the words "Fire" from 
the audio OIS system till we went back into the white room, I can only esti­
mate to be between ten and twenty seconds. I have no way of knowing exactly 
how long this time would be. As we proceeded into the White Room, the smoke 
was extremely heavy. It appeared to me to be a heavy thick grey smoke, very 
billowing but very thick, we couldn't, as we went in the first time, see the 
hatches well to work, we worked as we could by feel on the boost cover hatch, 
we had to come out in approximately, I would say twice, to even finish the 
boost cover hatch and go back in after removing the boost cover hatch. The 
smoke started clearing some, but we - there was still a problem with staying 
in there. We made several trips in and out. We could see as we worked on the 
outer ablater hatch a little bit better. We could see where we were working, but 
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could not see the whole hatch itself, and knew the general area of the place 
for placing the tool for unlatching the hatch, and as we removed it, we got 
it outside the White Room and also, about that time, I had to change crews 
in working there, because Mr. Gleaves had come very close to passing out 
from smoke. I had to order him out. Mr. Hawkins was in not too good a 
shape and Mr. Clemmons was also the same way. As we came out with the 
outer ablater hatch I observed more people in the level A-8, the gantry level 
A-8, and I motioned for two more of them to come in and assist us in reo 
moving the hatch. When we went in for the inner hatch, we could see the 
hatch fairly well. We could see the whole hatch well enough to work on it, 
the handles on the hatch, on the outer side of it, were cool enough to hold 
on to but the face of the hatch itself was extremely hot. As we unlatched the 
inner hatch and we attempted to rotate it (you have to go down slightly and in· 
ward and rotate the hatch to take it all the way out) we were unable to do 
this, either due to the speed or confusion or obstructions, so I told them to 
drop the hatch straight down, meaning to put it down on the floor inside the 
command module near the wall so that we could clear it. 
This terminates the statement of Mr. Babbitt. 
DONALD O. BABBITT 

NAA 

FEBRUARY 8, 1967 

This Statement consists of an additional statement furnished by Mr. Donald 
Babbitt who was Pad Leader on 34 during the incident. Mr. Babbitt, we've 
asked you to come in today to go into some detail with us on your observa­
tions when the inner hatch was finally removed. And, we are particularly con­
cerned with the configuration of the flight crew members as well as you can 
recall. 
When the inner hatch was first lowered, the onJy thing that I could observe 
was smoke inside. We could only feel the flight crew. We could not see them 
very well as I could tell. As the men working with me went out because they'd 
been in the smoke quite a while, I went back in, oh, approximately one min· 
ute or a minute and a half later; and all that I could observe was what ap­
peared to be Mr. White laying on his back with his arms over his head, ap­
peared to be reaching for the hatch or in something in that vicinity. I also 
observed what appeared to be Mr. Grissom laying with one of his arms through 
and appeared to be reaching in the direction of the hatch also. I went out 
again for a short bit and came back in maybe thirty seconds after that. I 
could see a little bit more. The smoke had cleared some more. All that I could 
really see was, oh maybe, to the waist of Mr. White. It appeared to me that 
they; I at first got the impression that tht;y were off the seats; and then I got 
the impression that no they were on the seats. It appeared that their suits were 
shredded. I could see bare skin. No one, at any time while I was in the White 
Room or up on Level A·B, touched the crew other than as I say when we first 
lowered the hatch and could feel in there to see what was near the hatch, if 
we could feel the crew at all. One of the firemen stepped in for just a very 
short period of time. I directed him not to bring any fire apparatus into the 
White Room and he stepped back out again. As I say, no one else from the 
time that I was up there, went in the White Room but myself. The crew 
appeared to me to be in their normal, in-flight position. I could only see what 
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appeared to be Mr. Grissom's left arm reaching through Mr. White's arm. 
I could not see his body that well, but it had the appearance of being in 
its satisfactory or its normal position. I did not observe Mr. Chaffee because 
I was a little bit too far to the right of the hatch and could not see him. Mr. 
White appeared to me to be as I say, laying in his normal boost position. I 
could not tell whether his head rest was up or down. In fact, I couldn't even 
see his features because of the, what appeared the smoke or soot blackened 
face plate on his helmet. My observations are based on the looking from the 
inside of the White Room as close as I could to the hood without stepping on 
the hood of the White Room. The hatch was lowered as far inside as we could 
lower it, and it was still sticking above the lower edge of the hatch frame about 
three to four inches. 
This concludes the statement given by Mr. Babbitt. 
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NAA 

JANUARY 29, 1967 

Are you ready for Mr. Gleaves? 
Who is the next? 
Mr. Gleaves, mechanical lead technician. 
Where was he? 
He was on the platform. Mr. Babbitt reported he would be the man in charge 
of the technicians. 
Mr. Gleaves, we are asking you to appear before us and give us your account 
what transcribed and with the understanding, however, that the same restrict­
ions continue regarding holding all this information under restraints. So with 
that I think perhaps you could just go ahead and· tell us about where you 
were and what you saw and then there will be a lot of questions probably. 
The last I remember we were waiting at ten minutes and we were holding 
for this communication problem and there were about four of us in the vicinity 
of the umbilical waiting to jettison the umbilical when it came time for us 
to do so. And Don Babbitt, the pad leader, turned up the monitor a little 
louder and during this communication problem we sent most of our guys down 
for coffee break and on this communication deal if I remember correctly they 
went from black 3 to black 2 or from black 4 to black 3 and the instant Mr. 
Babbitt flipped a switch as far as I can tell I believe it was Mr. Chaffee that 
hollered that we have a fire in the spacecraft. And immediately we ran to the 
white room. And as we started up the swing arm there was a loud shoooooo. 
Like maybe Grissom or one of them had dumped the cabin pressure. And as 
we entered the white room there was a big flash and we knew something was 
fixing to happen and we started back out. As we did so, the spacecraft ex­
ploded and fire and debris covered the whole right side. It appeared that the 
flames and all the debris came out the right side of the spacecraft. In the area 
of the rendezvous windows in this area. And it knocked us up against the or­
ange door, which I might say opens the wrong direction. We had trouble get­
ting out due to the smoke and fire in this area. But once we were out in the 
swing arm everything settled down in just a few seconds. I returned to the 
white room and the smoke, heat and flames were so bad at the hatch area 
that we just couldn't stay near the hatch. So we wouldn't. ... 
The three of you? 
No sir, I returned. Right. Then in the meantime a gentleman named L. D. 
Reece found the oxygen masks and was handing out the oxygen masks we had 
trouble locating the strip of tape on the bottom because they were painted the 
same color as the connector. And several times, one, two, three or four of us 
returned without masks and stayed as long as we could, then finally Babbitt 
and myself entered the white room after the fire had been extinguished by Jerry 
Hawkins and on all fours I crawled. I found the tool to remove the ablative 
hatch. I removed the ablative hatch and I didn't have a mask on at this time 
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and I just couldn't take it no longer so I returned out and gave the tool to 
Jerry Hawkins, Steve Clements and L. D. Reece. And they removed the abla­
tive hatch and L. D. Reece threw it out on level A8 and then these guys, also 
they had masks on, they removed the inter hatch and it was so hot they JUSt 
let it drop down under the couch. So they come back out and I in return went 
in and kicked the inner hatch and it sort of fell down under the couch. I push­
ed but it was still hot and inside the spacecraft was black and filled full of 
smoke. You couldn't see anything at all. So I returned to A8 and out of the 
white room· and got a flashlight and went back in and tried to see inside the 
spacecraft but the heat was. too great and the smoke was too bad so we re­
turned out on A8 and we continued to go back in. And as far as I can re­
member it took maybe 10 or 15 minutes for any fireman or any help to get 
to us up on the swing ar;n. 
Is there any point here? Could you draw a sketch indicating the sequences? 
Before you draw it, do you remember who the first assistance was other than 
you three mechanics? 
Do you mean from below? 
Right. 
We had two of our guys I don't remember their names. Willie Medcalf and 
some other guy came up to help us on the swing arm. From below on A8 
there was a NASA QC and a couple of North American QC with fire ex­
tinguishers fighting the fire in and around the hatches as they were coming 
out. This being the command module in the white. room here the pad leaders 
desk was here we had an electrician sitting here talking to an engineer and if 
I remeq1ber right we had an electrician sitting here at the lead man's desk, the 
umbilical being here I was standing in this area. We had a man here sitting' 
in a chair monitoring the 401 unit which was supplying G02 to the OP-l on 
sector 1 and" another one of the mechanics was standing here. And when Babbitt 
turned up, Babbitt was sitting in this area when he turned up the, monitor, 
and they hollered there is a fire in the spacecraft, I immediately run and went 

in the white room with Mr. Hawkins and a QC in the same vicinity as we went 

up these two stairs we heard a loud shooooo like maybe they had dumped 

cabin pressure. And once we entered the white room there was a tremendous 

flash and maybe the reflection come out of the hatch, I don't know. But there 

was a tremendous flash and then smoke and we started running in this dir­

ection and as we did from what I could tell the fire and debris just covered 

this whole area, just one big boom, one big blast. 

.. 
Which door did you get caught in? 
This is the orange door that the astronauts enter from the swing arm. This 

door opens in this direction, it knocked us against this door and we had to 

unpile to get out. In fact, the smoke and all was real bad at this time. 

Was there any noise associated with the flash? 
Yes sir, it exploded just like a big bang. 
Did you see anything of the hatch regard to the hatch or to the hatch window? 
B-64 

GLEAVES: 
PETRONE: 
GLEAVES: 
PETRONE: 
GLEAVES: 
PETRONE: 
GLEAVES: 
THOMPSON: 
GLEAVES: 
VOICE: 
VOICE: 
VOICE: 
VOICE: 
PETRONE: 
VOICE: 
PETRONE: 
VOICE: 
PETRONE: 
GLEAVES: 
PETRONE: 
GLEAVES: 
Well, as I entered the hatch, I mean as I entered the white room we saw this 
flash smoke and we thought it was going to blow or something bad was going 
to happen so we came out of the white room. And the instant we came into 
this area which is about three feet maybe from this door it exploded. 
You were outside the white room? 

That is right. With the flash and a lot of smoke and then we run. 

Was this direction of this explosion in the white room? 

No sir, it was from this direction. The white room fits up in this area and 

this is all open to the umbilical. 

You identify this as coming from the direction other than the white room? 

Yes sir, it come out between the white room and the umbilical I would say 

in the neighborhood where the windows are that is where it seemed to be. In 

that area. 

Can you indicate how far around that exterior shield goes, the outside shield, the 

boost protective cover, how far around that that comes relative to your picture? 

Well, the night before we had installed the boost protective cover for this run 
on our shift. And the boost protective cover when maybe a foot on the other 
side of flyaway umbilical. It went from there around to the same location on 
the other side, which if I am not mistaken is CMS the opening here and maybe 
13 here was still open but it covered this area. 
Show me where the door is into the white room. 
Well, the door into the white room is a sliding door right here in two pieces. 
That is the one if you had continued to go into the hatch you would have 
gone? 
No sir, we were into the white room. 
What was the position of the door? 

The door was in this position right here. 

Open or closed? 

Well, half of it was closed and half of it was open. These sliding doors We 

kicked it open. Yes sir. 

How many people got into the white room? 

Myself and one guy behind us. 

You were fully in? 

Yes sir. 
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Did you have a chance to look into the hatch? You were looking in what dir­
ection? At the time you felt this explosion. 
When we saw the explosion, we were on our way back out because we had seen 
the flash, the smoke, and we knew something was fixing to happen and we left. 
You saw the flash, it came from around the seal, in the white room? 
The reflect~on appeared to come out.... the hatch. There is a glass in the hatch, 
yes, sir. 

As I understand it, the point you're making is that you did not see flame dir­

ectly, but you saw the whole area light up, reflecting a flash, is that right? 

Yes, sir. 

Where were you, where did you say you thought that....? You say you thought 

the flash came from the window? 

On all three hatches. There's a little window on the boost protective cover on 

the inner hatch. On the outer hatch it gets a little larger, and the one inside 

is a little larger than it is. But there is a direct view from there into the SC. 

But you didn't get a chance to look in it? 

No, sir. 

Is that where the light looked like where it came from in there, or from around 

the hatch? 

It just appeared that there was a big flash, and I couldn't tell whether it came 
out through the window or whether it was coming from elsewhere. But there 
was the whole area lit up. 
The whole area? 

Yes, sir. 

Inside the white room? 

Yes, sir. 

That wasn't the violent....as several seconds later when you got out of.. .. 

No, sir, that's right. The big flash, as we went up the steps, like I say, we 

heard this whssh like maybe they'd dumped cabin pressure and a chance, may­
be to try to get out. And, as we entered the white room, there was a big 
flash, and then we turned and started to run, and as we did, it blew, and 
there was an explosion and a tremendous amount of flame and smoke. 
Then now did you to that door that was closed? 
Yes, sir. 
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Yes, sir. 

Which door did you run out? 

We ran out this door here, we .... 

Then out it again, anyway though you regrouped and.... 

Yes, sir. That's the only door we could get out. 

If you went out the other door, you couldn't get out that way because that 

was really burning? Out there? 

In this area? Oh yes, the Pad Leader's desk was on fire, and there was debris 
and all, laying here on fire. 
Tell us about this explosion. Try to think of some analogies to describe what 
is sounded like, now that you think about it, was it a crack, was it a whoom 
as if you threw a match into a barrel of gasoline, what was the character of 
the noise? 
I would say it was like maybe when you were a kid and you put a fire-cracker 
in a tin can and it exploded and you had the lid on it tied down and it blew 
the whole side out of the tin can with the flames shooting out. 
The noise was like that firecracker? 

Yes, sir. 

It was a loud bang, a loud explosion? Pardon? 

Bang? Yes, sir. 

Would you review for us again what you were saying about the men up near 

those oxygen bottles, what they were doing up there? 

In this area? 

Yes. 

We had two G02 bottles sitting here on a kluge which is a ZOO 025-401 unit 
which we were feeding in oxygen to sector 1, to OP 1 that fed the fuel cells. 
We had a man.... 
This was being fed at the time of the fire? 
Yes, sir. We had a man here whose prime job was to monitor that to make sure 
there was 750 psi remaining on this gauge at all times. Anytime it got low, this 
man changed the bottle. Then we had another man standing here with myself 
at the umbilical.. .. I believe he was in this area, he was actually closer to the 
SIC than myself, but he was between me and the white room, and we were 
standing there waiting to pull the lanyards to jettison the flyway umbilical when 
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our time came up which was T-IO and holding. 
This 002 was being fed where now? Does that go into the umbilical into the 
service modulei) 
This 002i) No sir, it goes into sector 1 down on the service module. 
Is this what they call the pad pressure on the tanki) 
No,__________ 
Yes sir, it's in a test port no, it's ah, in a servicing port, fill port, right .... 
into.... 
Into the cryo oxygen .... that's right. 
This isn't a typical engineering way to describe it. Your two bottles - you draw 
your oxygen for this test, directly from a bottle, fed into the system rather than 
the cryogenic system you normally draw your oxygen from the cryogenic tank, 
liquid oxygen, in the service module, as it boils off you feed it into the com­ .. 
mand module, into the surge tank which has been described to you a few times, 
in earlier discussions, into the surge tank into a set of regulators as you go into 
the environmental control system, cabin, of the suit loop. So this, for this test, 
we had no cryogenics aboard. It gives you the oxygen pressure you need to feed 
the 02 into the cabin. 
And at the same time is one feeding oxygen to the fuel cells? 
Fuel cells were not active. They were bypassed - they were on - you will find 
that the power system was not running. We had other things. The fuel cells 
were not active. 
Well, I think it will be very important, in that, to know where they were by­
passed because there are a number of parts of the system brought in even though 
the oxygen is being fed in from .... 
I am not sure that Mr. Gleaves is the man to give you the details on the con­
figuration, but we on the panel, Mr. Williams, is on .... the final configuration 
of the bottles, the loops and where they're tied in. 
This shows the 6th deck. The platform and the steps. 
That's a point I made earlier, I wanted to be sure. 
Well, let me come back to....you ran out the door, you moved when Abbott 
came out the door or did you not wait for them? You went back by yourself? 
Well, when Babbitt came out, he was screaming for someone to please get them 
out of there. And, we returned; not only myself, I returned first, but I came 
back out and at that time I was given a fire extinguisher, and I passed it to 
Jerry Hawkins, and he, in turn, went in and emptied it to extinguish the fire 
around the hatch. But, there was five of us out here, and we each took turns 
going in and out trying to do something. 
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Did you have a gas mask? 

At some times I had a gas mask, yes. Other times, no. 

At any time that you went in there, did you notice flames inside .... 

I nside the bird? 

Through the window, yes. 

No sir, the smoke was so great that you just couldn't see anything. But there 

was definitely flames coming up outside like it was coming up from the next 

level around the hatch. 

I think you've answered this question, but I want to be sure I understand it. 

The point where you were just prior to your receiving a first indication that 

there was anything unusual about the whole thing, what was the first indication 

that you had that there was anything wrong? Where were you? 

I was standing in the area of the umbilical. 

And what way were you looking at that time? Do you know which way you 

were facing? 

Yes, I was talking to the pad leader, or I had been talking to the pad leader. 

And what was the first event that gave you an indication that there was some­

thing wrong? 

When Mr. Babbitt switched on the communication. Like I say, it was either 

from Black 3 to Black 2 or from Black 4 to Black 3, I don't really remember 

which it was, but the minute he switched, it sounded as if it was Mr. Chaffee 

hollered, "We have a fire in the Sc." And at that time, we all run in this 

direction toward the white room. 

Why did they switch it? 

They were having a communication problem. 

Well, why did they switch it at that particular time? 

Because as he monitors the different channels on his head set, when he follows 
the test, and when the blockhouse who it is says go from Black 3 to Black 2, 
he immediately switches. 
We.assume that he switched over to this because the blockhouse had instructed 
him to. 
Well, because everyone on this channel was switching. 
Right, before they switched, they were talking to Mr. Grissom, and Mr. Grissom 
they told him he was very garbled; they were talking to Mr. White and he 
said he was a little better than Gus, but he was still garbled, and Mr. Chaffee, 
they told him that he was the best of all. That they could understand him more 
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plainly than any of the others. And when they asked them all to switch and 
that's when they started flipping channels, and that's when I'd say it was Mr. 
Chaffee hollered that we have a fire in the SC. 
How much switching action was both in the capsule and on the loop? 
Everyone on the loop everywhere was changing switches. 
Do you know what the time was, of the switching? 
No, I believe it was in the neighborhood of 6:30. 
No, I meant were we switching within ten seconds. 
We were at -10 minutes and holding for this communication problem. 
Yes, I know that but, in relation to the fire or the flash or the glitch of the 
communications when was the last time there was direction to do switching? 
At this, when they switched from Black 3 to Black 2 and someone screamed -
Mr. Chaffee I think screamed, we have a fire in the SC, immediately I run • 
and Mr. Babbitt throwed his headset down and was coming behind us at the 
same time. 
Can you describe what Grissom said, it was garbled, could that have been a 
call of fire or something? Was that around the same time? 
Pardon me? 
You said that as you checked communications that Gus Grissom said something, 
that it was garbled. 
Well, they were talking to them. 
Right. 

The astronauts. And they were checking this communications problem. 

And when was it? 

It was just prior to switching from Black 3 to Black 2 or from Black 4 to Black 

3, whichever it was. 

And then was that after the word fire? 

That was before the word fire. A matter of maybe 30 seconds or a minute. 

You heard this through your headset? 

No sir, I heard it through the monitor. I wasn't on the squawk box. 

Well, I think there's a point here that has been established and perhaps he 

should renew it. As I understand it the hold was on account of the communi­

cations problem. 

B-70 
WITNESS: 
THOMPSON: 
WITNESS: 
THOMPSON: 
VOICE: 
BORMAN: 
WITNESS: 
PETRONE: 
VOICE: 
PETRONE: 
THOMPSON: 
PETRONE: 
THOMPSON: 
PETRONE: 
THOMPSON: 
PETRONE: 
THOMPSON: 
VOICE: 
That is affirmative, yes sir. 
I t was on the ten-minute hold? Because of the communications problem? And 
then, is it correct that some change there decided that everybody switch to 
another channel because of that problem? 
Right, they were switching trying to determine what the problem was. Whether 
it was inside the spacecraft or the blockhouse or just where. 
The communications problem ..... 
They were switching around from different things. 
Internal switching, internal SC controls. 
Right. 
Dr. Thompson, I think on this .... 
They had done this prior on the C-band or Sob and or !Dmethin g else. 
You can get a communication engineer to relate how they, what they do in 
the SC vs. on the ground. Remember, we said we were on S-band communi­
cations. And, this configuration is very important, what channel they were on, 
what was being over the air, whether you were OIS or operations intercom 
system. What switching is done on the ground vs. what's in the SC. I think 
that's most importa'nt. 
Well, there's one point I would like to be clear on and that is the duration or 
the previous history of this problem, how long prior to this final switchover 
had that problem existed. Had it been, had it existed for two hours? 
Yesterday, in our summary, when the astronauts in their suits got into their 
suits got into their SC, it was the first time you could make a communications 
check with the actual speaker system and so on. And, there had been a series 
of difficulties in being able to hear. Either due to the air rushing by the mike 
or due to other difficulties, there had been a series of let's go VHF, go hard­
line, OIS, or S-band, so this had been the entire time they were in there, 
at various times there were switches in communications being made. 
Well, in other words, there was nothing so unusual about having a problem 
in communications. Is that the point? 
Yes. there is nothing unusual.. .. 
We will develop in a subsequent. 
At that particular time, that was nothing unique? 
We will develop the actual timing of this thing I think in subsequent review 
of the information. 
I guess it is a fair statement to make that the channel switching that this man 
did and the other man did, there's no physical connection between this man 
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between those systems and the spacecraft. 

Well, we will. 

Except they were switching at the same time. 

He said they were switching at the same time. Now that's the thing I think 

we'll have to, I don't think you would even know they were switching at the 

same time. 

I think we have apparently got just one point that seems somewhat important 

and that is to say whether because of the switching of communications one 

didn't hear the word "fire" for the first time. 

Yes, I think that will show up later. 

We will have a review of events, recorded events. It will clarify that to the 

extent it can be clarified. But Gleaves is not the man in the position to give 

us much. Information on that as far as I can see except to establish the pur­

pose of the hold and the fact that it's been a problem. 

You were monitoring the crew paneL ...all this time? 

Yes. I was on 1, 2, 3, and 4. I was on aU the channels. 

Any garbled conversations that you couldn't identify the nature of the conver­

sation? 

No. 

Let's get back to any further questions that you want to ask now before we 

let Mr. Gleaves go. 

Mr. Gleaves: Did you go out the door before Mr. Babbitt? 

Yes sir. 

You did? 

.,
Yes sir. 
In fact, Mr. Hawkins was first and I was behind him and who was behind me, 
I don't really remember. But I know he and I were the first two out this door. 
I was going to ask: Can you give us your estimate of time between when you 
first heard the fire call and went into the White Room? How much time do 
you think that took? And between the time you decided to exit the White 
Room before this big explosion. 
I would say it was just a matter of juSt a few seconds. 

There was two periods of a few seconds each then you would say? 

No, I would say from the time he hollered "there is a fire in the spacecraft" 
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and we started running until the time we headed for the door, was just a 

matter of seconds . 

Yes, well, I was trying to break down the two periods; one you went in the 

White Room and then you saw this flash outside and decided we better get 

out of there. 

And we immediately, there was no hesitation, we immediately turned and ran 

out. In fact, I almost ran over Mr. Hawkins. 

The first time was how many seconds would you guess to run that distance to 

get into the White Room before you decided to switch. 

Just a couple maybe three. 

And then you started running out and got about to the door and this other 

thing happened .... the Bang .... Would you say that was "2-3". seconds? Was it 

almost that long between the flash and the other "boom"? Was it about as 

long as it took you to get out of there? 

No. When it flashed, then we remember smoke, then immediately it blew. 

So there wasn'tmuch time to .... 

But he got all the way from the White Room out to the orange door in that 

length of time. 

No, we got almost to the white door which is maybe as far as here to the mike. 

And it's not that great a distance from there. 

You go through the white room door? 

Right. 

From the time you heard fire until the time you heard the bang. 

Pardon.... 

From the time you heard fire until the time you heard the relief valve. 

I say it couldn't have been over 10 seconds at the most.. .. or 15. 

You mean, it might have been on order of 10-15 seconds? But in the other 

period it was only one or two seconds. 

That's right. 

Sir, back to the....we, I say we.... there exists procedures for emergency egress. 

Pad egress. I know you can't think of everything, but do you have a procedure 
that would come close to meeting this kind of thing and did you or were you 
just reacting spontaneously or did you have pad egress procedure you were 
trying to do? 
No sir, we are well aware of how to get these hatches off. Then he hollered 
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"fire" and all we could think about was to get the hatches off. 

Could you have used more help? 

No sir. 

You couldn't physically get people in there? 

That's right. After the explosion we re-entered the White Room and the fire 

was too great and the heat and the smoke was too intense ....you could not 

breathe in there. After we could not breathe .... 

I believe they had more help during that period that they would have under 

a hazard egress condition. 

I think there is one thing of significance here your job was in 10 minutes to 

get that hatch off. 

No. 

Were they going to pull the hatch? 

We were going to plus three. 

The astronauts were going to pull it from inside and we were to assist them on 

the outside of catching the hatches as they came out. 

In 10 minutes he was going to pull the umbilical when we picked up the count. 
The egress would have been practable at the end of the count planned at plus 
three hours. 
What were the words from the crew the first words you heard? 
When Babbitt switched channels, the first thing we heard was that one of them 

hollered, "We have a fire in the spacecraft". 

It wasn't just fire? 

No sir. "We have a fire in the spacecraft." 

That was actually the sentence? 

He may have hollered the word "fire" before Babbitt switched. And then he 

did say, "We have a fire in the spacecraft." 

You were not wearing a headset? 

No sir. I was listening to the monitor. 

Any further questions? 

Well, thank you, Mr. Gleaves. 
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Mr. Chairman. I know it is slight side point here to this. It came up. WeJEFFS: 
talked about it. I know my people have been trying to work with that garbled 
transmission too. To see if we can get some information out of it. I presume 
the data team is also working with that and you will hear a report on that, 
later on. There might be something there we should try and see if we can't 
extract. 
., 
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LEWIS CURATOLO 

NAA 

FEBRUARY 22, 1967 

II' 
" 
My assignment as Pad Leader on Spacecraft 012, I was responsible for lst shift activities concerning 

Test and Operation of the Spacecraft and Ground Support Equipment at Launch Complex 34. The 

scheduled activity for January 2:7, 1967, was the performance of OCP-0021 (Plugs Out Test). Chrono­

logically, to the best of my knowledge the events of the day were as follows: 

Power was applied to the Spacecraft and Ground Support Equipment at approximately ow(3. Normal 

power up procedures were followed. System power up began almost immediately after the Spacecraft, 

Ground Support Equipment power up. No major discrepancies were noted during the power up se­

quence. 

During the power up portion of the procedure we experienced many OIS communications problems. 

At approximately 1300 I notified the Test Conductor and Test Project Engineer that we were ready to 

perform Crew ingress. The Suit Technician and the Spacecraft Technician performed the pre-ingress 

layout of the cockpit and couches. This procedure consists of laying out the pilots seat and shoulder 

harnesses, and routing of the 02 umbilical hoses. I instructed the Spacecraft Technician to remove all 

foreign objects and materials from the Spacecraft interior. At this time the Technician handed out a 

number of plastic bags and some foam rubber mats, which we normally use for protecting wire bundles 

and Spacecraft honeycomb structure. During the pilots ingress I handed the Spacecraft Technician two 

pieces of foam rubber wrapped in velostat which were to be used for protection of the inner hatch 

during the scheduled emergency egress procedure. 

After completion of the Crew ingress we proceeded with Hatch closeout, and Cabin purge, as directed 

by the Environmental Control System engineer and Test Project Engineer. During Cabin purge we 

detected a strong pungent odor which smelled like MEK. We reported this to the Environmental Con­

trol System engineer, and he directed us to do another purge because the 02 content inside the cabin 

was only 75%. We did another purge and pressurization and obtained a 92% reading on the analyzer. 

At this time we were directed to proceed with outer hatch and Boost Protective Cover closeout. We 

installed the outer crew hatch and started with the Boost Protective Cover installation but experienced 

some difficulty in getting the Boost Protective Cover to lock in, so I notified the Test Project Engineer 

and asked for an Interim Discrepancy Report. The Boost Protective Cover was left unlatched and we 

were instructed by the Test Supervisor and Test Conductor to clear the White Room. I followed the 

Test Conductor's instructions and at this point (1730) the 2nd shift Pad Leader (Don Babbitt) relieved 

me. After giving Mr. Babbitt a turnover on the next sequence of events I left the service structure and 

positioned myself in the Operations Trailer to monitor the "Liftofr' sequence of the procedure. This 

was my location at the time of the accident. Approximately 5 to 10 minutes after the accident I was 

instructed by the CVTS to go back to the A-8 level of the service structure to relieve Mr. Babbitt. 

Upon re-entering the A-8 level I observed that some areas of the Spacecraft exterior were still smolder­

ing, and the Crew Hatch had been removed. I instructed the firemen to remove the shear panel from 

the White Room to allow the smoke to dissipate and allow the interior of the Spacecraft to cool. I 

entered the White Room and observed that the flood lights on the Crew Couches were still illuminated 

and the main display Console lights were still lit. I reported this condition to the Control Room and 

the blockhouse. I observed that the body of the Senior Pilot was wedged between the Crew Couches 

and the hatch bulkhead; the Command Pilot was positioned in the center couch with his body part­

ially hanging over the center couch. The Pilot was in a reclining position in the Pilot's Couch. 

I observed that the Command Pilot's leg pans were in the rest position, the Senior Pilot's leg pans 

were in the boost position, and the Pilot's leg pans were in the full down position. 

I was relieved by Mr. J. Murphy at approximately 2100. 

/s/ L. Curatolo 
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L.D. REECE 
JANUARY 27 - 28, 1967 
At the instant of first indication of a problem, I was on station at the cut-out in service tower directly 
above the flyaway umbilical. I was standing on the side of the cut-out nearest the pad leader's desk. 
When the 10 minute hold was announced, I had moved around only slightly and had stayed pretty 
much in this area listening to the communications problem being discussed. I believe communications 
requested a test' count from one of the crew so he could "Investigate Cross Reception Between Black 2 
and Black 3." 
A very few seconds later a seemingly calm voice said, "There is a fire in the C/M" or "There is an 1 
electrical fire in the C1M., '" . 
• 	 Turned toward the C/M intending to go into White Room and assist removing hatch. Immediate (1-2 
sec.) there was a sheet of flame shooting out from C/M 17 access. Another 1 sec. I was inside White 
Room with one or two other persons, I don't know what happened the next 1-2 seconds, as I became 
scared and turned and ran across swing arm to elevator where several people were yelling and screaming 
that there was a fire and to help us. 
A couple of seconds later some one got their wits and yelled, "Fire Extinguisher." Some else yelled, 
"Gas Masks." I got the extinguisher from hook west side of No.22 elevator door and carried it back to 
step down and handed it to Gleaves. Turned back got a couple of masks; put one on; gave one to 
someone and went back to White Room to open hatch. Smoke was so thick, very black, could not find 
tool or anything else. Went to level A-8, had nothing to use. Went back to swing arm outside door, 
then returned to White Room two more times trying to open hatch and leading Gleaves out as his 
mask didn't work and was blinded and choking. Last time inside Gleaves located tool, got B.P.C. cover 
off or partially off! left again, and I stayed and helped Hawkins remove outer hatch. I think I got 
scared again as I returned to swing arm, then went back to find hatch (inner) finally being pushed 
in. I could see nothing at all, but finally made out the left hand head floodlight very faintly. I was 
very highly excited at this time, and thinking I heard crew I leaned in as far as I could feeling around 
center couch. I felt no one, but still convinced I had heard them, I took mask off yelled several times 
to crew, felt around, then left mask on center couch and returned to swing arm. 
I tried several gas masks after this, but all were broken or would not work. In meantime several men 
had been applying extinguishers, so as area got smoke cleared out, I gathered all Inspection Documents 
few at time and put on southeast elevator and called Inspection Trailer to meet me at ground level. 
At critical time between hearing crew announce fire and going out swing arm, I just am not sure how 
many explosions occurred, possibly two. 
lsi L. 	D. Reece 
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RICHARD A. HAGAR 

NAA 

JANUARY ZT, 1967 

REPORT ON 012 
I was monitoring the OCP on level 8 at the plus axis with Dale Hickenbottom. Dale told me there was 
a fire in the command module. I started for the White Room and had reached the +Z axis when I 
heard two loud pops. I stopped momentarily and at that time fire shot out of the command module 
at the +Y and -Y axis. The time elapsed couldn't have been more than a couple of seconds. 
lsi R. A. Hagar 
JANUARY 27, 1967 
SECOND STATEMENT 
While monitoring the OCP I heard the report given "fire in the spacecraft." I was on level 8 at the 
+Y axis. I started for the White Room and as I reached the +Z axis I heard two loud pops, at
• this time fire blew out of -Y and +Y access panels. I went out on one of the elevator arms and at this 
time all of level 8 was on fire. I then proceeded to leave the tower. 
'" lsi Richard A. Hagar 
JANUARY 28, 1967 
Everything relating to this AS 204 plugs out test is classified in accordance with the mission failure 
plan. My name is Richard A. Hagar, my organization is North American Aviation, my position is 
spacecraft electrician, my supervisor is Carl Black; and my station call sign is SCO. On January 27, 
1967, I was sitting at the -Y axis of the command module monitoring the OCP with Dale Hicken­
bottom, QC with North American. At approximately 6:30 there was a broadcast on the net that there 
was a fire in the command module. At this time I left my position - I was monitoring here, and walked 
to the +Z axis going towards the White Room. At this time I noted two loud pops, two loud bangs, 
and at this time fire shot out of +Z and the +Y and the -Y axis. Quite a bit of flame to be exact. 
At this time, noting the flame coming out I turned and went out onto one of the elevated platforms; 
however, I left the gantry. At this time, I reported to the tech trailer and reported to my supervisor, 
Carl Black, and stood by the trailer until approximately 11:30 when we went to the operations trailer 
for a short meeting where we wrote down our recollections of the OCP and the test and what had 
happened on the level, and then we were· to come to the War Room for another meeting. At this 
time, Mr. Pearce asked Dick Bachand and myself to go into the command module after they had 
removed the astronauts and check through the switch positions and so forth to see if there was anything 
unusual and maybe out of place. At this time upon entering we went to the OCP up and around 
where they were testing at T-minus 15 minutes. Up to this point everything seemed good. The two 
main things that we did note, panel 150, the pyro panel, was out of position; it is normally mounted 
on the forward equipment bay in the right hand corner and it was approximately 8 inches forward 
of the equipment bay sitting on two brackets. It had not, from all appearances blown out since the 
mounting screws were laying right in front of it in a neat pile, and if they had of blown, why they 
would have stripped the screws and probably blown around the command module there. There were 
thr~ circuit breakers engaged, they were Batt A power entry, Batt B power entry and Batt C power 
entry. The other circuit breakers on the panel were open. Starting after T-minus 15 minutes where we 
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would have picked up the count, which is T·plus 36, the only two things we checked into the sequence 
and fuel cell 3 on panel 18, fuel cell 3 to bus A was in the center position, and fuel cells 1 to bus B 
was in the center position. The other fuel cell switches on the busses were off, and you first step in 
sequence page 6, I don't recall the paragraph right now, but were to throw these to "ON" momen­
tarily. It looked like this might have been done ahead of time, I don't know what bearing offhand, 
this is done but going on 9206 sequence 06 the battery relay~ busses were open and on the command· 
er's panel 8, which would have been a few of his call-outs. The rate gyros were in the normal position 
and it looked generally pretty good. The test light or the abort light was hanging about half way out. 
It looked like there had been. some flames shooting out beside it. But I believe that does it generally. 
This is all I have to relate concerning this test. 
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RICHARD A. BACHAHD 
HAA 
JAHUARY 27, 1967 
At the time of this incident, I was standing about 10 feet from the outside between the + Z and + Y 
axis, level 8A, facing away from the C/M. When I heard the astronaut give the alarm over the headset 
of "Fire in here," I turned to look at the C/M. I heard a low burp, then a large whoosh, then a 
.. 	 wall of flame from the side of the CIM jumped from floor-to-ceiling and a pressure and heat blast 
pushed me backward. I dropped my headset, turned, and ran to the exit on the northwest corner. 
I called the elevator which arrived in about 30 seconds and went down in it. This is all I remember 
of the incident at this time. 
lsi Richard L. Bachand 
January Zl, 1967 
JAHUARY 29, 1967 
Everything related to this AS-204 plugs-out test is classified in accordance with the mission failure plan. 
My name is Richard L. Bachand, Tech Support Crew. My position is Spacecraft Mechanic Senior El­
ectronic. My supervisor is Carl Black. My station call sign is SCET, which is the Command Module 
electronic tech. On January 27, 1967, I was part of the before-mentioned test. I was on the adjustable 
8 level, 	Command Module level, between the +Yand +Z axes, approximately 10 feet from the Cpm­
mand 	 Module. I was monitoring the command channel and active on green ten with MRCS (sta­
tion call sign) at the time the alarm was given by the astronaut that there was a fire in the Command 
Module. I was facing away from the Command Module, and immediately I turned and looked at the 
Spacecraft; and I heard a small burp or thump which I didn't know exactly what it was at the time. 
I have been told since then that several others heard it and again find it is the Command Module 
pressure relief valve. Immediately following this, I'd say less than a second later, there was a large 
"woosh" and a wall of flame rose up between me and the Command Module. I'd say it was from 
floor-to-ceiling. Everywhere I looked there was flame. I dropped the headset, turned around, and ran 
for the exit which was on the northwest corner. I got out through the door, which locked behind me, 
and I'd say less than 30 seconds later, the elevator got there, and I went down on the elevator. This 
is all I have to relate concerning this test. My name is Richard Bachand. 
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STEPHEN B. CLEMMONS 

NAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

1. First attempt to enter CIM via white room. 
2. Went to get gas mask 
3. Second attempt to enter C/M. Helped to remove B.P.C. access door and outer hatch to C/M. 
4. Went to get another gas mask. 
5. Helped to remove inner hatch. 
JANUARY 27, 1967 
After hearing the words, there's a fire in here, I turned toward the SIC and saw a white glow coming 
from the edge of the boost protective cover at the next opening as diagram shows. 
Don Babbitt ydled, there's a fire inside and I ran toward the white room. Babbitt, Gleaves, Hawkins, 
L. D. Reece and myself tried to get in but by this time (10 seconds approx.) extreme heat and flames 
drove us out of the swing ann. We tried to find some gas masks but there was a little time required 
finding any. When we finally found some, one mask came off the hose and two could not be opened 
on port at bottom. By this time, the flames and smoke had subsided so that we could attempt to open 
the hatch. We finally removed the outer hatch and outer C/M cover, after some difficulty because of 
a binding condition on B.P.C. By this time our masks had been used up. All this occurred within 4 
minutes or less. With fresh masks, we attempted to remove the inner cover. On opening the last hatch 
we were driven back by the heat and fumes/smoke. I saw no fire and the small florescent lights on the 
seat head rest area was still burning. Before leaving, I stuck my hand inside but I could feel nothing 
or see anything because of smoke/heat. I did not hear any sounds emitting from inside. By this time my 
gas mask was used up and the fireman arrived. All this took place no longer than six minutes after it 
started, or so it seems. 
Then joined the other personnel putting the fire or remains out. There were not too many significant 
items except when it started. There seemed to be a loud venting of gases, then ignition which sounded 
like a gas jet being ignited. There was no loud explosion and the fire seem to come from all directions 
exiting from the command module access ports. 
Is/ Stephen B. Clemmons 
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JAMES EARL CROMER 

PAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

1215 - I went on station for the 220 foot level of umbilical tower for egress mode. 
1245 This was about the time the astronauts arrived. From this time until accident it was routine test 
on elevator which was in egress mode all this time. 
About 1530 - During this time Bendix crew on 220 foot level changed crews on the unit on 220 foot 
level. I obtained permission from French Johnson for them to ride elevator. I was in Blue 3 on the 
head set and was monitoring Black 3 at this time. There was two sampling men which came up and 
took samples in the 8th level and then returned to the ground. 
Accident - At the time of the accident, I was on 220 foot level standing beside elevator looking at 
White Room, there was a flash of fire which came out of the \Vhite Room door, the concussion blew 
the side doors open, personnel left 8th level onto the catwalks to get their breath. Personnel came from 
White Room and told me to tell someone th'l.t the spacecraft was on fire which I repeated over Blue 
3. I asked for gas mask to be put on elevator 1 to the 8th level catwalks. I also reported the 8th level 
was on fire. I assisted the personnel on the 220 foot level with gas masks and the one fire bottle on 200 
foot level. I asked that the elevator stay at 220 foot level which it did for quite some time. Personnel 
used all fire bottles that could be found. Personnel made repeated trips into the capsule, but had to 
return for air because of the gas and smoke. One made repeated trips in until one fellows put him 
and theirselves on elevator which I sent to the bottom to the ambulance. The elevator returned to the 
220 foot level for stay-by. From this time on Harry and I controlled the elevator from top to bottom 
for personnel that was permitted to use the elevator. \Ve stayed in this configuration until we secured 
the elevator at about 9:50 p.m. (the egress) at the bottom level. Which then we went to elevator 4 
and put it on express from the 1st, 6th, and 8th levels. 
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JOSEPH H. PLEASANT 

NAA 

FEBRUARY 7, 1967 

On Friday, January 27, 1967, at approximately 1830 hours, I was on Level A-8 of the structure stand­
ing near the stairs to the White Room. At that time, someone yelled, there's a fire in the Spacecraft; 
and about that second, there was a muffled explosion and fire shot out from around the bottom of the 
Command Module in several places. The Level immediately filled with smoke and some visible flame 
about the Spacecraft. The C02 bottles on that Level were being used by personnel to fight the fire. 
C02 bottles were brought from another levels to help. Every attempt was made to open the hatch for 
the astronauts' escape. There were no elevators available, so I climbed from Level 8 to Level 6 over 
the cat walks and then to A·5 where I went into a Douglas room and called the Fire Department; 
but they had already been notified. 
At that time, someone was paging for the Tech Trailer to come up on headset. This was made several 
times. I went to the Tech Trailer by way of the stairs and reported in on headset but no answer. I 
immediately started with a head count of the aSE personnel and notifying higher level of supervision. 
When the first-aid trucks arrived, I sent five aSE technicians to the Dispensary which had been on sta­
tion or or near Level A-8. Names as follows: B. Belt, A. Journey, J. McConnell, W. Wingfield and W. 
Schneider. 
lsi J. H. Pleasant 
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BRUCE W. DAVIS 

NAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

I was standing at the umbilical on the adjustable 8 level at the time of the fire. Just previous to the 
fire I heard that the astronauts were having trouble with communications. They were instructed to 
change to Black 2 channel. At this time I heard someone say, "There is a fire in the cockpi~." I 
turned around and after about one second I saw flames within the two open access panels i~--the 
command module near the umbilical. Someone said, "She's going to blow." Before I could turn around 
I heard a whoosh and flames shot out of the access panels. Someone shouted, "Clear the level." As 
I turned around and ran toward the south west door I felt a large breeze and felt the flames. Several 
of us got out the door and turned to look back through the window and all we could see was flames. 
Someone said the Launch Escape System is going to blow and some guys climbed down the beams to 
the next level. We looked back and someone said, "T~ere's nobody alive in there." The elevator 
finally came up and we got on it and rode down to the bottom floor. 
/s/ Bruce W. Davis 
.. 
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FRIEND D. HICKENBOTTOM 

HAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

I was on level A-B, on a head set, monitoring the test, located on the south side of the tower, near 
the Quality Control desk. 
I was facing east when I heard a report on the headset that there was a fire in the Command Module, 
this report I believe came from Chaffee, at that instant I looked northeast and saw a spurt of flame 
come from the area under the white room and heart a report that sounded like a small explosion 
followed by a louder, more distinct noise, and flames shot out of the openings of the Command Mod­
ule. 
At that time I left the headset and went to the phone which was located on the same level at the 
southeast corner of A-S. 
I reported a fire in the Command Module on Complex 34, Level A-8 to the PAA Fire Department 
and waited for the indication that they understood me, which they did. 
At this time I walked to the elevator on the southeast corner, called it and returned to the door where 
a fire extinguisher was, I took it and started to fight at the south side of the Command Module and 
continued until the firemen arrived. 
Time was approximately 1820, crew reported fire, Fire Department called on way to get fire exting­
uisher, elevator arrived, (Rogers, NASA Quality Control, covered me with smock), ran out of ex­
tinguisher, flames are at all ports, up to 5 feet high near pad leader desk. Documents caught fire 
from objects blowing out near Pad Leader's desk. Got new fire extinguisher, flames are high again, 
flames secured on area near Quality Control desk, partially secured by the Pad Leader's desk. Fire 
Department arrived and finished the flames in the area near Pad Leader's desk. The area near the 
umbilical island was hard to put out. 
The area had such dense smoke that it was not possible to determine where the major flame area was, 
but it was definitely on the north side near the umbilical and on around near the hatch. Flames were 
at times very near the base of the Launch Escape System (LES). 
Hagar and I were discussing the jackets and other non-test related items, the count was at about 10 and 
we were having communications problems. This communications problem was not of such magnitude 
that it kept me from hearing the report from the astronaut that there was a fire in the cockpit. 
lsi Dale Hickenbottom 
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JERRY W. HAWKINS 

NAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

I was located at the swing arm at the passway from level A8. Someone yelled fire, and I saw flame 
billow from the Spacecraft toward the pad leader's desk. The next thing, fire was show'ing up in many 
places; people were coming toward the swing arm; the area was rapidly filled with smoke and fire. 
We opened the swing arm exit and went to the umbilical tower to get gas masks and return to the 
white room, but fire and smoke was blinding. We ran back to the umbilical tower and found a fire 
extinguisher, returned to white room and put the fire out around the hatch area. My hose came off 
my gas mask, and I had to return to the swing arm. Gleaves, my lead man, came out a little later, 
how long I'm not sure, choking, and handed me his mask. He said "I got the B.P.C. hatch, get the 
others." I returned, and Clemmons and I removed the outer and inner hatches. We couldn't see in­
side, but leaned in and felt for the crew. The heat was tremendous, and I got ashes or soot on my 
hands, and all objects were too hot to touch. I was getting smoke in my mask at this time and left 
momentarily for fresh air and a flashlight - 10 - 15 seconds - returned to hatch with lite and there 
was nothing but what appeared to be a blanket of ashes across the crew couches, and no one could 
be made out anywhere in the C/M. The firemen arrived, and I left the white room to inform pad 
leader of condition inside C/M. Then helped Gleaves to umbilical elevator down and to medics. 
lsi Jerry W. Hawkins 
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W. DONALD BROWN 
NAA 
• JANUARY 28, 1967 
... Was at Quality Control desk when Command Module access panel 10 seemed to ignite as a minor 
type explosion. During this period 2 wooshes (loud) of escaping gas were heard. The area L·8 became 
immediately full of smoke, grey. I went to L-7, top of Service Module (S/M), Sector I and II, were 
burning. Also quads A and B were on fire. Fire was coming from inside Sector I access from below 
the access (much grey smoke). I returned to Level-8 from Level-5 and smoke was still coming from 
under and left-hand side of BPe. Upon returning from L-6 with extinguisher was told to leave area. 
I do not recall any times (clock) of these events. 
lsI W. D. Brown 
B.97 


JESSI E L. OWENS 

NAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

Accident Report - Launch Complex 34, Level A-8 
Time: Approximately 6:30 
My position was near the Pad Leader's desk (by the water cooler). Garbled communications, but in­
telligible enough to hear switch to Black 4 or Black 2 - then fire in Command Module - I turned, 
looked at the Pad Leader, looked back at the Command Module at the White Room P hatch area, 
heard what sounded like the cabin relief valve open and high velocity gas escaping. Within two sec­
onds (l estimate) high velocity gas came out the access panel in the +Y direction from the G and N 
(Guidance and Navigation System). Immediately this gas burst into flame somewhat like lighting an 
acetylene torch. I turned to go to the White Room at the above noted instant but was met by a 
flame wall. I turned to exit through the northeast door to the elevator and my hair was singed in the 
back under my white cap (evidence of the height of the flame). I exited to the crosswalk but no ele­
vator was available - turned back to into the A-8 area but flame and door being latching type from 
inside, I couldn't get in. I climbed out on the structure and down the beams to the stair area, went 
down the stairs and to the nearest trailer and phoned C. C. Stephens. 
NOTE: The smoke I breathed was foul and of an irritating nature. The flame was orange. 
/s/ Jessie Owens, NAA Supt. 
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ROBERT C. HEDLUND 

NAA 

JANUARY 27-28, 1967 

I was standing on the +Z+Y area watching Davis checking quick disconnects when I heard over the 
Pad Leader's speaker, "Fire in the cockpit," turned to look at the Pad Leader when I heard a whoosh. 
Looked at C/M, saw small flames coming from access hatches. Started away from C/M when a large 
whoosh accompanied by extreme heat and flame shot out of the access hatches. Fled to the southwest 
exit where a pile up occurred over a K bottle (oxygen storage) in the way. Finally everyone got out 
on platform where we were trapped until elevator arrived. The door to level A8 locks when closed. 
When elevatpr finally arrived, looked back and could see flames through A8 access door window. 
/sl Robert C. Hedlund 
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JOHN E. MARKOVICH 

NASA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

I was on duty on the 1530 to 2400 shift on January 27, 1967, as a NASA insepector on Launch Com­
plex 34 from the KD-22 (Quality Surveillance Division) office located at the Kennedy Space Center. 
OCP K-0021 was in the process of being accomplished and approximately 1830 hours I was standing 
at a point several feet and to the northwest of the command module of spacecraft 012 on the A-8 level 
of Launch Complex 34. 
At approximately 1830 hours, I was standing facing the spacecraft when I heard a muffled explosion. 
I then saw a huge flash fire shoot out from a service port at +z axis of the spacecraft. Fire quickly 
encircled the base of the spacecraft and between the spacecraft and the service module. Almost instan­
taneous the fire enveloped the complete spacecraft and extended upwards past the forward heat shield 
by about four feet. 
There was a stampede of personnel at this time towards the exits to the elevators. I was knocked to­
wards the northwest door and knocked down by several persons who had rushed for the door. I finally 
got back to my feet outside the door and walked to the elevator entrance door. 
Someone had summoned the elevator and after about two minutes the elevator arrived. We all then 
entered the elevator for ground level. If memory serves me correctly there was about twenty people on 
the A-8 level and about six of us on the elevator. After about 30 minutes PAA ambulances took about 
8 of us to the P AA Dispensary for treatment. 
/s/ John E. Markovich 
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JOSEPH L. STOECKL 
NASA 
JANUARY 27, 1967 
At approximately 1833 on Friday, 1-27-67, I was standing in the southwest corner of the service struct· 
ure on level A-8 reading the NASA Quality Control tie-in log. I had my back to the· spacecraft. When 
I heard what sounded like a muffled explosion, I turned around and saw that the spacecraft appear­
ed to be engulfed in flames. The area near the white room access door was engulfed in flames and 
level A8 quickly filled with smoke. The nearest exit was via the southwest elevator, and I and several 
others took this elevator to the ground level. 
lsi Joseph L. Stoeckl 
JANUARY 29, 1967 
I'm Joseph L. Stoeckl, Shift Supervisor NASA Quality Control at Kennedy Space Center. On Friday, 
27th of January at approximately 6:30 I was on the adjustable 8 level Complex 34. At the time, I was 
standing with my back to the spacecraft reading an entry in the NASA Quality Control tie-in log. 
Approximately 6:30 upon hearing what appeared to be muffled explosion, I turned around and saw 
that the spacecraft 12 command module was engulfed in flames. Immediately after this the adjustable 
8 level filled with dense smoke and seeing that there was quite a number of people up there who 
appeared to be in a better position than myself or closer to the white room and having access to fire 
bottles, I being in the southwest corner of the adjustable 8 level, I departed the area by using the 
elevator on that quadrant. We descended to ground level and vacated the pad. 
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HENRY H. ROGERS, JR. 

NASA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

At approximately 1825, I was on the southwest elevator going up to the White Room (level 8) on the 
way up I heard on the P.A. system or coming from the gantry area - fire - fire - a battery fire. I 
got off on the 8th level and asked a PAA guard to please hold the elevator at this level. 
I entered the White Room to locate a CO2 bottle to extinguish the flames. The fire seemed to be 
burning from the inside of the Spacecraft to outside as the flames were coming out of the servicing 
access panels. We expended (Mr. Higgenbottom, NAA Inspector and I) all CO2 bottles on the 8th 
.. 	 level, after approximately 10-15 minutes we located the gas masks. I and a NAA shop man donned 
ours and entered the Spacecraft White Room and attempted to remove the Spacecraft inner hatch. 
We were unable to get it all the way out or to force it downward when we finally had it out far 
enough to see and reach into the inside of the Command Module, due to the intense smoke and heat, 
the inside appeared to be a mass of charred materials, after we had extinguished all visible flames, 
we were ordered off the complex by Public Address System. 
/s/ Henry H. Rogers, Jr. 
JANUARY 27, 1967 
At approximately 6:21 in the evening on Friday, January 27, I was on the southwest elevator at Pad 
34 going to the white room. On the way up on the elevator I heard on the PA system that there was 
a fire in the spacecraft and as the elevator was going up I heard fire, fire, it's a battery fire. And 
the elevator stopped on the 8th level there was smoke coming out of the white room and there was 
a North American technician standing there looking for a fire extinguisher. I found one behind the 8th 
level entrance door with the walk way, I gave him the fire extinguisher and my coat to wrap around 
his face. I tried to secure the door open to let the smoke out and went in and found another fire 
extinguisher. We fought the fires until for about five or six minutes and we located the gas masks. We 
donned gas masks and the pad leader requested we go in the white room to assist in getting the inner 
hatch off. When I got in the inside of the white room, where the inner hatch was being removed, the 
hatch was loose but they couldn't get it out. They had quite a bit of trouble getting it out. I went 
outside and underneath the little white room that swings into the spacecraft I tried to jam the entrance 
hatch down with no effort. I went back in and we had it pushed down enough where we could barely 
see inside the command module and there was a lot of smoke and heat coming from the inside of the 
spacecraft. \Ve reached in and we couldn't see anything, so we reached in to see if we could feel any­
thing. All we felt was heat and ashes. I went back out and told the pad leader that there was noth­
ing in there that we could get out. He said go back in and get the men out. By this time we had 
gotten a flashlight and the smoke was still so dense you couldn't see a thing. We reached back in there 
again and nothing could be found except ashes and heat. I went back out and reported this to the 
pad leader. We continu~d fighting the fire until we heard on the PA system all personnel evacuate 
Pad 34' levels at which time I walked down three levels and caught the elevator down. 
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QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
CREED A. JOURNEY 
NAA 
MARCH 1, 1967 
Mr. Journey would you please give your name, organization, location of where 
you were the evening of January 27 and a brief recounting of the events as 
they transpired on January 27, 1967. 
Creed A. Journey, North American. I came up on level adjustable 8 to talk 
to the Pad Leader just prior to the fire. Shortly after I had entered the door 
on the level, someone said that they had fire in the Command Module. By 
the time that I had walked a quarter of the way around the Command Module 
fire broke out of the Command Module in high velocity streams. I had been 
on Level 7. I threw myself on the floor, due to the fact that I thought the 
Command Module was blowing up. There was high velocity streams of fire, 
oh, 6, 7 feet long coming out of the servicing ports on the southeast corner 
directly facing the ocean. I threw myself on the floor looking at the Command 
Module. After a few seconds, the fire died back down; and I realized that we 
could put the fire out that it wasn't going to blow up. It no longer was high 
velocity. It had settled back down. I did, I guess I wandered around A8 try­
ing to find a fire extinguisher which I couldn't locate in the smoke and in the 
confusion. Finally decided that I couldn't find a fire extinguisher so I started 
to leave. One of the men from A7 came up with a fire extinguisher, and we 
put out the fire. We continued to have trouble with fire breaking out underneath 
the heat shield. The substance under there took us several fire extinguishers to 
continue to finally stop this blaze from breaking out. After the confusion was 
over, we did go down (I asked the Pad Leader's permission) to go down to 
188 ievel and turn off the batteries for thc .... that were to simulate the fuel 
cell power supply. We went down and secured these batteries so that they 
wouldn't be on the service at the time. After securing the batteries, we pro­
ceeded on down the Tower and finally were taken in an ambulance to the 
hospital. By we, speaking of Bill Wingfield and myself, went down and secured 
the batteries and proceeded on down to the ground level and on the the hos­
pital afterwards. Just prior to the time that fire broke out of the capsule, it 
sounded like - similar to a C02 fire extinguisher which I realize there wasn't 
any in use that soon; but I assume that it was a pn~ssure relief of the Command 
Module. There was a large sound of this prior to the time that the fire broke 
out and came external to the capsule. 
Have you any idea of the time, in seconds or minutes? 
It would be in seconds, because I only had time enough to walk, as I say to 
walk a quarter of the way aro'llld the Command Module before the fire broke 
out, at ·the time I first heard that there was a fire in the capsule. 
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WILLIAM J. SCHNEIDER 

NAA 

MARCH 1, 1967 

QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
Mr. Schneider, would you give us your name, organization, and a brief des­
cription of your dutues. Then, launch into a recount of events, as you remem­
ber them, on the night of January Z7 of this year. 
My name is William J. Schneider, S-C-H-N-E-I-D-E-R. I work for NAA assign­
ed to the Ground Support Equipment Section. 
On the night of the incident, I was assigned to Level A7, the standby in the 
vicinity of the fly-away umbilical at approximate T-O and also the reinstallation 
of the fly-away umbilical. I had gone to the A7 Level at approximately 6:15 
to standby up there. We were monitoring the test on the squawk box on the 
7 Level. There were, I believe, two mechanics and one other electrician with 
me, plus company and NASA inspection. The first indication that I had trouble 
was when I heard someone hollering, "Fire in the Spacecraft." I am not clear 
at this time whether it came over the speaker or whether it was someone on 
the Level above us, on Level 8, that made this statement. 1 don't recall any­
thing coming over the speaker. I know that when we heard "Fire," very short­
ly thereafter, I felt heat on my back. 1 was sitting with my back towards the 
Service Module. At the time I ·heard the cry and felt the heat. I took off out 
the....1 went out the door towards the east passenger elevator accompanied by 
several other people. The elevator had just departed from Level 6 and was 
going down. I saw that I couldn't get on this elevator to get down. So, I 
turned around to go back into the tower figuring that I would go in the tower 
to the steps leading down to the next Level and go down the stairs this way. 
At this time, I saw the fire; and there was fire inside the Service Module or 
it appeared to be inside the Service Module. I could see it through the open 
doors - the open quad doors. Someone at this time hollered that we had to 
get the fire out or else the LES would go; and another man and myself, Space­
craft inspector, got a fire extinguisher and started playing it inside the door 
of the Service Module. When this fire extinguisher ran out, I left Level 7, took 
the stairs down to Level 6 and got another fire extinguisher on Level 6, came 
back up to Level 7 and by this time, the fire seemed to be in pretty good 
control on Level 7. There wasn't anymore around. We looked up at this time 
and could see more fire on Level 8. So, we went back up out Level 7 up to 
Level 8 and started using the fire extinguisher up there. When this fire exting­
uisher ran out, I left again and went down to Level 6, two flights down, and 
got another fire extinguisher from the.... it would be the altogether opposite 
corner (the west corner). I went back up to Level 8; and we used this fire 
extinguisher until it ran out. I then headed back out the door again back 
down to Level 6 and on the way ran into two more people coming up from 
ground level with a bigger fire extinguisher and some gas masks. We went back 
up to the 8th Level, I put on a gas mask; and we went inside with the big 
fire extinguisher. By this time, I. had started coughing rather severely from 
smoke. The gas mask that I had gotten hold of didn't seem to be operating 
quite properly. So, I took it off, went back out and got another gas mask. 
When I came back in, the Pad Leader grabbed myself and another man. I 
had given the fire extinguisher to a third man up there. He grabbed us and 
said that· we had to get inside; we had to get the men out. About this time, 
I was coughing real heavily; and my gas mask fogged up; and I just felt like 
B-ll1 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
I was getting sick. So, I tore the gas mask off and went out across the access 
arm that comes in on Level 8 to the Umbilical Tower to get some air. I stayed 
on the Umbilical Tower about, oh time is hard to tell how long - thirty sec­
onds or so - maybe, until I quit coughing a little bit; and I headed back 
across towards Level 8. I then met a man bringing one of the Spacecraft lead 
men out who was coughing real heavily, and I assisted this man in getting the 
Spacecraft man down to the ground. When I got down on ground level, the 
guards down there wanted us to clear the area. I went out across the Pad and 
did not go back into the area. The man bringing the big fire extinguisher up 
from the 6th Level along with the gas masks was McConnell, a NAA mechanic 
assigned to GSE; and the Spacecraft man who we helped, (it was McConnell 
also who was waiting) a man by the name Gleaves, Spacecraft lead man, across 
the access arm. I helped McConnell get Gleaves down below. The personnel 
assigned on the 7th Level with me before the incident occurred were: Bill Dea­
ver, Electrician/NAA; Sam Williams, Mechanic/NAA; and Randy Rooker, 
Mechanic/NAA. 
Did you notice any exploding or popping sounds or would you tell us please 
just what you did hear in the way of sounds? 
There was no sound that you would normally classify with an explosion, not a 
loud bang or anything like this, no popping. About the only word that I could 
use to describe anything, any sound I heard, would be a sort of swooshing 
sound or great rush of air. This sound that I heard occurred before I was able 
to clear the area....shortly after, or at approximately the same time that I felt 
the heat on my back. 
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DAVE E. HOWARD 

NAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

I was on station just below the G.S.E. umbilical. I heard one of the astronauts say they had a fire in 
the cockpit. Then a loud swoosh and a ball of flame came from the bottom of the Command Module. 
Everyone exited and went out to the Northeast elevator on my side and to the Southeast on the other 
'" 	 side. I returned from out on stand and the area below command module around the umbilical was on 
fire. I extinguished this fire and then noticed the fire coming up out of sector one. I emptied fire bottle 
in sector one. Found another fire bottle and used it in sector one and on quad door. We then went 
to level "A" eight where they needed fire bottles. Fire was com!ng from access hatch nearest umbilical 
and from under the B.P.C. in that area. We emptied a couple of fire bottles in these areas. Then I 
grabbed the gas mask from outside southwest door of level and took them to pad leader on swingarm. 
I then went back for fresh air and a mask to use. The fire department arrived shortly after this and 
we cleared the pad. 
This whole sequence started with the blast and continued till they announced for us to clear pad. 
We were on level A Seven for two to three minutes and on A Eight for five to ten minutes. 
JANUARY 27-28, 1967 
I went out exit to my left. Turned and saw fire had diminished from original burst of flame. I put 
out fire between Command Module and Service Module and on quad door. Then put fire in Sector 
1 out twice. I then went to level 8 and helped put out fire in access panel 17 and under B.P.C. and 
gave gas mask to pad leader. 
lsi D. E. Howard 
Method Used to Reach Ground Level: 
Howard used elevator #4. 
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J.e. SCOTT 
~AA 
JANUARY 27-28, 1967 
.. 
I was standing on Level VII (7) just under the umbilical. Someone said, "Fire in cockpit." Almost 
at the same time I heard a noise of some kind started to run took two steps and second noise occurred. 
Large ball of fire fell from Command Module down to Service Module into Sector I (one). Got fire 
extinguisher helped put out fire on Service Module Sector I (one), was burning at this time from some­
where below. This took approximately 8 minutes then went to Level VIII (8) to help. At this time had 
got gas mask. When I got to Level VIII (8) fire was coming from all access. Got three access put out 
with help from several others, went into White Room to help, got there just as inner hatch was re­
moved but was not able to see anyone. Went to get new mask at this time fire was out then cleared 
pad. 
/s/ J. C. Scott 
NOTE: Witness feels the 8 minutes mentioned above was more like 2 minutes after thinking it over. 
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ROB ERT I. BASS 
NAA
.. JANUARY 27, 1967 
I was on station on the 200 ft. level of the umbilical tower manning UFET station (Umbilical Tower 
Facility Electrical Technician). I heard a muffled explosion and went out of the Acceptance Checkout 
Equipment (ACE) room to see what had happened. There was smoke pouring out and around the 
swing arm going into the White Room. I heard men shouting Fire! I grabbed a fire extinguisher and 
climbed up to the 220 ft. level and carried it across the swing arm to the entrance of A-B. There 
were men running around and in and out of A-B. I gave my extinguisher to someone inside of A-B 
who used it on the side of the Command Module. The smoke was very thick and impossible to stay 
in for longer than a minute or two. They were trying to get the hatch off the Command Module, but 
it was too hot. I stayed on the swing arm until the hatch was removed. I then left and went down 
to the ground. 
is/ Robert Bass 
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JOHN C. McCONNELL 

NAA 

MARCH 1, 1967 

This is John C. ~fcConnell from Xorth .-\merican. I am a GSE Technician. My duty station was on 
. the 190' level on the water-glycol trim units. I was on the 190' level of the Umbilical Tower. I heard 
somebody say there was a fire in the Spacecraft. I was on the headset, but I can't remember whether 
I heard it come off of the headset or one of the guys up in A8 say it. After I heard somebody say 
fire in the Spacecraft. I stood up and walked around. Just about that time, it exploded. It lit up the 
whole A8 level when it exploded. I hollered at the guy up on the 200' level. He handed me down 
the fire extinguisher. I crossed the cat walk on to A6. There was a gas mask box sitting by the door. 
So, I had to break the seal on it. I grabbed two gas masks, went through 6, and climbed the stairs 
up to A8. When we got up to the top of the stairs, we put on gas masks and went inside with the 
fire extinguisher. I came in the south door on A8. went around the Spacecraft to the small connecting 
panel - I think it's where the cables go into the Spacecraft, the one closest to the White Room. That's 
where we used the fire extinguisher. After the fire extinguisher was completely empty, I talked to Don 
Babbitt and Jim Gleaves; and the only thing they said was get them out of the Spacecraft. By this 
time, they had the hatch off, both hatches. So, I went up and I looked in. You couldn't see any­
thing but smoke. So, I came back out and got a flashlight.."asked where they were (I'm not too 
familiar with the Spacecraft itself). I went back in with the flashlight and got as close in as I could. 
Even with a flashlight, you couldn't see anything--it was pretty smoky and it was pretty warm. I went 
back out, and I don't know how long I stayed out. We went back in again, and a fireman followed 
me in. I stayed in there with him in the White Room. He went in with his fire suit on, and he came 
back out and said, . 'Forget it," or something to this effect. I don't know exactly what happened. 
Then, I left and we went down on the elevator, the Umbilical Tower elevator to the ground and 
then went to the hospital. 
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BURT B. BELT 
HAA 
MARCH 1, 1967 
This is B. B. Belt, North American Aviation, Lead Man/GSE, Complex 34. The following are the 
events as I remember them on the night of the incident, on Complex 34: I had left AS Level to go 
downstairs to the latrine. On returning and entering the express elevator, I overheard people yelling. 
coming down from the second level . that there was a fire in the Spacecraft. The elevator started up; 
and due to a situation in the elevator, it stopped at A6. The door opened, and I heard people from 
AS yelling for gas masks. They needed them on AS in order to get back in and go to work, I suppose. 
We found gas masks on A6, outside of the door on the northeast corner. By the time that I got to 
the gas mask box and broke the seal and opened it, there were two or three more mechanics and 
inspectors on the Spacecraft crew that got to A6. We loaded up with gas masks and immediately 
went to AS. We distributed them around to the people who were standing outside of the Level. We 
entered the southwest corner door into the Spacecraft and started getting fire extinguishers and fighting 
fires that were coming out from ports for qd's and so forth and so on around the Spacecraft.' At that 
time if I remember correctly, firemen arrived with portable fire extinguishers on wheels; and the fire 
was put out. We worked in the area trying to get smoke out and doors opened so the smoke would 
clear. About that time, Lou Curatolo who is the first shift Pad Leader, instructed myself and three or 
four other technicians to go down the Umbilical elevator (the egress elevator) and enter ambulances 
and go to the Dispensary. 
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GEORGE W. RACKLEFF 

NAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

.. 
I was on level A7 directly under the clean room at time of accident. Reason I was there was to assist 
• 	 the technicians in installing a modification kit to the A14-019 flyway umbilical. This was to be accom­
plished after the Plugs - Out Test. 
I had been on the pad for about one hour. During this time some communications problems, appar­
ently, were occurring with the crew members. 
I was standing beneath and slightly to the right, looking inboard of the swing arm entry. A moment 
before the accident, I heard one of the crewmen say "Fire," then I saw a large puff of smoke and 
fire exploding from the area round the swing arm entry hatch. At this point a great amount of con­
fusion started. My main thoughts were of safety. I followed the workman out to the elevator and went 
to the ground. This all happened about 6:30. 
Since I had inhaled a small amount of the smoke, I was requested to go to the dispensary for a check 
up. I was released about 10:30 and returned to my motel room at Cocoa Beach. 
/s/ George W. Rackleff 
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SAMUEL WILLIAMS 
NAA 
JANUARY 21, 1967 
.. 
I was sent up to level A-7 to support OCP 0021 on the disconnect of the flyaway umbilical (A14­
019). I was sitting on a work stand monitoring the OCP between the TC and the Astronauts, they 
were having a lot of radio trouble, and switching back and forth between channels. 
They were at T-IO minutes and ready to pick up, when one of the Astronauts, it sounded like Grissom, 
say, "There is a fire in the cockpit." 
There was a scream from one of the Astronauts and then silence, then there was a very short lapse of 
time, and I heard the first explosion, which was not too loud, then immediately following it, there 
was a second explosion and fire came down through level A-7 at the swing arm where I was on the 
work stand, and I could feel the heat on the back of my neck. I run for the door and got to the 
elevator at the north east end of the structure, and waited to get down to ground level. 
While I was 
at that level. 
waiting for the elevator, I looked up at level AS and could see fire and a lot of smoke 
/s/ Sam Williams 
• 
.. 
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RANDY ROOKER 

NAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

• I was sent up to level A-7 to support the fly-away umbilical disconnect per OCP K·OO21. I was to 
perform a modification on the A14-019 (umbilical disconnect) after it had been disconnected from the 
spacecraft. While monitoring the conversation between the test conductor and the Astronauts as to the 
communication problems between MILA and the Command Module, I understood the Test Conductor 
to tell the Astronauts to switch back over to VHF and pick up the countdown at T·tO minutes. There 
was a time lapse of, I guess, approximately two or three minutes, and then I heard Astronaut Grissom 
say, "We have a fire in the cockpit", and then I heard a scream over the intercom. Immediately 
after the scream, I heard a small muffied explosion and then a large explosion followed by a large 
flash of fire. The flame came through the opening between levels A·8 and A-7 where the umbilical swing 
arm connects, I immediately ran to the exit which leads to the northeast elevator, got aboard the 
elevator, and left the structure. 
lsi Randy Rooker, 420508 
.. 
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WILLIAM H. WINGFIELD 

NAA 

MARCH 1, 1967 

.. 
.. 
My name is William H. Wingfield. I am employed with North American Aviation, Complex 34. My 
job is a GSE Electrical Technician. At the time of the accident, I was on Level 5 of the Complex 
structure. At the time of the accident, I was monitoring a GSE equipment on Level 5 and was re­
quired to stay there. I might add that the only thing that I could actually say for sure is that I did 
hear someone call out "Fire". I feel that it was Roger Chaffee. Again, this I'm not sure of; but after 
listening to the conversations of the other personnel involved, I feel that this was he. Momentarily 
after the fire began, I contacted my Lead Man (Steve Jones) who was in the AGCS area and asked 
him if I should leave my station, leave the structure, or go to Level 5 and help assist the other per­
sonnel up there. I was advised to stay at my station. (Correction, I was at Level 5 and asked my 
Lead Man if he suggested that I go to Level 8 to help in the evacuation or aid in any other way.) 
I was advised to stay at my station until further orders. Immediately thereafter, there was an announce­
ment on the PA system to leave the structure. I left my area, went out of Level 5 to get on an eleva­
tor; and the elevator was not there. Approximately a minute later, another Lead Man, Mr. Journey, 
came out on the level where I was to get on the elevator with me. After getting on the elevator, 
went from there to Level 8. We were there for a few seconds (thirty seconds at the most) going through 
the level and from there we walked down, or I walked down to Level 188' and opened some breakers 
on a power supply. This was, I understand, the 20 volt power supply. However, I understand later 
that this power supply had not been activated or it was not being used at the present time. Never­
theless, I felt like that I should open the breakers to prevent any further fire or danger to any other 
people that may be around. 
After leaving the 188' level, I walked from there down to the ground level across the Pad. After a 
delay of about ten minutes, we were (I say we - myself and other people that were around) taken to 
the Cape Dispensary for smoke inhalation tests and whatnot. While I was at my station on Level 5, 
I did not see any fire in the immediate area. However, there was quite a bit of smoke. I looked out 
of one of the windows on the Level, and I could see fire, paper flying from the structure or from Level 
8 I suppose. But as far as any fire on my Level, there was none. 
/s/ William H. Wingfield 
• 
• 
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MARVIN L. NELSON 

NASA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

I was on A·7 at southeast side of the service module. I heard the words "Fire in the Command Mo­
dule" over the loudspeaker. It seemed that almost immediately smoke began to fill the area. (I was on 
A.7 waiting for the umbilical disconnect.) When the smoke started to fill the area, I went out to the 
southeast elevator. It was not working so I went back through the 7th level to the stairway and came 
down that way. 
lsi Marvin L. Nelson, NASA 
Phone: 452·3611 
... 
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PATRICK E. MITCHELL 

HASA 

JAHUARY 27, 1967 

I was standing on A7 at the A14·019 umbilical disconnect when the word "fire" came over speaker. 
The level filled with smoke, and I tried to get the southeast elevator which wouldn't work. I returned 
through the A7 level and noticed flames between Command Module and Service Module. This was 
aU because level was filled with smoke. 
/s/ Patrick E. Mitchell 
.. 
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w. e. DEAVER 
NAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

I was on A-7 to work fly-away umbilical portion of test when the count was held at ·10 min. Heard 
someone say there was a fire in cockpit and to get us out of here. I heard two explosions and then fire 
was coming out between Command Module and Service Module. I headed for the elevator and came 
down to ground leveL 
/s/ w.e. Deaver 
• 

B ·135 


WILLIS M. MEDCALF 

NAA 

MARCH 1, 1967 

• On or about 1825 Friday, January 27th, I left the Tech Trailer on my way to the Eighth Level. 
After getting on the elevator and rising three or four levels, I heard someone shouting Fire. When 
the elevator stopped on the eighth level I went to the door to go inside. I met Dale Higgenbottom on 
the way out to get a fire bottle. He went back inside and I tied the door open to let some of the 
smoke out. I then ran down to one of the lower levels and got an arm load of gas ma!lks. I returned 
to the eighth level. As I brought the masks inside, I saw the Pad Leader standing on the swing arm. 
At this time the Firemen were starting to arrive on the eighth level. The Pad Leader looked in my di­
rection and shouted that he wanted "Two Firemen right now". He said he had a Crew inside and 
he wanted them out. A Fireman and myself headed for the White Room. When we got inside I saw 
that the Boost Protective Cover (BPC) and outer hatch had been removed and the inner hatch had 
been pushed in and down. There was about a six inch to a foot gap between the top of the hatch 
and the hatch opening. I told the Fireman to give me a hand to get the hatch out. We almost had 
it out when he let his side go and took off. I ran out of the White Room and grabbed another Fire­
man. We went back inside and took the hatch out. The C/M was full of smoke and I couldn't see 
anything. Someone came up behind me with some flashlights. We looked inside again and all I could 
see was what appeared to be white ashes laying over the couches. I then went out on the swing arm 
and told the Pad Leader that there wasn't anything left inside. I then asked him if there was any­
thing left that I could do. He said that there wasn't so I got on the umbilical elevator and went 
down. 
/s/ W.M. Medcalf 
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ROBERT C. FOSTER 

HAA 

MARCH 1, 1967 

On the night of the accident, I was working in the AGCS Room. We had a break, and I went up 
to the ramp and was checking the servicing units for security. I was in the fuel area when I looked 
upward and saw smoke pouring from level A-8. I immediately yelled, "Fire". at two PAA Security 
patrolmen who were stationed on the south side of the structure. They ran to their vehicle at once. 
I then returned to the AGCS Room and got my flashlight and went back to the ramp. I observed 
some PAA people close to the east side of the tower and went over to warn them. It was then I heard 
the word being passed for gas masks and fire extinguishers on level 8. 
Mr. Carl Black of NAA and myself carried a box of gas masks from the vicinity of the Umbilical 
Tower to the southeast corner elevator. I carried a fire extinguisher on also. Meantime, a PAA fire 
truck had parked adjacent to the elevator. We tried to get fire extinguishers from them. We got one 
small bottle and a fireman to go up the elevator with myself and a KSC Safety man. 
Immediately upon reaching level 8, the fireman got off first with the fire extinguishers and went into 
the White Room. The Safety man and myself followed with the gas mask box and started passing them 
out. I t was still smoky. 
The floor was littered with empty extinguishers so I started moving them off to the side away from the 
immediate area of the Spacecraft. 
Meanwhile, more extinguishers arrived and a fire hose was taken from its stowage rack and put into 
use. 
During these events, the hatch was opened, and I heard someone say the astronauts were dead. 
I cleared more fire extinguishers and gas masks, etc., out of the way and then stood off to the side 
or outdoors until Mr. Curatollo said there was no more we could do and to please leave the area, 
which I did. 
lsi Robert C. Foster 
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CLARENCE A. CHAUVIN 

NASA 

FEBRUARY 3, 1967 

STATEMENT OF WITNESS: (Written) 
The hold at T-IO minutes was a result of general communications problems with spacecraft and facility. 
I had judged that, although the spacecraft communications were not good, it would be worth a try 
to pick up the count. I informed the CSTC that we were ready to make our power transfer to internal, 
but we were requested to maintain present configuration because of crosstalk problems on the CVTS 
channel. At the first indication of trouble, there was little activity in the control room. I was reading 
the next operation in the procedure (to myself) when I heard something about a fire. I looked up at 
the TV monitor and saw something burning around the upper part of the command module. At this 
point, I was still not aware that we had a fire in the spacecraft. I had at first thought that a fire had 
started outside the command module and then someone over the headset confirmed that the fire was in­
side the command module. I immediately attempted to contact the command pilot over the headset 
with no response. I then had our communications people attempt to contact the spacecraft from our 
Ground Service Equipment transmitter located at the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building. No 
response was received in this mode, so our next action was to power down the spacecraft as rapidly 
as possible. The instructions to make the communications check with GSE and the order to power 
down the spacecraft were given off of the headset in order to minimize traffic on the command channel 
(Black 3). From this point on, there were no control room functions performed. Sometime later we 
had the control room secured with a guard at the door. \Vritten statements were obtained from each 
of the different groups that were on station at the time of the incident. All recorders were stripped 
and data confiscated. All procedures and documents were impounded and held in. the control room for 
further disposition. 
lsi C.A. Chauvin 
FEBRUARY 3, 1967 
QUESTION: 	 Would you identify yourself by name and organization? 
ANSWER: 	 Clarence Chauvin. I work for the Test Conductor's Office in Spacecraft Opera­
tions. 
QUESTION: 	 Mr. Chauvin, you probably are aware that this information is of a critical nature 
regarding the review board's attempt to learn as much as they can from a 
causative standpoint regarding the incident, and you are requested not to discuss 
any information which you may have except to authorized members of panels 
or the inquiry board. Mr. Chauvin, would you describe your responsibilities 
and duty location with respect to the Plugs-Out Test, conducted on Complex 
34 on January Z7, 1967. 
ANSWER: 	 I am the NASA Spacecraft Test Conductor. My basic responsibilities are to 
conduct the test in real time with the crew and all the support people. The 
location of my duty station was at the MSOB ACE Control Room 1. 
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QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
Would you describe the events which you observed prior to, during, and sub­
sequent to the incident which occurred on Complex 34 on the day in question. 
We ask, wherever possible, that you give us time references or time frames, 
specific locations, as well as you can define them, or use reference to structural 
points. 
I would first like to preface any comments regarding the incident by recapping 
the problems that occurred that were not resolved at the time of the incident. 
The first problem that we encountered was when Gus Grissom ingressed· into 
the spacecraft, and hooked up to his oxygen supply from the spacecraft. Es­
sentially, his first words were that there was a strange odor in the suit loop. 
He described it as a "sour smell" somewhat like buttermilk. We stopped to 
take a sample of the suit loop, but it was our intent in discussing it with Gus, 
that we would continue under these circumstances. The next problem that 
was encountered was regarding a high oxygen flow indication which periodi­
cally caused the master alarm to corne on. In discussing the problem with our 
Environmental Control System people in real time, they felt that the high 
oxygen flow indications were caused by movement of the crew, therebyestabli­
shing transients in the oxygen system itself. At the time of the incident, there 
was no further resolution on the high oxygen flow. The third problem that was 
encountered was regarding the command pilot's (Gus Grissom's) communica­
tions from the spacecraft to the Control room. During the course of trouble 
shooting the problem in the spacecraft, the problem appeared to be localized 
with, or when, Gus put his VHF AM switch to the Transmit/Receive position. 
The crew did interchange cobra cables. It was my assumption at the time that 
the interchange was between the command pilot and the senior pilot. The 
command pilot's cobra cable was later changed with a spare. The problem still 
existed, which led us to believe that it was localized somewhere with the switch 
or behind the panel. Over and above the localized communication problem that 
we encountered in the spacecraft, we also had problems with general communi­
cations, even from the MSOB to the Complex 34 blockhouse. The overall 
communications problem was so bad at times that we could not even under­
stand what the crew was saying. Just prior to the hold at T -10', which was 
approximately 1821, we had the crew go to the S-band mode of communica· 
tions. We had the CAST panel configured to put S-band on Black 3 only. In 
this mode of communications, we were able to obtain a fair conversation with 
each of the crew. Under these circumstances, at approximately 1827, we informed 
the blockhouse that we were ready to pick up with the count. The blockhouse 
asked us to stand by because they were having crosstalk problems on Black 2, 
apparently picked up from our Black 3 channel. At this time, everyone in the 
control room was standing by their consOles to pick up at the T-1O' point. 
I specifically recall that I had my pen in my hand and I was glancing over 
the next page to keep it fresh in my mind. At the first call of "fire" over 
the headset, I immediately glanced up to look at the TV monitor in the control 
room. I noticed flames somewhere in the vicinity of the apex cover at the top 
of the command module. I could not tell what was burning, and, at the time, 
I was not aware that we actually had a fire in the spacecraft. I had thought 
possibly the call of fire had corne from someone on level 8 and so I continued 
to watch the TV monitor. Shortly after that, someone on the headset con­
firmed that we did have a fire in the spacecraft. I immediately attempted to 
contact the command pilot on Black 3, possibly four to five times. I got no 
response. and I then proceeded to have our communications people attempt 
to establish contact with the spacecraft via our GSE, which would be an RF link 
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• 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
transmission. Attempts to reach the crew were unsuccessful in this mode, and 
by this time we had actually realized, or I had actually realized, that the crew 
was in real trouble. My next step in the control room was to get the space­
craft powered down as rapidly as possible. My direction was to the Electrical 
Power System people, not in specific directions, but just to power down the 
spacecraft as rapidly as they could. Both my directions to the communications 
people and to the power people were not over the headset. It was sort of yelling 
across the room in order to keep the Black 3 command channel as clear as we 
could. We were continuously monitoring the TV in the control room and we 
did see the smoke, and we did see the people come out, attempting to put the 
fire out. The TV monitor in the control room had the view looking along the 
.y axis of the spacecraft. We could not see the hatch from this view. vVe could 
not see the Pad Leader's desk from our view, and at the time that I first noticed 
the fire, there were no personnel that I could see on our monitor. Everyone 
in the control room had their headsets on at this time, and everyone was moni­
toring the Black 3 channel. As we listened over the headsets to the people on 
level 8 talking, we confirmed on our TV monitor what they were saying reo 
garding the smoke getting progressively worse. Much of the activity that we saw 
in attempting to put the fire out, the people were not on headsets, they had 
donned their gas masks at this time. \Ve had a second monitor, TV monitor, 
in the control room with a view of one of the service module quads. We had 
used this monitor in our simulation of the Reaction Control System static fire. 
Sometime during the course of events after the fire had started, I did glance at 
the second monitor and noticed that there was a fire already burning toward 
the top portion of the quad. As I watched the monitor, a technician..... 
As I monitored the TV shot of the quad, a technician with a C02 bottle 
moved into the area, and we watched haying hopes that possibly they would 
be all right, but had just lost communications. 
~lr. Chauvin, would you review for us what transmission you overheard on 
Black 3 prior to and during the fire. 
I would estimate that approximately 30 seconds before I heard anything audible 
concerning a fire, there were no transmissions from the crew or from the block­
house. I heard something about a fire but I couldn't make out the details. 
I do remember hearing the word "fire" through, at that time was when I 
glanced up to look at the TV monitor. Again, at this lime I was not sure if 
the fire had started outside the spacecraft or what the situation was. It was 
not until later when I heard the blockhouse attempting to talk to the crew did 
I realize that the fire was actually inside the spacecraft. I recall hearing the 
blockhouse . I had assumed it was Chuck Gay - ask the crew to egress. He 
said "Crew egress". He then followed up with the question, "Crew, can you 
egress at this time?" There was no response from the spacecraft that I heard 
in the control room. Now, it was at this time just following his lack of commu· 
nications with the crew that I had our communications people attempt to reach 
the spacecraft via the RF Loop. I then recall the blockhouse again, apparently 
Chuck Gay· instructing the Pad Leader to get the crew out. The Pad Leader's 
response to the best of my recollection was that they were trying but the smoke 
at that time was so bad that it created problems. I have specifically and in­
tentionally neglected to use time references from the base line of when we knew 
we first had trouble because of the confusion in my own mind . it appeared 
much, much longer for each of the different operations than it actually was. 
lsi Clarence A. Chauvin 
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#45T 
WILLIAM H. SCHICK 

KSCINASA (DLO) 

FEBRUARY 3, 1967 

ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
'" 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
I am William H. Schick, John F. Kennedy Space Center, Directorate of Launch 
Operations. 
As a point of information, Mr. Schick, you are probably well aware of the criti­
cal nature of the information that you will furnish to us and we request that 
you don't discuss any specific knowledge or observations you may have regard­
ing the incident on Complex 34 with anyone other than those authorized by 
the Review Board in session or members of the subpanels. Would you des­
cribe your responsibilities and location with respect to the Plugs Out Test con­
ducted on Complex 34 on the day in question. 
On the day in question, I reported to work at 1630 hours as Assistant Test 
Supervisor in the Blockhouse, Complex 34. I relieved Bert Grenville, who was 
the day assistant test supervisor and assumed my responsibilities of monitoring 
the spacecraft checkout procedure for DLO in the Test Supervisor's position. In 
addition to this responsibility, I had the responsibility of keeping up the Test 
Supervisor's log with respect to the space vehicle procedure. I was located at a 
Test Supervisor console. 
To the best of your ability, will you describe the events which transpired shortly 
prior to, during, and subsequent to the fire which occurred on the pad on 
January Z7. We ask that you give us specific or approximate time references if 
possible, or perhaps a time frame or time lapse from one activity to another, 
and then your references to other prts of the blockhouse or the pad area, if 
you could define them to us by some either specifically, relative to a diagram, 
or make reference to some physical structure in that area. 
From 1630 until the time of the incident, I was performing my function of 
listening to OIS networks Black 1, Black 2, and Black 3 and noting various 
items on the Test Supervisor's log sheet. Items that were listed were only items 
that I thought to be significant during a normal type countdown. This includes 
problem type items and milestones that had been completed through the checkout 
procedure. While monitoring on Black 3 and just prior to the incident, there 
is recorded in my log various statements of communication problems that the 
SIC crew was incurring just prior to this particular event. I might also note 
that all times quoted by myself that are listed in my log were recorded from the 
Greenwich Mean Clock which is located on Test Supervisor Panel A-9, at which 
I was positioned. At the time of the incident, which was 1831, the first words 
I heard of anomaly was a report of "Fire in the cockpit". At this time I 
immediately looked at the Greenwich Mean Clock and recorded the hour and 
minutes. The words that were heard over the DIS "Fire in the cockpit", could 
not be identified by myself as to the particular channel it was transmitted on 
since I was monitoring Black 1, Black 2, and Black 3 at the time. After the 
incident I continued to record to the best of my ability all significant events that 
were coming over DIS. The "majority of these events being on Black 3 with 
the exception of a few launch vehicle directions that were being given out by 
the launch vehicle test conductor. At this point in recording I would like to 
cover a brief period of time from my log that I can verify is accurate with 
8-145 
respect to times and statements that are in the log which were heard over 
the OIS system. Item No.1- recorded at 1831 . The words "Fire in the 
cockpit", I presume came over Black 3. Item No.2- 1832 . The pad leader 
was directed by the Test Supervisor to help the crew egress. Item No.3­
1834 . The Command was given over the Black 3 channel for the spacecraft 
to immediately power down. Item No.4 - 1835 - The launch vehicle reported 
that all power was down except for power to support the water system at that 
time. Item No. 5 1836- It was reported on Black 3 that the SIC hatch was 
open. Item No. 6 - 1836 - It was reported on Black 3 that the SIC hatch 
was off. The following is a quote. It was on OIS Black 3. "Too much smoke 
in the spacecraft to see". Item No.7 - 1838 - On Black 3 a report that people 
were available with gas masks but cannot see. The following quote on Black 3: 
"Can feel Astronauts but cannot see". "Need battle lights." The CVTS log 
sheet that I was keeping was kept until 1928 - at that time the log sheets were 
turned over to the space vehicle test supervisor. Now that I have reported on my 
log I would like to give a brief description as to what I saw during this time 
period on the TV monitor. One thing must be kept in mind. These visual .. 
observations of mine were very limited and that most of the time my eyes were 
on my log sheet as I was recording. Immediately following the words that I 
heard, "Fire in the cockpit", I looked directly across the blockhouse to TV 
monitors. At this time I saw flames coming from between the interface of the 
spacecraft and the top of the Spacecraft Lunar Module Adapter. The flames 
at this position appeared to be licking about half-way up the side of the space­
craft. When I mentioned SLA I was referring to the interface between the com· 
mand module and the service module. I do not remember how much time had 
elapsed between seeing the incident just described and when I looked at the 
TV monitors again. The thing that I remember visually the next time was 
with the spacecraft hatch removed and viewing the monitor that had the fixed 
TV camera on the spacecraft hatch. All that could be seen was solid smoke at 
the entrance of the spacecraft hatch. And, occasionally, a person moving about 
into the hatch and back out. This concludes my visual observations for the time 
period recorded in my log and so described in this recording. 
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#8 
G.W. PROPST 
RCA 
JA.,.UARY 31, 1967 
I work for RCA at LC-34/37 in the closed circuit operational TV system. 
At 1825 on January 27, 1967, I was on duty in LC -34, stationed at the OTV control racks 
located in Area D on the first floor. I was working with camera 29 which is one of the cameras on 
the A8 level. This camera is on the northeast side and views the exterior of the spacecraft and the 
White Room. The video level from this camera had fallen off and I was readjusting it. 
My OIS headset was active on Black 7 and I was also monitoring Black 3, the spacecraft test 
channel. 
The test was at T-lO minutes and holding; there were communications going on between the test 
conductor and the spacecraft occupants. 
At about 1830 one of the Astronauts said, "Fire in the cockpit", this was followed by a scream 
and then silence. 
I know that it was the voice of one of the Astronaut's as the sound seemed to be VOXed off. 
It was either White or Chaffee that spoke as Grissom's voice is deeper and somewhat gruff. The voice 
was clear, but very excited. 
Immediately I looked over to our camera 24 which is located inside the White Room. I did not 
have to move in order to see this camera as it is one monitor to the left and one monitor up from 
where I had been looking. 
The camera itself had been "zoomed in" about an hour before in order to see the hatch with the 
porthole on the spacecraft. 
I saw the following: as soon as my eyes caught sight of the camera 24 monitor I noticed a bright 
glow inside the spacecraft, however, I saw no flames. Just a split second later I saw flames go past 
the porthole. The flames were not in the order of an explosion but were, in fact, that of something 
just burning. The fire increased steadily during the next two to two and one half minutes. 
After about three minutes the flames from the outside bottom of the spacecraft began to eat through 
the area where the bottom lip of the White Room meets the spacecraft. The White Room began to 
fill with smoke. Prior to that time the air was clear. Also, about this time, flames could be seen com­
ing from under the spacecraft hatch . 
.. Outside the White Room, the A8 area started to fill with smoke. This happened approximately 
30 seconds after the cry of fire. 
Because of the clear atmosphere in the White Room I was able to see the Astronauts in the 
Spacecraft. I noted that at this time no one entered the White Room to remove the hatch. 
At the time the cry of "Fire in the cockpit" was made, the increased light in the spacecraft 
made it possible to see the Astronauts inside. 
The first thing I saw was what appeared to be the center Astronaut's arms reaching above his 
head toward the hatch. There followed a great deal of motion as his arms seemed to fumble with some­
thing and then quickly reach back for it. From time to time the top of his helmet could be seen. 
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About 15 seconds after the cry of fire, I saw more arms in front of the porthoie seemingly com­
ing from the left. Looking further back into the spacecraft, I could see the legs of the center Astro­
naut moving about. 
The movement inside the spacecraft lasted about 2 minutes before the flames began to block the 
view. 
At first the flames were behind the Astronaut's arms toward the center of the spacecraft and then 
spread forward to the area of the hatch. 
During the entire time that I watched the Astronaut's moving, their spacesuits were silver in color 
with no signs of being burned or charred. 
I think it noteworthy that no one entered the White Room until it had become smoke-filled some 
minutes later. Had anyone entered and gone near the spacecraft they would have been visible on the 
TV camera. 
.. 
I know that my times are very near accurate because I remember saying to others that had gath­
ered in the area of the monitor: "Blow the hatch, why don't they blow the hatch?" One person that 
was near said that the spacesuits would protect them from the heat until they could get out. A short 
conversation then took place concerning how long and how much the suits could protect them from 
the fire. Also comment was made on why no one had entered the White Room as yet. During the 
time of this conversation the White Room was still clear and the Astronaut's motion still visible. 
About 5 minutes after the incident we had lost all three cameras, the two on A8 and the one in 
the White Room, due to the dense smoke. However, it could be seen from the A7 cameras, a level 
below, that C02 was being used on the fire. 
Once the fire was out rescue workers entered the White Room and removed the hatch. Power 
down of the spacecraft now took place as the pilots display panel was still on and the intense heat 
kept rescue workers out. 
Shortly thereafter I was told to secure the White Room camera ending the view of the White 
Room. 
I will make no conclusion or attempt to explain what happened that night. I only hope my ob­
servation may be instrumental in the prevention of like occurrences. 
lsi G. W. Propst 
RCA Employee #72752 
#8T 
G.W. PROPST 
RCA 
FEBRUARY 16, 1967 
These are additional 	 comments made by Gary W. Propst, RCA, as a supplement to his statement. 
QUESTION: 	 Would you describe for us the adjustments which you made on Camera 24 
and, as well as you can, reconstruct the timing involved and the effects that 
these adjustments may have had on the image projected. 
ANSWER: 	 When the initial call, "Fire in the Cockpit", when I heard this, I looked up 

at the monitor on Camera 24, and at this time saw a faint glow to the left 
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.. 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
center of the inside to the cockpit. I started to readjust the camera at this time, 
using the beam and target controls. These controls - the target is used first of 
all for giving a contrasting picture, one of black vs. white. The beam is a sup­
plement adjustment to the target controlling the amount of electron flow hitting 
tha face of the tube. In essence, the camera, at the time, was set and adjusted 
for the outside of the hatch and the light levels there. When I first looked at 
this there was no fire visible at the time, and I readjusted the camera using the 
beam and target control for the internal light level which was a little bit lower ­
or was lower at this time - than what it was on the outside. The effects on the 
picture of moving the beam and target adjustments - the target adjustment to 
give you a contrast picture, black vs. white, if it is set for a moderate gray 
scale and there is a bright light off to one side, or anywhere in the picture, 
this could appear washed out or kind of ragged on the edges - very white, 
to the point where any detail, if there was any in this information, couldn't 
be seen at all. The beam adjustment, when it's moved, or when it's moved 
back for giving you the best quality picture, this adjustment will interact with 
the target when it's first moved, it will completely wash out the picture to a 
total white picture. To get a good picture, the target must then be adjusted for 
maximum gray scale without washed-out whites and with fairly good blacks, 
and then the beam adjustment moved so you get your best quality picture. 
This is done just as soon as the beam is moved into the ... as soon as the pic­
ture appears on the screen. This is when you have your best quality picture 
Your electrical focus can also be moved or touched at this time just to sharpen 
the picture. This actually has no inter-effect on the white scale or gray scale 
of the picture. When I first looked at the camera, I did make these adjust­
ments to it, at which time the picture could have appeared to be washed out 
for a fraction of a second when the beam adjustment was made. Any light 
coming in thereafter, in other words the light in the spacecraft was lowered at 
this time and I was readjusting the picture for this lower light intensity in the 
spacecraft. When the beam adjustment was then moved, it would or could have 
washed out the picture for maybe 1/2 a second or so until the picture came back 
with a perfectly clear image. 
Will you relate what effect the adjustments that you have just described would 
have on a picture being observed by other observers at other monitors, who are 
not aware that these adjustments are being made. What effect would it show 
in the picture itself? 
First, with the target adjustment, if the target is increased, the whites will be­
come much whiter to the point of being washed out or very bright on the 
screen with absolutely no detail. The blacks will lose detail and slightly go 
gray, in other words, a grayer scale rather than a totally black black. The 
second adjustment which goes along with the target would be the beam adjust. 
This would be moved into a higher position or a more maximum position. This 
would cause the picture to go totally white. In other words, the observer's 
monitor would go completely white with no picture detail whatsoever, then as 
the beam control is backed off, the picture would then appear or reappear and 
in its reappearance, again the whites would be washed out, the blacks gray, and 
then it would settle down into a normal good contrast picture. From the time 
I initially heard the call "Fire in the Cockpit." I looked at the monitor, there 
was a higher light level in the spacecraft, but no visible flames. I adjusted the 
camera for this particular light level. This total adjustment took a duration of 
about three to four seconds. During the adjustment time of three to four sec-
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onds, any observations made on TV monitor, would not be reliable as the 
images were from adjustments more than they were from the actual happen­
ings. I want to correct a statement made previous to this regarding the turning 
of the target and the black scale going into gray. Actually, the black scale 
doesn't turn more gray in color. It loses its detail and actually could be said 
to not appear more black but to appear less contrasting. There is no resolution 
within the area. It's washing out the picture you could say, in an opposite 
direction. 
This concludes the statement of Mr. Propst. 
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QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
• 
#36 
A. R. CASWELL 
RCA 

FEBRUARY 2, 1967 

Sir, would you identify yourself by name and organization. 
My name is Caswell, A. R., I am employed by RCA KSC communications 
project. 
Mr. Caswell, would you discuss this memorandum on security classification, 
correction, would you review this memorandum on security classification and 
indicate your understanding. 
Yes sir, I have read the memorandum on February 1, and am familiar with 
its content. 
Mr. Caswell would you describe to us your observations prior to, during, and 
subsequent to the incident which occurred on Complex 34 on Friday, January 
27, 1967. We ask that you specify locations, time references, and structural 
references points and your actions and activities at this time. 
My assignment with RCA is one of a communications controller. During major 
test my duty station is behind the communication racks specified as area D, 
Blockhouse 34, first floor. This location is approximately mid-distance between 
the OIS and the OTV monitor racks. My duties are to insure the integrity of 
communications during major tests and to assist in any trouble shooting pro­
cedures that may be necessary to insure these communications. During the plugs 
out test on January 27, I was situated at my normal position in back of the 
communications racks, and, specifically, directly in front of the monitor for 
camera 24, which was the white room camera. At approximately 18:30 Eastern 
Standard Time my attention was directed to the monitor by OTV technician 
Gary Propst, his remarks was that there is a fire in the capsule. Prior to and 
during this time my attention was primarily concerned to maintaining com­
munications. Conversing on the point to point circuit with our communications 
console at Merritt Island Launch Area. I had two head sets on at the time 
with a monitor on OIS Black 7 and OIS Black 3. Since the OIS unit I was 
using did not have a monitor capability it was necessary to wear two head 
sets and a considerable length of cord stretched down the back of the panels. 
Upon directing my attention to the remark by technician Propst, I observed 
on the white room camera, a flickering of flame inside of the capsule on the 
left side of the port hole. This flame flickered for some time I would estimate 
15 - 20 seconds and then it spread across almost the full face of the port in 
the hatch cover. The picture that it displayed by this particular camera is 
one looking directly at the hatch cover with a primary observation of the port 
in the hatch cover. In this configuration with the hatch closed observation is 
limited essentially to the top of the helmet of the individual in the center couch, 
although absolute movement was difficult to describe since the helmet itself 
was white and the surroundings of the capsule, hatch cover, and other similar 
items were also white. There was no great definition nor shading of color to 
determine in what direction this movement took place. After observation of 
ten or fifteen seconds I would judge I glanced at another monitor we had on 
adjustable 8 which is situated next to the monitor that depicting camera 24 
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QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
and I observed a cable leading to the capsule which was burning, and I remem­
bered distinctly because the flames were dancing along the entire length of 
the cable. Reverting my glance back again to the camera covering the hatch 
porthole I would estimate that some 30 to 40 seconds elapsed before the flames 
reached a very high proportion, in which there was nothing visible but a white 
searing type of flame inside the cockpit. The period specified from 15 to, or 
rather to, 30 to 40 seconds was subsequent to my initial time that I observed 
the fire in the hatch. The fire, the flames that I saw were definitely inside the 
capsule, there was no fire around the hatch at this particular point in time. 
I would like to interject my full attention was not on this monitor at all of 
of the time, because my primary responsibility was the insuring that communi­
cations were maintained during this period. I did make a telephone call dur­
ing this period on the point - point telephone to inform our console an emer­
gency did exist. Further I did have some discussion with technicians in back 
of the rack although my attention was focused essentially on the monitor during 
this particular period, 10 or 15 minute period after the first outbreak of the 
fire. I would judge that in the space of perhaps 2 to 3 minutes we did notice 
smoke coming' out from around the hatch cover, smoke coming into the white 
room, from where I don't know, but presumably from beneath the spacecraft. 
But the visibility of the camera commenced with the injection of additional 
smoke in the area, we did observed on the other camera adjustable 8, smoke 
coming from beneath the capsule. 
During the time from the initial awareness of a unusual situation can you give 
us a run down on what communication that you would have been monitoring 
at that time and as to also the quality of such communications. 
As I said before I was monitoring my active normal channel Black 7 which 
is the communication channel and I did have several communications with my 
supervisor on the firing floor. I did also on the other ear have a monitor on 
Black 3 and I noted no anomalies or unusual conditions on transmission Black 
3. During this particular period I was monitoring OIS Black 3 with one head 
set with the volume decreased since my primary attention was directed to ac­
tivities on Black 7 on the communications channel. I did not detect or hear 
any indication of communications from the astronauts during this period. As 
time progressed there was considerable traffic on Black 3 which was completely 
readible. 
Mr. Caswell, you stated that you were informed by Mr. Propst that there was 
a fire in the spacecraft and shortly thereafter you looked up at the monitor 
from camera 24. How would you describe the visibility, that clarity of visibility, 
into the spacecraft? 
Initially during my first observations, first time I detected flames on the left It 
side of the cockpit the clarity of view was quite good. 
Mr. Caswell you also indicated that you observed movement by what appeared 
to be the helmet of the crew member in the center couch. Was this before or 
after you noticed the flame to the left side of the porthole? 
This was after I 'first detected my attention was directed to the flames inside 
the spacecraft? 
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QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
Mr. Caswell did you detect any further motion from inside the spacecraft? 
Well let me put it this way, when we first noticed the flames at the cockpit it 
appeared on the left side facing the hatch cover. And it was during this initial 
period that we detected what we feel was motion by some movement of the 
helmet of the center crew member. And then seconds perhaps 10 to 15 seconds 
the flames had spread across the face. 
I believe the question on the previous tape was how long was any motion de­
tected after my initial observation of the fire. I noticed, as I previously stated, 
I did notice what appeared to be motion of the center crew man upon the 
initial outbreak of fire as my observation was directed to it. And then it ap­
peared within perhaps 20 seconds, the flames had obscured a good view or 
any type of view of the crew member because they were spread across the 
face of the porthole. As time progressed, perhaps to 45 seconds to a minute, 
the intensity of the flames greatly increased to where they appeared to be white 
hot. This is confined to inside the spacecraft. Shortly thereafter we did detect 
smoke coming into the White Room, as we did detect smoke coming, what 
appeared to be coming from around the hatch cover. As I stated before, my 
initial attention was directed to the flames visible on camera 24 and shortly 
thereafter, possible within 15 seconds, I glanced to my right which depicted 
the monitor of another camera on adjustable 8 which in its view had a cable 
running across the upper right portion of the monitor which appeared to be 
commented to the spacecraft. I noticed that, and I remember it particularly, 
because the flames were not in anyone point but were completely across this 
cable, flames licking up perhaps 3 - 4 inches from the top of the cable all the 
way across. 
Mr. Caswell, can you give us an estimate of the time which elapsed from the 
first sign of fire that you saw in the spacecraft until you witnessed some activity 
outside the spacecraft and in the White Room area. 
Yes, sir, it appeared to me, and I again am not, cannot be exact about this 
because I was performing other functions during this period, but it appeared 
to be quite a long period of time perhaps 3 or 4 minutes before we, or I, 
detected the entrance of anyone to the White Room which was I believe either 
one or two individuals, at least one individual who did come running in with 
what appeared to be in his hand a fire extinguisher. However, by this time the 
White Room was commencing to be obscured by smoke and motion of any 
kind was becoming increasingly difficult to detect. Prior to this time, I do 
recollect that we did see some activity on the other monitor or people moving 
about, apparently attempting to react to the emergency. 
Mr. Caswell, can you furnish any further information to this panel which may 
be pertinent to the overall inquiry? 
The only other condition that I can recall, there appeared to be as the fire 
progressed a significant reduction in visibility in the particular area in which 
the pad leader called for additional lanterns, emergency lights of any type that 
would assist. We dispatched an OIS technician from the ADCS area with ap­
proximately ten flashlights to the base of the umbilical tower elevator to hand 
to the next fireman going t:? 
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#72 
D. K. SLAYTON 
FEBRUARY 8, 1967 
Would you identify yourself for us by name and organization? 
This is D. K. Slayton, Director of Flight Crew Operations, Manned Spacecraft 
Center, Houston. 
Mr. Slayton, would you describe your functional responsibilities and location dur­
ing the Plugs-out test conducted on Launch Complex 34 on January 27, 1967? 
I had no functional responsibility. I was sitting at the Stony console with Capt. 
Roosa who was communicating with the Spacecraft obseIVing what was going 
on from that position. 
Mr. Slayton, as well as you can, would describe for us the events which you 
obseIVed in the proper sequence or the sequence as well as you can establish 
it prior to, during, and just subsequent to the accident which occurred on the 
Complex on that date. 
As I remember, we were in a ten-minute hold and had been for quite a time 
trying to establish adequate communications with MSO Building. Communica­
tions had been good from Roosa to the Space~raft and still were. We finally 
agreed to pick up the count in spite of the relatively bad communications; and 
essentially, things were very quiet. I think I was sitting there reviewing some 
items from the flight plan when I heard a call of "fire" on the intercom. I 
wasn't sure who made it at the time. I immediately looked up at the TV 
monitor; and as best I remember, there was flame around the hatch at that 
time. Shortly thereafter, I heard another call of "Fire in the cockpit," or 
something similar to that. There were some other communications on the other 
loops superimposed on this, and I don't remember exactly what those all were. 
I did remember another call - the first one that sounded rather frantic to me 
that was something about, "We're burning up here, we need some help," or 
something to that effect. At that time, I attributed it to the Pad Leader. I 
thought this call came from him. Reviewing the tapes later on, I concluded 
that this last call was from Chaffee. At about this time, we had no further 
communications from the pad area. There seemed to be a fair amount of con­
fusion and smoke and fire up there. I could see some people trying to get at 
the hatch door, and they had to back out. About this time, there was so much 
smoke that the TV monitor couldn't even pick up what was going on in the 
area. We settled down to try to establish communications with the Spacecraft. 
I think Roosa did try to call them on a few occasions with no response. Some­
where about this time it appeared it was a fairly serious situation, and I think 
I went over and talked to the Medics. I recommended that they get on out 
to the Pad area because they were probably going to be needed up there. 
The Spacecraft Test Conductor cleared them to go, and they left the Block­
house. Mter they had been gone three or four minutes, I had a conversation 
with the, I believe, the Pad Safety Officer. He indicated things looked pretty 
'bad from his communications. So, I 'elected to call Houston immediately and 
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get things cranked up back there just in case they were as bad as we thought 
they were. They did set up a command post immediately and got prepared to 
notify the families. I think it was about ten minutes later before we finally 
got positive confirmation. We did get a call right after the hatch was off that 
it looked very bad up there which is something like five minutes after the fire 
started. We could not confirm positively that the crew was dead. As soon as 
we did confirm that, I called Houston; and I went up to the Pad area some­
time after completing my calls to Houston. I don't remember the exact time. 
It was after the Doctors had been up there. At the time I arrived, Dr. Kelly 
was there and Charlie Buckley. These were the only two people I recognized. 
I believe I was the first person to leave the Blockhouse behind the Medics to 
go up there. At the time I arrived at the Spacecraft, there was no.... there was 
a very acrid smell of smoke with no visible smoke in the area - of course, no 
fire. When I looked into the Spacecraft, there was one arm hanging out which 
I understood, and there again I hesitate to indicate who told me this because 
I'm not sure, but somebody indicated that they couldn't and left them where 
they were. But, in any case, one arm was out at that time. Chaffee was in. his 
couch in the right side where we'd expect him to be; and as close as I could 
determine, strapped down . had not attempted to unstrap himself. The other 
two crew members I could not identify them. I didn't know which was which. 
Both face plates were closed, I could determine that and locked. There was 
one head, in looking into the Spacecraft, the lower left side, and the other, I 
believe, was on the lower right side. There were two legs which the suit had 
both been burned off from, doubled up right in front of the hatch. It is very 
difficult for me to determine the exact relationships of these two bodies. They 
were sort of jumbled together, and I couldn't really tell which head even be­
longed· to which body at that point. I guess the only thing that was real ob­
vious is that both bodies were at the lower edge of the hatch. They were not 
in the seats. They were almost completely clear of the seat areas. I did not 
check switch position. I did note that the caution and warning panel lights 
were still burning. The two main lights, the ones between the seats. There is 
a cabin light between the center and the right seat and one between the center 
and the left seat. I believe both of these were still burning at that time. I guess 
at the time I went up there somebody had cailed from the Pad and said they 
needed some help or somebody to make a decision up there which is one reason 
I went up. One thing the people up there had already concluded is that they 
probably should not move the bodies or make any further attempts to do any­
thing with the Spacecraft until some photographs were Illade, and I concurred 
in this. So, everything essentially stopped at that time. I think Buckley did call 
for a photographer to come up. I left before he arrived, and I don't know ex­
actly what pictures he took. I did see some of them later on in the evening. 
I think the object here was to try to pin down body positions as well as we 
could on photographs and also try to get a little feel for the switch positions. 
The next time I saw the Spacecraft was after the bodies had been removed; 
and at this time, the lights were out. I looked inside; but again, I did not 
attempt to identify any switch positions. I figured this would be done adequately 
by other people. This concludes the statement furnished by Mr. Slayton. 
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#90 
DARYL CAIN 

NAA 

FEBRUARY 20, 1967 

SUBJECT: Observations 
On January 27th while performing OCP K-0005 on SIC 017. Control room 2, TV displays were 
patched. So that on the Test Conductor Console we were watching the Command Module Hatch 
within the White Room on Pad 34. I witnessed the Outer Hatch and intermittantly the Boost Pro­
tective Cover Hatch installations. We, Gerry Schiendel the NASA Test Conductor and myself, noted 
and commented on the amount of activity with the White Room at this time. Later we observed the 
Center Astronaut thru the Hatch Window remove his left glove held just above his faceplate. I be­
came occupied with a Spacecraft 017 power loss and did not witness him replacing it. I did comment 
that this appeared to be a poor time for this adjustment to Mr. Schiedel in that the suit would be 
discharging gas into the Cabin. 
We handled our own problem and only intermittently watched the Spacecraft 012 test progress .. 
At about 1830 EST I observed the White Room TV block with a flash of light. When the visual 
presentation was recovered, I observed a flame at the base of the crew hatch similar to that of a burn­
ing candle. I assumed that there had been a flash fire in a quad and since no egress efforts were 
apparent, that the Crew was being left in the environmentally sealed Command Module where they 
would be safe. I observed the fire extinguished from outside the White Room at which time the White 
Room filled with smoke. I observed the Pad Leader open the Command Module Hatch only partially 
due to the personnel obstructing the White Room Camera and the excessive smoke. I assumed that 
the Crew did not egress because of this smoke. 
Later television was shutdown and due to the nature of our Spacecraft test, I was astounded and 
speechless when advised that the Astronauts were fatalities. 
At no time did I observe any fire within the Command Module. 
/s/ D. Cain 
#90T 

DARYL O. CAIN 

NAA 

FEBRUARY 21, 1967 

Would you idem!fy yourself by name and organization? 
ANSWER: 	 I am Daryl Cain, C-A-I-N. I was the North American Test Conductor per­
forming OCP 0005 on Spacecraft 017. We were conducting this test from Con­
trol Room No.2. The Spacecraft was in the V AB. 
QUESTION: 	 Mr. Cain, would you describe your observations regarding the incident which 
occurred in reference to the plugs-out test being conducted on Complex 34 on 
January 27 . 
ANSWER: . This evening we came on station, replaced the day shift and at approximately 
6:00 in the evening, it 	was pointed out to me that the test was in a hold and 
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we had monitored the communications channel on our side tone basis. We 
were performing our own systems test. Spacecraft 017 experienced a power fail­
ure, but we were watching the television monitors on the Test Conductor's 
console. One of which was in the Blockhouse and one of which was pointing at 
the Spacecraft 012 within the White Room at the Spacecraft hatch. We, Gerry 
Schiedel, the NASA Test Conductor and I, commented when the hatches were 
installed, that the time to install the hatches seemed to be considerably less 
than what had been written into the test. We observed the hatch installation 
crew leave the White Room; and sometime after this, I don't know how long 
after this, we did observe the astronaut in the center crew couch, Ed White, 
remove his left-hand glove. Looking through the crew hatch, we remarked that 
the White Room TV was quite clear. We could see his face plate. I'd say 
about an inch in front of his face plate we could see his left arm from the 
wrist about halfway down the fingers. We watched him disconnect his cuff 
and pull his left glove partially off. I did not see him take it entirely off. I 
did not see him replace his glove; but shortly after that, his arm was no longer 
visible in the port. I did see his face plate a couple of times after that. This 
was sometime during the hold at T minus 10 minutes on Spacecraft 012. We 
were experiencing difficulties on Spacecraft 017, and I was just watching this 
out of the corner of my eye. At some time after this or after looking in the 
hatch there, we did see the TV camera in the White Room completely blank 
out, like someone had shined a very bright light into the lens of the camera. 
When the visibility in the White Room was regained, we saw a guttery-type 
flame at the base of the hatch, I would say probably about six inches high and 
mostly on the right-hand side, although it did go downhill toward the left-hand 
corner. We watched this for a period of time, I would estimate at about 2 
minutes, then we saw what appeared to be a jet of carbon dioxide gas or 
white snow or something of that nature, from the lower right-hand corner of 
the white room, up across the hatch and the fire was extinguished, there were 
no more flames. After a short period of time the white room started to fill 
with smoke and we did comment that the inside of the crew compartment 
looked like a real fine place to be during this fire which appeared to be only 
on the exterior of the Service Module. Gerry, and I did comment that it did 
look like one of the quads had fired or that there was a fire underneath the 
Command Module which would cause Spacecraft 012 to lose its quad and the 
piece of the boost cover that covered the hatch. OK, we did assume that the 
fire was underneath the command module and from the nature of the flames 
burning upward. This is where we thought it was. On the cameras, we, I, did 
not observe any fire and I did see them jet some carbon dioxide up to the 
quad that was in the one camera. I don't recall which camera it was, but one 
of them was looking at a quad and we did watch the crew squirt the carbon 
dioxide on that quad. After a period of about 5 minutes we saw a number of 
personnel come up into the White Room with Gas Masks on their face, and 
there was so many people there that we did not observe, or could not observe 
the removal of the hatch. I don't know where the hatch went, I didn't see 
that. The personnel here after two or three minutes did leave the area, and the 
Camera did shine down into the Command Module for a period of time. We 
did not see any motion inside the Command Module, so we assumed that the 
Astronauts were safe, and that they were staying inside until the smoke in the 
White Room could be cleared. We commented back and forth to each other that 
this looked like still a very good place to be and based on my knowledge of 
the egress operation that the crew would have to come out, and hook up to 
the Portable Life Support System (PLSS). We thought that by their remaining 
in the spacecraft that they would keep the smoke in the White Room out of 
their suits. 
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After the men removed the hatch from the Command Module and cleared the 
area, there was no activity for a period of time there-in, the smoke was very 
heavy in the White Room and shortly thereafter the Camera looking down in­
to the Command Module was extinguished, and we were unable to watch ac­
tivities there anymore. We also lost the presentation for looking down into the 
blockhouse at the same time, but the other cameras remained on for a short 
period of time. All the other displays remained on for a short period of time. 
During our testing we had noticed earlier that communications channel which 
we were using, 214, down in the RF Room where the CI4-442 was located 
did have a bad habit of over-modulating and causing disturbance of all the 
other channels that we were using. We had called the RCA people a few times 
to come down and see if they could fix this particular problem associated with 
the COMM. System testing. At that time, also checked out the communications 
in the Low Boy Console where Mr. Thomas and Charlie New, our communi­
cation engineers were sitting. We had commented particularly about this in 
that back when we were testing spacecraft 011, we experienced many diffi­
culties with the voice communications between the MSO and this particular 
communications room that we were in; and the fact that the on occasion par­
ticularly at 7 in the morning and at 3 in the afternoon we had numerous 
occations to lose the PCM and had to hold on our testing at this particular 
time of the day. But we had experienced none of this difficulty in testing space­
craft 017 out at the VAB and thought this was quite an improvement in the 
communications. Shortly before the accident, we were working our spacecraft 
and all communications were wiped out in our system, due to somebody shout­
ing very loudly and unintelligible to us and interfering with our conversation. 
I don't know exactly when this happened, but it was approximately 25 min­
utes after 6. Shortly after that however, we did have normal communication 
back with our people and it didn't affect us anymore. During the period of 
time at from about 6 to roughly 6:45 that evening, we had been watching the 
television presentation of the Spacecraft 012 test and on occasion when we were 
not too busy we would side-tone Channel 126, Black 3, which was the Com­
mand Channel for Spacecraft 012. I believe Mr. Byrd our Instrumentation man 
was the fellow that found that this channel was active in our control room and 
pointed this out to us, and on occasion when we weren't too busy we would 
listen in to see how they were doing. Mr. Byrd, I think, was the fellow that 
pointed out to me that they were in a time, T-I0 minutes and holding. Just 
prior to the time that we watched Ed White take his glove off. Because of 
the activity in our spacecraft I was unable to sidetone Black 3, during that 
period of time, on a steady basis, I may have listened to it intermittently. I 
did not hear any of the words to put the hatch on, I did not hear the words 
to clear the area. I did not hear anything concerning the magnitude of the 
fire or egress operations or anything of this nature. I was really too engaged 
to get power back on Spacecraft 017. I think that was all that I saw and that 
just about ends it. 
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DONALD R. JONES 
KSC/NASA 
JANUARY 24, 1967 
Statement of Personal Observation of Activities at LC-34 During Plugs Out O.A.T. on January 27, 
1967. 
The undersigned was present in the LC-34 blockhouse on January 27, 1967, from approximately 12:30 
P.M. until 9:30 P.M., in his official capacity of Chief, S-IVB Electrical System for the purpose of 
observing the test operation. Since he is not assigned a regular operating station, and due to the crowd­
ed condition of the blockhouse during test operations, the undersigned witnessed operations from the 
"VIP Room". The operation was observed over operational TV and monitored over O.1.S. 
No major anomalies were noted during the period prior to the fire aboard the spacecraft. Minor diff­
iculties were noted during the E.D.S. test. Minor or major difficulties were being experienced with 
spacecraft communication immediately prior to the spacecraft fire. The launch vehicle had been in a 
"Hold" condition for some length of time at T-I0 minutes and the count was to have resumed shortly 
when the spacecraft fire was first noted. 
The undersigned was monitoring O.1.S. channels Black 3 and Black 6 and observing the spacecraft 
on two TV monitors. One TV camera (A) was monitoring the spacecraft hatch, the other camera (B), 
the left rear of the spacecraft. The astronaut in the center spacecraft position could be observed on 
camera (A). 
The first indication of the fire was noted as an increase in illumination within the spacecraft. Almost 
immediately the word "Fire" was heard over O.1.S. channel "Black 3" and was followed by an 
unintelligible transmission, thought to be a request for clarification of the first transmission. During the 
above a more noticeable increase in illumination within the spacecraft was noted. A third transmission 
stating "A Bad Fire in the Spacecraft" was heard and a tongue of flame noted between the center 
astronaut's helmet and spacecraft hatch window. The astronaut's left arm and then right arm moved 
toward the hatch top. At this point the interior of the spacecraft was illuminated with such brilliance 
that the camera picture was blacked out. A fourth transmission, thought to be a request to "Get us 
out of here" 'Nas not completely clear and may have in fact originated from another location. At 
approximately the time the hatch picture was blacked-out, flames were noted on monitor (B) from the 
lower portion of the spacecraft and exposed cabling begin to ignite. The above, it is felt, occurred with­
in ten to fifteen seconds. Although repeated attempts to contact the spacecraft were heard, no further 
transmissions were recognized as coming from the spacecraft. Dense smoke which began following the 
external flames prevented a clear view of rescue attampts. It was felt, at the time, that due to the 
apparent intense heat and rapid progress of the fire that no successful rescue would be possible . 
No attempt will be made to provide a detailed account of the rescue operation in this statement, how­
ever, it is felt that every attempt humanly possible was made to gain entrance to the spacecraft con­
sistant with the circumstances. All personnel were requested to remain on station until officially released. 
All outside telephone communications were terminated. Personnel were officially released at approxi­
mately 9:30 P.M. 
The undersigned has no personal knowledge of the spacecraft configuration at the time of the fire or 
as to the cause of the fire. 
/s/ Donald R. Jones 
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C. G EYBEL 

AND 

J. M. RUBIO 
On January 22, 1967, Mr. C. G. Eybel and Mr. J. M. Rubio, General Electric Company, Apollo 
Support Department, observed tests on AS-204 Space Vehicle in performance of a task assigned by 
NASA. They were physically located in the CIF Building and observations were made from 0800 
to 1920. The purpose of the assigned task was to make observations in support of the NASA program 
to reduce human and procedural errors during pre-launch operations. The notes taken during the ob­
servations are as follows: 
January 26, 1967 (Friday) 

Test Plugs-Out Drop Test 

1·20015-SA-204 

Test Pickup at 0600 
..J. 
0800 Begin Monitor 
0820 T-5 hrs. 40 min. 00 sec. 
Begin Power Transfer - Prior to Spacecraft (SIC) 
) Going on Internal Power Lou is Pad Leader 
0825 Communications adding items (equip) to SIC - POWER IS ON Also SIC is 
through with command Carrier RF Checks O.K. 
0900 T-5-00-00 
TC and EPS 
SIC confusion as to what 100 AMP circuit breaker "On" will do to SIC 
(5 mins. - No hold) 
TC wants breaker on and voltage reading taken (it was 3L5V yesterday) 
They must take off rear cover of GSE unit 
Pad Safety - Thundershowers this P.M. 
3L2V Reading 
0938 Close Circuit Breaker (100 AMP) 
Prepare for SIC Internal Power Transfer 
Pad Safety - Stop Grinding Operation on Service Structure 
0945 Main Bus B dropped to zero during power transfer on SIC-trouble shooting -
Potential Serious Problem (TP) 
1003 Procedure was wrong - rewrite 
1033 SIC Inst. Test complete 
.: 1035 SIC is down 1 hour· Problems with ECS 
1040 Suit Compressor Check Complete (SIC) 
1100 T-3 hours estimate 1 hour hold so ECS can support crew ingress (suit technician 
'\ 
sets up SIC but can't if crew is in) holding 
1110 SIC move switch position check list up 15 minutes earlier so crew will ingress 
smoothly. 
Also a sequence in document was entered twice· Line one out 
SIC switches must be set before test is picked up (and will take approximately 
20 minutes) 
1135 Must let SIC cool down· TD and suit technician 
Discuss off net 
1200 Extend hold +20 minutes (still waiting for ECS)· then suit technician must still 
set switches which will be approximately 15·20 minutes 
1209 ECS Complete 
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1210 
1220 
1233 
1235 
1240 
1245 
1254 
1256 
1256 
1303 
1305 
1306 
1308 
1318 
1320 
1330 
1403 
1405 
1414 
1424 
1430 
1436 
1440 
1442 
1445 
1449 
1458 
1522 
1540 
1542 
1545 
1552 
1555 
Begin setting switches in SIC (Confusion in switch setting) 
T-3:00:00 and counting 
Switch settings complete 
Suit technician out of SIC 
Astronauts departing for pad 
Crew leaving Astronauts Quarters on way to Pad 34. 
Couches almost set up crew approaching pad 
Crew at SIC level 
T-2-22-35 Begin crew ingress Command Pilot (Grissom) 
Command Pilot - Smells funny odor in suit (like buttermilk) 
Command Pilot Secured 
Senior Pilot (Ed White) begin ingress preparation (Gus wants an air sample 
taken) 
Chaffee begin ingress 
Ingress Complete 
Bendix Environmental Engineer to take 02 sample. 
Pad Safety - 20% probability of elect.' activity in 2 hrs. ~ 
Will hold at T-2:00:00 until air sample is taken 
T·2 hours and holding 
Chaffee is on board (over net not TV) ( 
Crew didn't bring check lists with them - Pad Leader gave them set - its 
extensive 
Estimate 11/2-2 hour hold to take air· sample. Also 02 sample to see it meets 
specification Type 11-B 
Per George Page - Send for second crew to take sample. 
Extend hold 20 minutes 
Found changes to be made in check list. 
Begin taking sample - (original crew) 
Take from Gus loop - through helmet fitting ­
Inflate the watermelon 
Sample Complete (Bendix) 
Reset Environmental Switches in SIC 
Begin suit circuit check 
Estimate 5 minutes 
C. Kraft and G. Page - Whose causing most holds 
Houston or MSC facetious 
Extend hold 10 minutes - ECS 
Begin suit circuit purge (sample) 98% - Go 
ECS Complete 
'r 
T -2 hours and counting 
Rain expected in 1 hour 
T-l:53:15 Closing Hatch 
Discrepancies between crew check list and SIC switch settings - Can't make I" 
run in present configuration 
Begin LV EDS Check 
Standby - Communication Problems - Very noisy and cutting out over net 
SIC VHF AM - Switch position was incorrect 
Begin Cabin Purge 
Abort light not received (SIC) 
Trouble Shoot 
T -60 and counting - EDS check not finished 
Abort light o.k. - Switches were not in correct position for test 
T-50 and holding estimate 15 minutes 
Did not get reset verify light in ECS check - standby 
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1557 
A. E. JOROLAH 

EDS test is complete 
1620 
1635 
1655 
1702 
1703 
1736 
1738 
1750 
1758 
1800 
1800 
1805 
1813 
1815 
1820 
1832 • 
1835 
1838 
1844 
1845 
1855 
(off station) 
Still holding - Not getting right concentration - (Bad Analyzer) Cabin 
Start cabin leak check (purge is ok) 

Estimate 30 minutes for completion - including hatch closure - will then be in 

T -50 configuration. 

Ready for hatch closure. Leak rate is zero 

Hatch secured - Ready to pick up 

T -50 and ,counting 

SIC has communication problem 
T-15 and holding 
(Command Pilot's Cobra Cable) Suspect 
Command Pilot's transmitter and receiver VHF fuse switch appears bad 
Changed Comm Configuration in SIC 
It still isn't too good 
Trouble shoot after run 
Prepare Static Fire 
Set up switches in SIC and Static Fire 
Test complete -- Ready to pick up 
T -15 and counting 
T -10 and holding 
Communications Problem again 
Fire in SIC (Voice from SIC) 
3 arrive at White Room 
Masks on 
Pad Leader and crew can't see to get Astronauts 
Pad Leader can feel Astronauts but can't see them 
Pad Leader - I better not describe what I see 
Pad Leader - Ambulance is all I need at the White Room 
Pad Leader 2 - Pad Rescue have smoke casualties 
TIC - Several ambulances on way 
1858 TIC - Batteries that couldn't be disconnected were ones that caused the problem 
Panel 150 could not be reached by Pad Leader to remove power from spacecraft 
1920 Leave CIF 
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A. E. JOROLAN 

NASA/KSC 

FEBRUARY 15, 1967 

, 
,) 
) 
BLOCKHOUSE: Personal Statement of Observation made during the AS-204 Plugs Out (OAT) (Ref­
erencing Spacecraft Accident). 
1. During extended countdown hold at T-I0 -- (purportedly for spacecraft communication difficulties) 
the undersigned was at the assigned position in the Launch Vehicle Operation (LVO) Blockhouse meas­
uring station on the firing room floor. 
2. Because of the. hold, the undersigned was listening to the spacecraft communication channel (believed 
to be Black 3) to determine the hold status. 
3. The communications between the astronauts and the ground appeared to be intermittant. The com­
mand pilot and pilot transmissions were okay, but the senior pilot's transmissions were sporadic. 
4. A few jibes from the astronauts to the ground positions were made. 
5. During a lull in the voice transmissions, the undersigned heard one of the astronauts say in a slightly 
high tone "Hey, there's a fire in here". The undersigned identifies the voice with that of the pilot, 
Roger Chaffee. This was predicated on his previous transmissions. The pilot's voice was pitched higher 
than the other crew members. 
6. A few seconds later, the undersigned thinks that the same crew man yelled over the net "Hey, get 
us out of here" . 
7. All communications from the astronauts ceased, although repeated attempts to raise the spacecraft 
were made from the blockhouse. 
8. The undersigned immediately looked at all the strip charts and other measuring equipment. All read­
outs were nominal. A further determination was made to see if the transducers and/or sensors could 
possibly indicate any anomalies in the spacecraft stages. The answer was, no. During these observations, 
power was removed from the Launch Vehicle stages and the strip charts no longer indicated data. 
9. The undersigned then went to look at the nearest TV monitor. The monitor presented a dark picture 
with two distinct tongues of fire emanating from an undefined object. The fires appeared to be posit­
ioned at 11 and 7 o'clock on the screen. 
10. The undersigned remembers that someone was trying to increase or decrease the Environmental 
Control System (ECS) output into the spacecraft. At one time, the output was increased, but it appeared 
that the test ccnductor and the Service Structure white room personnel were not sure whether this 
was aiding or hindering the fire. Therefore, the ECS output was turned down. 
11. Since the Firing Room floor was getting somewhat crowded, I entered the LIEF or VIP room, 
sat down, listened over the net and watched the TV monitor for the remainder of the time. 
12. The few items of conversation remembered just after the initial fire was: 
(a) No visibility on the platform because of smoke. 
(b) Request made by the pad leader for lights, id. battle lanterns. 
(c) The hatch was finally opened (time frame unknown) but no access or visibility into the space­
craft was possible because of heat and smoke. 
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13. After continuous cooldown with the carbon 
was that nothing could be done for the astronauts. 
dioxide bottle, ingress was finally made. The report 
14. The next step was to try and save the spacecraft and associated sub-stages. This could not be done 
because the control signal lines for bringing spacecraft power down were probably damaged by the 
fire. Therefore, the spacecraft panel lights were still on despite ground indications that all power was 
off. 
15. Attempts to turn 
the circuit breakers. 
off power 'from the spacecraft failed because the astronaut(s) were in the way of 
16. It must be noted that as much as 15 minutes elapsed between the breakout of the spacecraft fire 
and the clearing of the Service Structure personnel. 
17. It was unusual that (to my knowledge) no LVO personnel stayed to look at the data. 
18. The use of the Black Phone was not prohibited until an hour or more after the accident. ~ 
19. Difficulty was encountered when various key personnel attempted to communicate over secure com­
munication nets. 
v 
( 
/s/ A. E. Jorolan 
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#62 
LEROY G. WEST 

NAA 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 

On 1/27/67, we were checking out SIC 012. Every operation was performed per OCP·K·OO21. To the 
best of my ability to recall, these are the only things that were abnormal: 
Some of the crew systems equipment was stored in plastic bags. Because the storage compartment was 
not in the SIC at that time, the equipment was left in, but the plastic bags were removed. There 
was also a bundle of electric wiring lying on the floor to the right of the Senior Pilot. One end was 
connected, but the outer end was not. Also, the Command Pilot said that he had a sour buttermilk 
smell in his suit. So, we called Bendix in to take a watermelon sample. 
During cabin purge, there was a real strong smell in the White Room coming from a tee fitting we 
had hooked on the return side of the SIC. We first purged for twenty minutes and were unable to 
get above 74% 02 on the Beckman analyzer. We then purged for another ten minutes. We also no· 
ticed that smell we had in the White Room was getting weaker. At this time, we took another sample 
after changing analyzers and were able to get 93% 02 So, we picked up an Interim Discrepancy Re· 
port (IDR) and went on with hatch closeout. The inner and outer hatch fit real good, but we were 
unable to lock the Boost Protective Cover (BPC). So, we took another IDR and just set the BPC in 
place and reported that it was not locked. At this time, I left the Pad. 
lsI LeRoy G. West 
NAA 
February 6, 1967 
Witness Statement on PANEL #12 
Att: Mr. C. J. McNamara 
On 1-27·67 after Crew Ingress I noticed that the Gas chromatograph was not in the spacecraft, and in 
its place was some flight crew systems equipment stored on the shelf. The items were stored in plastic 
bags. I questioned it and was told to remove the equipment from the bags and place them back on 
the shelf. While I was doing this I noticed an electric cable on the right hand side of the shelf on 
.. 	 Panel 12. It also had a bag over it so I picked the cable up removed the bag and placed the cable 
back on the shelf in the same place I picked it up. I passed the bags out of the spacecraft. 
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#10 
J. A. BURCH 

PAA FIRE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

I was on the first fire run vehicle to Complex 34 when we responded to the alarm. On entering the 
eighth adjustable on Complex 34, there was a lot of smoke and burning wires, no flame. The men 
were yelling the astronauts were still inside the module. I worked my way around to the hatch of the 
module. The smoke and heat were thick and there was one man trying to get the hatch cover off. 
I gave him a hand but we could not get it off. 
I had to go back outside with the other man to get a gas mask. Then returning he tried to tell me 
how to remove the hatch. We were having a hard time trying to breathe with the gas mask on. It 
got to be too much for the other man and he had to leave. I pulled on the hatch and turned it 
sideways and it came out. 
C 	 I could not see much inside - I asked for a light. With the light I looked all around inside - I couldn't 
tell anything. I started to pull some of the burned looking "stuff' in front of me. I must have pull­
ed part of the suit off one of them. There was a pair of legs in my hands. I felt to see if the skin 
was coming off. It was not so I grabbed both legs and tried to pull him out. I couldn't move him. 
I then took a good look at what I had uncovered and determined they were all dead. I then told 
the man outside on the headset that they were all dead and there wasn't anything we could do to 
help them. I advised him that we needed a smoke ejector. Everything was then under control. 
QUESTION: 
ANSWER: 
I 
1 
Sir, would you give your name, organization and give us a short discussion 
of your actions as you arrived at the top of the gantry on Pad 34. 
James A. Burch, Pan American Fire Department. From the time we received 
the call, I would estimate that we got the the gantry in around five or six 
minutes. 	We took the slow elevator up. The fast elevator was out. It took us 
approximately two minutes to reach the top of the gantry. Assistant Chief, 
McMillan, Bob Batts the Crew Chief, Rector - Fire Fighter, Dawes the Fire­
man and myself reached the top. As we reached the top, I went around to 
the side 	 of the capsule where the man on the headset was hollering that the 
men were still inside the capsule. I was not sure who was inside, and I asked 
him specifically who was inside the capsule. He said that the astronauts were 
still inside. There were about five or six technicians standing on the gangway; 
and as I looked into the hatch, there were two men coming out that had been 
working 	on the hatch. Me and one other fireman, I'm not sure who he was 
- it, I believe, was Rector, we proceeded in without a mask and tried to take 
the hatch cover off. It was loose but was still intact. As we picked it up and 
down, we couldn't move it. We jammed it back and forth quite a few times, 
but the smoke was thick and we did not know how to take it off. I would 
say we stayed in around thirty seconds before we had to leave to get a mask 
because 	 the smoke was too thick. Upon going out on the gangway, one of the 
men out 	there gave me a mask - gas mask - I put it on and entered the room 
again with one of the technicians. We then tried again to take the hatch cover 
completely off. He was trying to tell me that you had to drop it down and 
push it 	 in and turn it sideways to get it off. We worked quite a few minutes 
on trying to do that. It seemed like minutes .... I'm not sure how long it was. 
But, anyway, we could not get it; and we were choking up considerably on 
the smoke and fumes that were in there. We then went back outside, got a 
breath of air and then returning back, we tried again to get the hatch cover 
off. I know I choked up two or three more times, and the man that was with 
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me also choked up. It wasn't but just a few seconds that he choked up so bad 
that he turned around and left. Frantically, I was still working on the hatch 
cover. I was shaking it, turning it, doing everything in the world I could to 
get it off. Then, just all at once it seemed to fall back on me; and as I turn­
ed with the hatch in my hand halfway off - someone was there to grab hold 
of one of the handles; and we set it back away from the hatch. Then, I took 
a flashlight, I laid over inside the capsule trying to see the bodies or anything 
that I could see. The inside was burnt considerably, there were wires hanging 
down. I shined the light completely around inside the capsule, and I couldn't 
see anything except burnt wires hanging down. I then backed out, told the 
man on the headset, I said, "There's no one in there." He said, "There has 
to be someone in there. They are still in there. Get them out." Ire-entered, 
looked around again; and I still didn't see anyone but there under me was a 
boot. I grabbed the boot, pulled it, it came off. There wasn't anything there 
except just a black mask. Then, I just grabbed an armload of I don't know 
what; but it seemed like it was coming loose. The first thing I knew I had a 
pair of legs in my hand. The hair was still intact on the legs. They were not , 
burnt bad. In fact, they were not burnt at all it looked to me like. I checked 
to see if the skin was going to slip, it wasn't so I reached my arm through 
both legs, under both legs, and pulled up just as hard as I could pull. The 
body moved probably six inches or less, but I knew I couldn't move him out. 
I then backed off to see just exactly what I did have. I could see that the, 
just the knees were sticking up on the only person that I could recognize. As 
far as the rest of it, it was just a black mass and I couldn't tell which way 
the bodies were laying or anything. I then backed out. I told the man on the 
headset, "They are all dead, the fire is extinguished. The only thing we need 
now is to get the smoke cleared out, and then we can tell more about it. As 
I leaned in with the light, I crawled into the hatch and went as far as my 
knees, I looked around with the flashlight all the way to the back of the cap­
sule; and I could not see anyone. At the time, the knees of the top man must 
have been under my stomach because I drew myself back and just grabbed a 
hand full of which just had to be a burnt suit and came up with a pair of 
knees. They had to be right at the hatch. As I leaned in, I must have been 
lying right on top of the knees. I could not see anyone in the back, but I 
could see full vision all the way to the back of the capsule. 
This ends the statement of Mr. Burch. 
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J.e.MOONEY 

PAA 

JANUARY 27, 1967 

At approximately 6:27 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, the Egress Team was preparing for the egress 
drill on Complex 34. 
Upon receipt of the alarm via the radio from Pad Safety Office, Complex 34, I started to respond 
to the Complex in No. 250 vehicle. Before I reached the Dispensary, the Superintendent, Range Op­
erations called on the radio and requested the Egress Team. I radioed the Station and requested all 
3 units prepare to rolL I turned around and proceeded to the Station and parked No. 250 and enter­
ed No. 3 M113 which was ready to roll at that time. Time elapsed was about 2 minutes. We then 
proceeded to the Complex led by Egress member J. Blankenship in P-6 truck No. 16. 
I caHed the S.R.O. on Fire Crash Net and advised him our 3 units were responding. Upon arrival 
at the south gate of the Complex, we again notified the S.R.O. of our location. We proceeded to the 
base of the umbilical tower and parked in our designated area. Egress members Blankenship, Crowl, 
and myself proceeded up the elevator to the 8th adjustable level. Upon arrival at the spacecraft, I 
met J. Blankenship coming back stating that we needed Scott Air Paks. They were ordered from be­
low. I then met the Assistant Test Conductor from North American Aviation and asked him what 
condition existed. He stated the spacecraft was burning and he thought that we had 3 dead people 
in there. Upon approaching the spacecraft hatch we found it almost impossible to remain without 
breathing equipment, which had not arrived yet. 
The hatches were removed and all 3 bodies could be observed through the hatch. They all appeared 
badly burned and no movement was visible. I then contacted the Test Conductor again and asked 
about the status of the spacecraft and the Launch Escape System. He informed me that they could 
not shut off spacecraft power since it was on internal power and that the Launch Escape System was 
armed. I instructed all my personnel to not to try to enter the spacecraft until our Pad Safety Officer 
aI1:d Spacecraft Test Conductor had assured us that all power was off and the Launch Escape System 
was disarmed. 
We attempted to remove smoke and fumes from Environmental Chamber by disconnecting the AIC 
duct and using it to push the smoke out. Blankenship was notified to call Crash and have Chief Hipp 
notified. 
We were told by Spacecraft Test Conductor and Astronaut Doctor to begin removal of astronauts, 
but found that power was still on and we moved back until Chief Hipp arrived. We then checked 
with Pad Safety Officer, Test Conductor, etc., and determined that we would wait until given per­
mission to enter the spacecraft. It was given by the Doctor. Then Chief Hipp and we proceeded to 
remove Ed White from the spacecraft. He was wedged in under Gus Grissom and with his back to 
the east wall of the spacecraft lying on his left side. We removed White with a good deal of difficulty 
and took him to the ambulance waiting at the base of the base of the structure. We then went back 
to the spacecraft and removed Gus Grissom and placed him in an ambulance, returned to the space­
craft and removed Chaffee. Notified Pad Safety and Security that we had completed our assignment 
and were returning to Headquarters at 2:30 a.m., EST. 
All persons involved performed their duties flawlessly and without any questions at any time. Many 
suggestions were made and tried; some with a great deal of success. 
All members are to be congratulated for their tireless efforts. We were only deeply sorry that we could 
not do more for all involved. 
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